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»The large question is not whether abandonment can be 
avoided, gentrification controlled, displacement eliminated, 
or even how these things can be done, but rather whether 
there is the desire to do them. That is a question that can only 
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Providing shelter for a global population that is urbanizing quickly presents a critical human de-
velopment challenge. By 2030, it is estimated that almost five billion of us will be living in cities, 
constituting around 60% of the world’s population. Rapid urbanization is linked to numerous 
socio-environmental concerns such as concentrated use of energy and air pollution with significant 
impacts on human health, infrastructure, and economic prospects (UN, 2018). Facing these challen-
ges has resulted in a myriad of solutions being proposed, and the list of possible urban forms within 
which dwellers can be housed sustainably is long and growing. 
High up on this list is the “compact city”, which has been introduced as a promising way to meet 
the challenges of a growing urban population for considerable time (Newman & Kenworthy, 1999). 
The “compact city” (in the US also termed “new urbanism” or “smart growth”, “Stadt der kurzen 
Wege” in Germany) is a concept that evolved in the UK during the 1960s as parts of wider efforts 
to combat resource depletion (for discussion see e.g. Kahn, 2000; Holden, 2004). The authors of 
these studies argue that compactness of the built environment – generally defined as an increase in 
density of units in a given area (Boyko & Cooper, 2011:47) – would slow down urban sprawl in 
order to limit settlement expansion and to ensure sustainable urban growth. 
1.1  Rise of the compact city model in international policy making
As a consequence, many advantages of the compact city model have been highlighted in the past 
few decades. They include, for instance, the conservation of the countryside (Elkin et al., 1991); the 
protection of environmentally vulnerable landscapes (Dieleman & Wegener, 2004); less need to tra-
vel by car, thus reduced fuel, energy and air emissions (Ewing, 1997); the support for public trans-
port, walking and cycling modes of mobility (Squires, 2002); better access to services and facilities, 
along with more efficient utility and infrastructure provision (Frey, 1999); as well as increased 
potential for revitalization and regeneration of inner urban areas (Kahn, 2000). The compact city 
has become a physical response to many urban challenges, such as land consumption, energy and 
resource waste, accessibility, air pollution, and social segregation. It has practically evolved as a sy-
nonym for “the sustainable city” (Neuman, 2005:17) – which is generally associated with ensuring 
the long-term interaction of economic changes with ecological, and social transformations (Barbier, 
1987:103). If one of the three dimensions – economic, environmental, or social – is not adequately 
secured, the development is not considered sustainable. 
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Indeed, many international organizations, politicians, and urban practitioners have agreed with 
the benefits proposed and started to introduce “densification” as a legally binding policy objective 
(e.g. UN Declaration on Environment and Development 19921, Principles 4 and 15). Densification 
(also termed “intensification” or “consolidation”) is the process through which the compact city 
model is attained physically. A useful definition of the term can be found in Broitman and Koomen 
(2015:32) where they define densification as “a process leading to an increase in the number of 
households within existing municipal boundaries.“ The process creates an increase in exploitation 
or use density – defined as the number of persons per square meter (Boyko & Cooper, 2011:47) – 
in order to reduce individuals’ overuse of natural resources, such as land, water, or energy (Holman 
et al., 2015). Densification is thus widely assumed to play a decisive role in the sustainable trans-
formation of settlements. 
1.2	 	Densification	evokes	challenges	for	social	sustainability	in	housing
However, by the mid 1990s, the “compact city” had increasingly become challenged on three 
planes: first, it is not sure whether it can deliver its supposed benefits towards sustainable de-
velopment (Gordon & Richardson, 1997); second, it is not sure how it can be implemented in the 
urban environment (Jenks et al., 1996); and third, it is not sure whether it is welcomed by the local 
population that will be affected by such changes (Cernea, 1993; Breheny, 1997). These studies clai-
med that the process – next to its potential environmental benefits – would threaten quality of life, 
particularly in regard to social aspects and the conditions of the poor (for discussion, e.g. Danesh-
pour & Shakibamanesh, 2011). The critique of the compact city concept focused on claims arguing 
that the relationship between urban density and sustainability that was postulated is too simplistic, 
and that densification has undesirable social consequences. Those consequences include residential 
displacement and social exclusion, which are caused by gentrification and a general shortage of 
affordable housing in metropolitan areas, as well as being a direct consequence of (re)development 
and upgrading. 
The main argument against the compact city was and still is that densification leads to residents’ 
social exclusion because there is an increase of housing prices and rents when real estate stocks are 
rebuilt and modernized. Although densification enables more apartments on the same parcel to be 
constructed, newly built housing is often only accessible to certain – mostly high-income – groups 
of the population (Hackworth & Smith, 2001; Davidson & Lees, 2005). Social exclusion is a pro-
cess through which the composition of inhabitants changes, particularly due to the inflow of higher 
income groups and the (in)direct displacement of lower income groups, which in turn cause gentri-
fication, social segregation, and social polarization (Lees, 2008:2463). The result is that lower-in-
come residents living in these neighborhoods are forced to leave the center for cheaper suburban 
areas as they can no longer afford a dwelling in recently densified areas (Marcuse, 1985:207). Ten-
ants deprived of housing in the center, and who are pushed to the margins of cities, struggle to find 
1   In June 1992, at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro more than 178 countries adopted Agenda 21, a 
comprehensive plan of action to build a global partnership for sustainable development.
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alternative housing in the city center. This is because they can no longer afford the rents after den-
sification occurs. They are thus forced to move to the agglomeration areas, where rents are lower. 
Hence, the solution to one problem (natural resource consumption) causes another problem (social 
exclusion) instead. 
Densification has thus been accused of posing a threat to the very existence of social sustainabili-
ty in housing, which focuses on various dimensions, such as social mixing, inclusion, residential 
stability, or neighborhood cohesion. It can subsequently lead to unfair distribution of power and 
resources, freedom, access to decision-making, and general capacity-building (for discussion see 
e.g. Williams et al., 2000; Whitehead, 2003). Social sustainability in housing is generally defined as 
given if housing development “is compatible with harmonious evolution of civil society, fostering 
an environment conductive to the compatible cohabitation of culturally and socially diverse groups 
while at the same time encouraging social integration, with improvements in the quality of life for 
all segments of the population” (Polese & Stren, 2000:15-16) (for a detailed definition of the con-
cept, chapter 3.2). 
To be more precise, while some approaches have pointed out the gentrification and displacement 
effect of densification on local residents and activities (Lees, 2000; Chiu, 2003), or the risk of we-
aker social ties in higher density environments (Freeman, 2001), others have examined the exacer-
bation of social exclusion of particular groups within local communities (Gosling, 2008) as well 
as the accumulation of residents’ low skill jobs as results of displacement (Law, 2002). In addition, 
Williams, Burton and Jenks (2000) conducted research on the social sustainability of housing areas 
where development has been densified. Their often-quoted study concluded with claims that densi-
fication would result in a reduction of private space, smaller houses and gardens, or no gardens at 
all. Moreover, more intensive traffic causes potential negative environmental impacts, such as air 
pollution, noise, and a generally poor environment for cyclists and pedestrians, as well as increase 
in potential “bad neighbor” effects, such as noise, disturbance, or litter. 
The authors concluded that if the social preconditions to support densification are not given, then 
sustainable development as a whole will inevitably fail because of people’s resistance to rising 
housing prices, exclusion, segregation, and polarization. A vicious circle is created “in which the 
poor are continuously under pressure of displacement and the wealthy continuously seek to wall 
themselves within gentrified neighborhoods” (Marcuse, 1985:196). This process may finally cause 
low-income groups to lack power and control over the most basic components of life – which are 
the places they call home (Salter, 2009:307). Such a scenario is considered highly unsustainable 
(Jenks et al., 1996:84).
1.3	 	Implementing	densification	objectives	is	a	process	shaped	by	power	games:	
 problem statement
In summary, an intense debate has been ongoing for more than forty years over the supposed 
environmental advantages of the compact city. That debate is also about the potential drawbacks 
6
of the compact city for different categories of stakeholders, particularly those of lower income. 
Whereas until the 1990s, development on greenfield outside city boundaries was largely promoted 
by policy makers and urban practitioners (for discussion, Filion, 2015), the land use conditions have 
changed under the compact city model. Land use interests cannot continue to be generously reali-
zed because unbuilt land is no longer available unlimitedly. Instead, implementing the compact city 
implies that the objectives and visions of different individuals and groups clash at the very same 
locations. 
The policy shift towards densification has made conflicting use interests more pronounced becau-
se stakeholders now must deal with each other in a context of scarce urban land. This implies that 
they must negotiate for their interests within the already built environment and within existing city 
boundaries. Implementing densification policy objectives becomes a complicated process because 
the objectives are embedded in a tight web of already existing, diverse, and contradictory rights, 
claims, and duties. What benefits one stakeholder, potentially hurts another. A landlord’s profits 
through (re)development or upgrading might come at a tenant’s expense. High-rise construction 
might cast shadows on neighboring land. And accessibility for one is pollution or loss of security for 
others. Apart from potential ecological benefits, consolidation produces both advantages (e.g. increa-
sed housing options, business opportunities) and disadvantages (e.g. rising noise or rents through 
costly upgrading of settlements, loss of green surfaces, or view) for different individuals, firms, and 
households. 
However, densification objectives never get implemented on a one to one basis. Rather power games 
influence the way their implementation is or can be realized. Power is broadly understood as the 
“ability to get what one wants from others. It may come from greater wealth or social position or the 
ability to manipulate the ideology of others” (Ensminger, 1992:7). Powerful actors are those who 
know how to influence the densification goals of the other actors in a targeted manner to promote or 
to protect their own values, needs, and objectives. 
As I will demonstrate in this thesis, densification causes social exclusion because of such power 
games among actors. Veto-rights controlled by powerful stakeholders, as well as the negotiation of 
intertwined private and public interests, influence the way densification is being performed. To un-
derstand how social displacement works, therefore, a close analysis of these power games is needed. 
Hence, the focus of this thesis is on analyzing how the process of implementing densification objec-
tives is shaped by power games. Densification is regarded and conceptualized as a highly socio-poli-
tical challenge because its implementation results in losses for some and in wins for others. 
1.4	 	Densification	as	a	governance	challenge:	identifying	a	research	gap	
Political ecology is a research field which concerns environmental degradation and the reasons why 
land-use conflicts arise in the first place (e.g. Lasswell, 1936; Ribot & Peluso, 2003; Robbins, 2004; 
Swyngedouw, 2009). Political ecology is about identifying the socio-political structures that contri-
bute to social, ecological, and economic change. Identification occurs by highlighting questions of 
power, responsibility, decision-making, capacity-building, and sustainability (e.g. Krueger & Agye-
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man, 2005; Evans et al., 2006; Evans & Jones, 2008; Haller et al., 2016). These authors provide an 
alternative view on mainstream environmental degradation discourse that often puts the blame on 
local communities or on the least well off from society in general. Moreover, these authors question 
the activity of resource exploitative that powerful economic actors engage in, and they make “expli-
cit considerations of relations of power” (Robbins, 2004:12; for details see chapter 2.4). Although 
political ecology approaches have so far mainly focused on environmental or land use change in the 
Global South, challenges in first world political ecology (such as the policy shift towards densificati-
on) demonstrate that political ecology perspectives also concern the Global North (McCarthy, 2002). 
This thesis continues the type of research mentioned above by appraising densification as a socio-
political field. But while much research in the past decades has been done on the technological, ar-
chitectural, or urban design obstacles of densification (e.g. Kyttä et al., 2013; Broitman & Koomen, 
2015; Bibby et al., 2018), few studies have focused on its process and socio-political challenges of 
implementation (Nabielek, 2011). Therefore, in my thesis, densification is analyzed for its socio-po-
litical consequences on different categories of stakeholders and their responses. 
By socio-political it is meant that legal configurations (laws and policies) are analyzed as well as 
actors‘ decision-making behavior. In essence, densification is conceptualized as a governance chal-
lenge in this thesis – which is generally defined as the study of “the interactions among structures, 
processes and traditions that determine how power and responsibilities are exercised, how decisions 
are taken, and how citizens or other stakeholders have their say” (Graham et al., 2003:2). Governan-
ce analysis is about spheres of conflict and dispute entered into by citizens, civil organizations, and 
by public authorities that influence and determine the decision-making behavior of different stake-
holders involved (Evans et al., 2006:850). 
More specifically, the theoretical framework employed in this thesis involves a new institutiona-
list political ecology framework that enables researchers to analyze governance mechanisms in a 
systematic manner (section 2). This thesis is a new attempt to build a bridge between planning, 
neoinstitutionalism, and power. The added-value of this conceptualization is shown by explaining 
how contested urban redevelopments take place under densification. To reveal potential loopholes or 
challenges to densification implementation, local governance mechanisms are understood and analy-
zed as theoretical (as described in the law) and as actual mechanisms of action (section 3). 
By combining approaches from public policy analysis (planning as a public policy), new institutio-
nal economics (property rights), and political ecology (power), this framework makes it possible to 
recognize why many different stakeholders can come into conflict with each other. It also allows for 
a systematic analysis to examine how various actors behave in response to a specific socio-political 
setting and proves to be particularly suitable for the analysis of joint use situations in which several 
different users find themselves as rivals (such as in dense urban environments). Moreover, it enables 
me to systematically capture power games among actors in order to explain the function and evoluti-
on of structures that drive conflict and socio-environmental disputes in the first place. 
In regard to the compact city, for instance, this new institutionalist political ecology framework 
acknowledges that different actors involved (e.g. owners, public authorities, NGOs, residents) try 
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to shape the implementation of densification. They simultaneously aim to defend their own in-
terests and objectives, e.g. to preserve affordable living space, to save or consume energy, or to 
invest capital. The shift towards the compact city increases the potential for use conflicts among 
these actors as it implies that they deal with the already built environment within firmly established 
city boundaries. Each one follows different strategies to defend their interests and to achieve their 
goals for resource use in dense city areas. By answering the question how and why various actors 
involved in densification procedures question, disrupt, modify, and use the socio-political setting to 
appropriate resources, and thus potentially cause them to change, this research project brings new 
insights to neoinstitutionalist political ecology research. 
The analysis focuses on the housing stock as a resource (sections 3.1 to 3.2). It is appraised as such 
because it produces different goods and services for its users such as housing for shelter, target for 
capital investment, or energy supply. Thus, this resource not only represents a key component of 
the urban built environment. It also provides the basic human good for shelter and essentially con-
tributes to access to jobs, services, or social networks. Through housing, individuals express their 
identity or sense of community, and offer distinct insights into their personal modes of life (Jonk-
man, 2019). However, as mentioned in chapter 1.2, housing faces the challenge of being greatly 
affected by and involved in the socio-economic effects of densification in many cities worldwide 
(e.g. Davidson & Lees, 2005; Rérat, 2012). Land-use conflicts in densifying city areas may put 
additional pressure on rents caused by (re)development and upgrading (Lai et al., 2018). Housing 
thus requires more detailed analysis.
1.5	 	Who	gets	what,	when,	how?	–	Research	objectives	and	questions	
This thesis identifies the socio-political challenges of implementing densification objectives, rather 
than considering the process as a technological, architectural, or design-based problem. The point 
of departure is that consolidation per se does not necessarily lead to sustainable outcomes in terms 
of social inclusion or community stability. Rather, how it is planned, implemented, and governed by 
the actors involved is what matters. Stated another way, the overarching objective of my thesis is to 
politicize densification. This is done by identifying the actors involved, their objectives, their stra-
tegies, as well as the socio-political structures that govern densification that try to prevent rivalries 
among competing groups and unsustainable social outcomes in housing, such as discrimination or 
displacement. 
More precisely, the goal is to examine, both theoretically and empirically, the different mechanisms 
that govern the implementation of densification objectives and its impact on housing uses, actor’s 
strategies, as well as the impact densification has on social sustainability in housing. Moreover, this 
project aims to contribute to neoinstitutionalist political ecology research by analyzing how public 
and private actors govern densification with regard to housing, and by focusing clearly on the social 
dimension of housing development. Understanding the conditions for success or failure for social-
ly (un)sustainable implementations of densification objectives is an important step to overcoming 
barriers and to supporting policy makers and planning practitioners who promote more socially 
inclusive outcomes. 
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One overarching and three analytical research questions underlie this thesis. They are explained in 
more detail below. 
RQ:		 What	governance	mechanisms	lead	to	socially	sustainable	housing	development	in	a		
	 	 dense	city?
Together, answers to sub-questions (SQ) 1 to 3 provide input to answer the main research question 
(RQ). The main question is answered by using a theoretical approach that combines theories of 
public policy analysis (planning as a public policy), new institutional economics (property rights), 
and political ecology (power) (sections 2 and 3). To answer the main research question, the theo-
retical point of departure is to start with the concept of social sustainability in general (section 
3.2.1), before relating social sustainability literature to the field of housing (section 3.2.2), and then 
considering how different governance mechanisms (relations between institutional rules and actors’ 
strategies) shape socially sustainable housing outcomes (sections 3.2.3 to 3.5). More specifically,
housing and social sustainability are discussed on two levels: first, the social sustainability of 
housing is conceptualized because the focus of the analysis relies on housing as a resource. Second, 
what is discussed are the social sustainability implications of formal rules and policies (particularly 
of land-use planning and property rights), and actors’ positions with respect to housing. 
Empirically, the main research question is answered by adopting a qualitative research design that 
is able to capture the origins of socio-political structures, human behavior, and decision-making 
(section 4). Empirical research is done in Switzerland, a country that has been strongly challen-
ged by rising housing use conflicts as results of densification in recent years, particularly in cities. 
While for the past twenty years much quantitative research in Switzerland has been employed to 
measure the impacts of urban sprawl (e.g. Schwick et al., 2012; Grams & Nebel, 2013), specifi-
cally on the quantitative effects of certain policy measures such as urban growth boundaries (e.g. 
Gennaio et al., 2009; Weilenmann et al., 2017; Klaus, 2019), this thesis contributes to the work of 
fellow scholars who endeavored to analyze densification as a governance-oriented challenge from 
a qualitative research perspective (Rérat, 2012a; Hersperger et al., 2014; Devecchi, 2016; Rudolf et 
al., 2018; Hengstermann, 2019). 
In particular, this thesis contributes to existing neoinstitutionalist research employed in Switzer-
land that focused on housing as a study objective (Nicol & Knoepfel, 2008; Nicol, 2013; Balmer & 
Gerber, 2017). But this thesis more closely connects housing challenges to densification and land 
policy debates (e.g. Davy, 2012; Kolocek, 2017), as well as to social sustainability concerns (e.g. 
Burton, 2000; Chiu, 2004; Bramley et al., 2009). Considering future challenges of land scarcity 
that currently evolve in many cities globally, the findings of this research may help governments, 
practitioners, and planning professionals to cope with rising rental prices, exclusion, displacement, 
and social challenges in cities. 
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SQ1:  How do institutional rules affect the outcomes of densification in terms of social sustainabili- 
  ty in housing?
The first sub-question (SQ1) addresses the influence of the institutional setting and policy change 
(towards densification) in allocative rules on the housing opportunities that households have. It 
looks into how densification policy objectives impact the social dimension of housing and how this 
development can be assessed through the analytical lens of sustainability. This question is first theo-
retically studied in sections 3.1 to 3.2, in which an evaluative framework for the valuation of social 
sustainability as produced by housing is introduced. Moreover, the different institutional dimen- 
sions that shape housing in dense urban environments are analyzed in section 3.3. 
Sub-question 1 is then empirically studied in Article 1, which disentangles how and why institutio-
nal dominance of private property rights contributes to socially (un)sustainable housing outcomes. 
The article starts with an analysis of the Swiss federal level legislation. Moreover, it analyzes how 
the distribution of legal power between public policy and property rights in the Swiss federal regu-
latory framework affects the way actors use housing goods and services (e.g. living space, energy).
In Articles 2 and 4, the content and characteristics of an institutional regime necessary to establish 
the conditions for social sustainability in housing are then further elaborated. In addition, Article 2 
introduces an emic social sustainability approach that is most sensitive to community, local needs, 
and values. Article 2 does that so we can gain a detailed understanding of how residents understand 
and perceive impacts of consolidation on their urban livability. The added value of such a residents-
oriented perspective is presented in section 3.2.3, particularly regarding the justification of why 
local inhabitants are considered to be legitimate claimants to housing space from a social sustaina-
bility view. Thus, after assessing the context of national-level policy change, Articles 2 and 4 zoom 
in to the institutional configurations at the municipal level. 
SQ2:  What strategies do actors (owners and non-owners) follow to contribute to socially sustain- 
  able housing in a dense city?
For sub-question 2 (SQ2), it is clear that motivating actors to use housing stocks in dense city areas 
in a socially sustainable way is a complex challenge with no single solution. Processes of action 
that shape housing in a context of densification are theoretically assessed in section 3.4. Empiri-
cally, the strategies in housing that actors use to densify existing stocks are studied in Articles 1 to 
4. The extent to which the applied strategies provide a starting point for socially inclusive housing 
outcomes are explored – both at the federal and local level. Moreover, Article 3 provides a central 
theoretical contribution to this field of research in the sense that – by conducting comparative case 
study research – the article shows how municipal authorities can effectively steer socially sustain-
able housing transformation by applying a more active strategy of land policy. Along with the city-
regions of Zurich and Basel, the smaller city-regions of Kloten and Köniz function as embedded 
case studies here. 
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SQ3: How does the implementation of densification objectives impact social sustainability in   
  housing?
The third sub-question (SQ3) brings the two previous sub-questions together. By analyzing the in-
stitutional rules that influence densification in terms of social sustainability in housing (sub-ques-
tion 1), and the involved actors‘ strategies using housing under scarce urban land use conditions 
(sub-question 2), a final conclusion is drawn as to whether and how densification objectives are ne-
gotiated, and how this impacts social sustainability in housing (sub-question 3). This question helps 
me to elaborate the impacts that densification has on different categories of stakeholders. It also 
reveals power games among actors because institutions that impact the process of densification are 
also studied along with actors‘ decision-making behavior. 
The third sub-question is empirically studied in Articles 1 to 4. Conclusions drawn in all four articles 
reflect on the impacts that densification has on households from a perspective of social sustainabili-
ty. Figure 1 provides a schematic overview of the different elements and sections of this thesis.
Figure 1: Schematic overview of the different elements and sections of this thesis.
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sustainable housing development in a dense city? 
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In the following sections, the theoretical background and analytical framework that I used in this 
thesis are introduced (sections 2 and 3). In section 2, the value added by the neoinstitutionalist po-
litical ecology approach is explained for the study of social challenges in housing and in a context 
of densification. In section 3, the theoretical concepts of the analytical framework are explained in 
more detail. Particularly, the three main theoretical concepts this thesis is built on are introduced – 
housing as a resource, institutions, and actors’ strategies – that help to answer the research ques-
tions. As demonstrated in the sections to come, these three blocks cannot be separated from each 
other as it is exactly the relationship that binds them – the local governance mechanisms – which 
provides valuable insights into how actors involved in densification procedures govern housing 
socially sustainably (sections 3.1 to 3.5). The introductory part ends with the study design and the 
geographical context of the empirical analysis (section 4), and by describing the structure of the 
four articles constituting this doctoral thesis (section 5).
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2.	 	Politicizing	densification:	analyzing	the	process	from	a	
neoinstitutionalist political ecology perspective
 
2.1	 	Historical	background	of	institutional	thought:	from	classic	to	new	institutionalism
To understand what socio-political structures challenge the implementation of densification ob-
jectives, this thesis largely builds on theories and concepts of new institutionalism. Historically, 
institutional thought has a rich and diversified history in the social sciences (for discussion, e.g. 
Mandelbaum, 1985; March & Olsen, 1989; Immergut, 1998; Dembski & Salet, 2010). In gene-
ral, an institutional analysis approach makes it possible to explain human behavior as results of 
joint values, norms, routines, and procedures stipulated in formal rules, codes, and ordinances that 
guide social behavior and action. Institutions are defined as “the conventions, norms and formally 
sanctioned rules of a society. They provide expectations, stability and meaning essential to human 
existence and coordination. Institutions regularize life, support values and protect and produce inte-
rests” (Vatn, 2005:24)2. They range from the rules of a constitutional order, the standard operating 
procedures of a bureaucracy or firm relations. Classic institutionalists regard the institutional orga-
nization as the principal factor structuring collective behavior in society and in generating distinc-
tive outcomes (Hall & Taylor, 1996:937). Following this approach facilitates an understanding of 
how densification as a process is embedded into diverse institutional structures (laws and policies) 
that influence actors’ decision-making behavior. 
By the end of the 1980s, scholars of several sub-disciplines of political science studies, economics, 
and sociology rediscovered, quite independently from each other, the potential of this approach and 
began talking of a “new institutionalism” (for discussion, e.g. Koelble, 1995). In contrast to classic 
institutionalism (see previous paragraph), which often led to unravelling the functioning of institu-
tions in a descriptive and legalistic language (Thelen, 2003), new institutionalism or neoinstitutio-
nalism as a theoretical concept developed from the behavioral, cultural, and spatial turn during the 
1960s and 1970s. The main purpose of this turn was to elaborate upon the role of institutions in the 
determination of social and political outcomes in more detail (Hall & Taylor, 1996:936).
In particular, neoinstitutionalists have started to acknowledge that it is exceptionally relevant to 




categories of institutional rules have become considered necessary to understanding the outcomes 
of social behavior and practice. Simultaneously, institutions themselves have come to be under-
stood as a product of social construction rather than given per se (e.g. Williamson, 2000). In con-
trast to classic institutionalism, new institutionalism goes one step further in the sense that it raises 
new questions: for instance, why institutions have emerged the way they did. It also focuses more 
closely on microanalytic perspectives and criticizes the image of social causation as ‘path depen-
dent’, while respecting that the effects of institutions are mediated by contextual features of a given 
socio-political situation and are often inherited from the past (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Hall & 
Taylor, 1996; Healey, 1996, 1999). New institutionalists have also started to emphasize in a more 
detailed manner that, besides the importance of public policies, property rights (e.g. Demsetz, 1967; 
Jacobs & Paulsen, 2009), rent-seeking, and transaction costs (costs other than those involved in the 
physical production of buildings) (Coase, 1960) play a crucial role in the operation and develop-
ment of institutions. In section 3.3, particular emphasis is put on the different forms of institutional 
rules influencing socially sustainable housing development in a context of densification.  
2.2	 	Towards	political	and	actor-centered	neoinstitutionalism:	from	Hardin	to	Ostrom
In this thesis, densification procedures in the urban housing sector are analyzed by applying theo- 
retical concepts deriving from political and actor-centered neoinstitutionalism (e.g. Mayntz & 
Scharpf, 1995; Scharpf, 1997, 2000). This approach has received its popularity with the Nobel-Me-
morial-Prize-winning3 political scientist Elinor Ostrom in 2009. Ostrom won the award in eco-
nomics because she disapproved of Garret Hardin’s concept of “The Tragedy of the Commons” 
(1968). In his metaphor, Hardin argued that a common good such as land for cattle could not be 
used in a sustainable way, as finally, this would lead to overuse and unproductivity of the land. He 
saw this observation as an irrefutable argument for the superior efficiency of private property rights 
in the management of land and other common pool resources (CPRs) such as air or water as well as 
an undeniable justification for privatization.4   
Elinor Ostrom, however, countered some of Hardin’s presumptions in her book Governing the 
Commons (1990) and showed that it is, in fact, private property in cattle and individual utility maxi-










 lation or privatization. In her perspective, it is more about how and whether bottom-up and self-gover- 
 nance can lead to sustainable management of commons.
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the resource. To prove her assumption, she analyzed the sociological, historical, and anthropological 
structures that guide the use of natural resources and showed that, if the herders talked to each other, 
or shared cultural customs and procedures, they might be able to solve any commons challenge. She 
showed that individuals are capable of developing sensible collective ways to manage common pro-
perty resources for individual and collective benefit. Her main concern was then to investigate how 
and why in some cases stakeholders succeed in doing so and under what conditions they do not. 
With the findings of her research, she questioned the long-lasting economic orthodoxy, which only 
recognized policy in terms of a dichotomous choice between state and market, but not as a stand-alo-
ne and integral part of the socio-economic system that determines the use of sustainable resources 
(Harvey, 2012:191-207). Her results have led to the recognition and integration of more cultural 
approaches of sociology, anthropology, and philosophy in political economy (e.g. Berger & Luck-
mann, 1966; Weber, 1968; Bourdieu, 1977, 1998). Scholars of this research field have started to (re)
consider social norms and their guidance function over action, in addition to purely formal rules and 
procedures.   
Indeed, Elinor Ostrom was one of the first to describe, analyze, and explain environmental problems 
and the unsustainability of natural resources use as results of institutional patterns and the involved 
actors’ individual behavior. She fundamentally questioned the dichotomy between the state and the 
private sphere and discussed the potential of other forms of use rights to regulate resources (e.g. 
public or collective). William Blomquist (2012:370) concluded that Ostrom was a pioneer in raising 
unique questions such as “how people create property rights and for what purposes, why and how 
they choose the types of property rights institutions they do, and how and why they change property 
rights over time. […] She was explicitly and primarily concerned with (1) ‘who gets what, when, 
how‘ to quote Lasswell’s (1936) famous characterization of politics; and (2) the even more intensely 
political questions of who decides who gets what, when, and how, and how that question is decided.” 
Ostrom accepted the fact that political use conflicts among rival groups lie at the heart of resource 
scarcity and raised awareness that environmental concerns are ultimately political problems (Book-
chin, 1993). 
Her work inspired many different scholars from other fields (e.g. anthropology, ecology, sociology), 
and particularly led to new debates and criticism in neoclassical economy. Connected to the writing 
of Elinor Ostrom, the award-winning economist Douglass C. North (1990, 1994), for instance, argued 
that neoclassical theory (e.g. Schumacher, 1973; Becker, 1976) failed as it does not consider political 
structures as a fundamental element explaining economic and environmental change. Neoclassical 
economics held the environment separate from humans and their economic activities. Therefore, the 
origins of resources depletion cannot be explained in depth because markets are not recognized as 
results of socio-political structures and human action.
By the end of the 1970s, the research field - of which Ostrom and North became the most prominent 
representatives - was summarized under the new approach and term “New Institutional Economics”. 
This new approach “entails trade-offs between environment and development and the integration of 
the economy and the environment. Under the balance rubric, environmental justice, economic equity, 
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and other manifestations of redistributive justice draw their basis” (Neuman, 2005:19). The central 
message of new institutional economics is that institutions matter for economic performance. Becau-
se resource scarcity is mediated through institutions, it is acknowledged to be politically and socially 
constructed (Shahab et al., 2019:541). As a refinement of the neoclassical model, new institutional 
economics regard the way by which property rights are allocated and enforced as determined by 
transaction-costs because any kind of economic exchange results in external effects that need to be 
internalized by incentives. Changes from common to exclusive private property rights therefore leave 
room for unexploited gains of exchanges or benefits. While neoclassical economics consider this 
change in property agreements as triggered by self-interest and as results of spontaneous order, new 
institutional economists emphasize that they are imposed on society by civil authority, the state, and 
in the interests of individuals. 
Later on, Elinor Ostrom incorporated her findings into the “Institutional Analysis and Development” 
(IAD) framework, which was used to systematically analyze policy processes and outcomes in the 
study of common goods such as fishery stocks or woodlands (Ostrom, 2005, 2007). According to 
Ostrom, the IAD helps to understand how governance systems enable individuals to solve specific 
problems democratically and how to organize diagnostic and prescriptive capabilities. Without the 
use of a framework, the systematic and comparative institutional assessment would not be based on 
analysis of performance, but instead on normative ideas about what kinds of institutions are “good” 
or “bad” (Ostrom, 2011:7). Even though in this thesis the IAD is not applied, I agree that an analy-
sis framework is needed to analyze densification processes systematically. In the following chapter, 
therefore, the Institutional Resource Regime (IRR) analytical framework is introduced, which allows 
me to address the research questions in an appropriate manner.
2.3	 	The	Institutional	Resource	Regime	analytical	framework:	an	introduction
Based on the major conceptual shift that took place with the evolved approaches of new institutional 
economics (Ostrom, 1990; North, 1990, 1994), the Institutional Resource Regime (IRR) analytical 
framework has emerged. This particular neoinstitutional analysis approach combines new institutio-
nal economics and property rights theory with policy analysis (for discussion, Knoepfel et al., 2001, 
2003; Aubin, 2007; Gerber et al., 2009; Gerber et al., 2020). The IRR framework is rooted in political 
science or, to be more precise, environmental policy analysis. It enables “a systematic analysis of 
the institutional context that influences actor behaviour and the use of natural resources“ (de Buren, 
2015:9). It moreover postulates that a combination of approaches from political science (in particular 
policy analysis) and institutional economics (of property rights) ensures the identification of the most 
relevant institutional dimensions, which can explain the (un)sustainable use of resources (Gerber et 
al., 2009:799). Thereby, distinct insights into the diverse array of regulatory conditions and actors are 
provided.
Other than Ostrom’s IAD framework, the IRR explicitly distinguishes between two main sources of 
formal rules – public policies and property rights – which simultaneously influence the use and dis-
posal rights of resource use and have very different characteristics (Gerber & Nahrath, 2013:12). The 
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IRR does not only focus on single use situations with model character (e.g. pastures for cattle) or 
analyze a limited number of actors, but it rather follows a more comprehensive approach. It proves 
to be particularly suitable for the analysis of joint use situations in which several different users 
find themselves as rivals (such as in dense urban environments) because it is able to fully take into 
account the role of the public state (Knoepfel et al., 2001; Knoepfel et al., 2003). 
In contrast to the IAD, the IRR framework facilitates an understanding of how various actors behave 
in response not only to changes in the individual regulations of the institutional setting, but also to 
various characteristics of the institutional rules involved as a whole (Nicol, 2011:460). To identify 
conflicts that arise during contested use situations, which potentially hamper a resource’s sustaina-
bility, the IRR examines in-depth how and why rival use situations between multiple actors emerge. 
This high complexity of user situations helps “to understand a more representative range of re-
sources uses [in order to] be capable of portraying the complexity of heterogeneous use situations“ 
(Gerber et al., 2009: 800). In this thesis, the IRR’s ability to analyze complex use situations becomes 
particularly relevant since densification potentially exacerbates resources use conflicts among actors 
due to limited land availability. 
In sum, this approach is to be seen as a next generation of institutional analysis as it incorporates 
earlier models, such as Ostrom’s IAD (2007, 2009). It allows for analyzing behavioral patterns 
stemming from incentives of different policy fields such as contradictions between public policies 
(e.g. planning law) and property rights (e.g. Civil Code). Furthermore, a major strength of the IRR 
framework is its ability to conceptualize institutions in a way that echoes real-life resource use situa-
tions by taking their complexity into consideration, and to propose causal mechanisms explaining the 
relationship between institutions and sustainability. The IRR therefore contributes to a broad set of 
questions on the political and institutional dimensions of resource governance (Gerber et al., 2020). 
It must also be noted that Ostrom‘s IAD originated in the context of the Anglo-Saxon legal system 
(common law countries) while the IRR has evolved in countries with a codified legal system (civil 
law countries). This further presents an added value of the analytical framework applied in this the-
sis. Moreover, in chapter 2.4, I explain how a political ecology perspective is added to IRR research 
in this thesis, and what the benefits are that result out of this merge for the analysis of housing in 
dense urban areas. In chapter 3, I will then further introduce and elaborate on the different key ele-
ments the IRR analytical framework is built on. However, as I discuss in greater detail in section 13, 
the IRR approach also has some theoretical limitations that need to be addressed in order to critically 
reflect upon the results.
2.4	 	Power,	new	institutionalism,	and	the	IRR:	adding	a	political	ecology	perspective	to	
neoinstitutionalist research
Political ecology is a field of research within socio-environmental studies. Its core endeavor is its 
focus on power relations, socio-economic and political processes as well as the coproduction of 
nature and society (Swyngedouw, 2009). It moreover focuses on the study of the relationships bet-
ween political, economic, and social factors that cause environmental degradation (Robbins, 2004). 
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Theoretical inspirations to explain environmental changes are taken from different sources grounded 
in human geography, social anthropology, development studies, or heterodox economics. In contrast 
to apolitical explanations of environmental change (e.g. Neo-Malthusianism, Limits-to-Growth mo-
dels), political ecology differs by politicizing environmental issues and phenomena. It demonstrates 
that natural resources use is linked with distributive political processes, practices, and power asym-
metries among different groups of stakeholders (Gerber & Debrunner, 2021 in prep.). The approach 
takes consideration of the political processes through which resource access is defined, negotiated, 
and contested at multiple scales (Zimmerer & Bassett, 2003). The status of powerful actors (e.g. con-
servation organizations, governments, businesses) and what is taken for granted in leading discour-
ses is critically and explicitly questioned and reflected upon (Svarstad et al., 2018).
A useful definition of the school of thought can be found in Robbins (2004:12), who describes poli-
tical ecology as the attempt to search for “empirical, research-based explorations to explain linkages 
in the condition and change of social/environmental systems, with explicit consideration of rela-
tions of power. Political ecology, moreover, explores these social and environmental changes with 
a normative understanding that there are very likely better, less coercive, less exploitative and more 
sustainable ways of doing things.” Despite apparent agreement that power is at the core of political 
ecology studies, over the years diverse power definitions have been introduced. A popular definition 
was given by Ribot and Peluso (2003:156), who defined power, first, as “the capacity of some actors 
to affect the practices and ideas of others [...], and second, [that] power [is] emergent from, though 
not always attached to, people. [...] Disciplining institutions and practices can cause people to act in 
certain ways without any apparent coercion.“ Power is studied as contestations over material assets 
(land, natural resources) as well as over meaning (Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2019:391). 
In this thesis, I focus on a particular political ecology perspective that emerged from the 1970s as a 
result of a Neo-Marxist critique of Malthusian ideas in environmental thinking (also the IRR ana-
lytical framework developed within this tradition) (see e.g. Ehrlich, 1968; Enzensberger, 1974). The 
argument was that studies of human ecology are never neutral or apolitical, but involve interests, 
norms, and power. Environmental degradation was and still is seen as caused by human impact 
and political choices creating winners and losers. In particular, Neo-Marxist political ecologists 
address the issue of power by relying on a political economy perspective (for detailed discussion 
see Svarstad et al., 2018; Haller, 2019) that insists on the need to link the distribution of power with 
productive activity and ecological analysis (Robbins, 2004). 
To be more precise, political economy builds on Neo-Marxist insights pointing out the role of mar-
ket (capitalistic) relationships in the stratification of society with differential distribution of power 
among social classes, and corresponding impact on resource use and overuses (Robbins, 2004). 
The study of power relations is connected to the question of who controls the access to and uses of 
natural resources. Whether through exclusive property rights or tenure arrangements or through me-
chanisms of social exclusion from decision-making (Ribot & Peluso, 2003). Hence, Neo-Marxist po-
litical ecology underlines the agency of resource users and aims to analyze the conditions triggering 
forms of resistance against more powerful actors following productivist objectives in the manage-
ment of resources (Haller, 2019). It points out that ecological objectives should not be the starting 
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point of analyses of resource degradation and sustainability, but socio-political conflicts – which are 
often unspoken environmental conflicts (Martinez-Alier, 2002) – targeting institutional change. 
This thesis adds the above mentioned political ecology perspective to IRR research (e.g. Knoepfel, 
2007; Gerber et al., 2009) to provide a solution to the question how housing in dense city areas can 
be used and governed sustainably. Even though a major strength of the IRR is to conceptualize diffe-
rent categories of formal rules (public policies and property rights), and the way in which they influ-
ence resources use. So far, despite continuing efforts planning seemed unable to provide an adequate 
enough solution to the uncoordinated – and therefore unsustainable – use of resources. The shift 
towards densification in land-use planning to curb urban sprawl has proved very tricky to implement 
because densification inherently implies to deal with the already built environment. Potential for 
redevelopment is often given, but the land is frequently not accessible due to the land rights secured 
by actors in power positions (for details see section 3.3.3). 
This thesis sheds some new light to this question by explicitly adding the question of power to IRR 
research, i.e. forms of power that influence the implementation of densification objectives (Articles 
1 to 4). Even though one could argue that power already presents an integral part of the IRR since 
the framework provides the political science concepts (public policy analysis) to analyze power, and 
how it is embedded in political practices and decision-making procedures (of owners and non-ow-
ners). My argument is that political ecology can make a real contribution to IRR literature as it ma-
kes power relations more explicit, transparent, and reflects on them as a standalone element. Rather 
than conceptualizing it as an integral part of policy analysis. 
Political ecology moreover not only endeavors to describe and to analyze socio-political phenome-
na, but also aims to explain and to critically question them. Vice versa, political ecology does not 
manage to identify power structures in any systematic way. Even though it might help to ask the 
right questions, it does not offer any assistance in providing concrete answers to them (Hengster-
mann, 2019:8). Therefore, in this thesis, I aim to open this dialogue between new institutionalism 
and political ecology to insufflate greater power-awareness to IRR research. Power relations that 
drive densification are identified and systematically explained. In chapter 3, I will continue to present 
the core elements of the IRR approach in greater detail – especially how it is applied to the study of 





Building on theories and concepts of new institutionalism (sections 2.2 to 2.3), the IRR analytical 
framework defines key variables through which to interpret the world and postulates a causal link 
between these variables. In addition, by bringing in a power perspective (political ecology) (section 
2.4), this thesis adds a new angle to IRR research as it draws a more critical focus on socio-political 
processes that drive resources use conflicts, its origins, effects, and causes. Political ecology makes 
more explicit the political science dimension of resources degradation and environmental change, 
and thereby adds a new and socially more critical perspective to IRR research.  
Figure 2 summarizes the three key elements on which the IRR analytical framework is built on: ins-
titutions including formal policy instruments (independent variable), actors’ use strategies (interme-
diate variable), and the condition of the housing resource (dependent variable). The IRR considers 
formal institutions as particularly relevant for shaping the scope of action of housing resource users 
(owners and non-owners). In turn, users develop strategies within the existing legal framework 
such as selective activation of specific policy instruments that help them to defend their housing use 
interests effectively (e.g. reasonably priced living space, or profitable capital investment). Changes 
in use strategies, which are expressed as changes in the way actors use the goods and services offe-
red by the housing resource, affect its (social) sustainability (Nicol, 2011). Thus, one of the major 
contributions of the IRR framework is its ability to describe the different configurations of instituti-
onal rules, both theoretically and empirically, and to assess their effect on sustainable resources use 
(Gerber et al., 2009:798).
Governance in the IRR is generally appraised as “the interactions among structures, processes and 
traditions that determine how power and responsibilities are exercised, how decisions are taken, 
and how citizens or other stakeholders have their say” (Graham et al., 2003:2). It is about spheres 
of public debate, partnership, interaction, dialogue, and indeed conflict and dispute entered into by 
citizens, civil organizations, and by public authorities (Evans et al., 2006:850). By analyzing the 
local governance mechanisms at play (black arrows in Figure 2) between the three main variables, 
the IRR analytical approach enables to explain why some groups or interests experience dispropor-
tional access to housing and tend to lose while others tend to win (power relations) (Gerber et al., 
2009). In other words, the identified local governance mechanisms are defined as places of power 
where actors involved in densification procedures are able to influence the “rules of the game” 
(North, 1994), their activation or implementation process in a targeted way (Gerber & Debrunner, 
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Depending on the institutional setting, stakeholders have different means to either change these 
intervention ways or try to influence others to do so. These mechanisms are at the same time the 
channels through which stakeholders exercise power. 
Power is thus seen as ”the ability to get what one wants from others. It may come from greater we-
alth or social position or the ability to manipulate the ideology of others” (Ensminger, 1992:7). Not 
only are powerful individuals more likely to influence institutions to their own advantage, but also 
“any given set of rules or expectations - formal or informal - that patterns action will have unequal 
implications for resource allocation, and clearly many formal institutions are specifically intended 
to distribute resources to particular kinds of actors and not to others” (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010:8). 
Vice versa, the institutional framework also shapes and affects all actors’ behaviours, as well as 
their negotiating power (Mackay et al., 2010). By making explicit the local governance mechanis-
ms of action in which actors succeed or fail in defending their interests – especially regarding their 
influence on decision-making procedures leading to social exclusion, segregation, or inequality – 
power structures among actors are made explicit. 
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This new institutionalist political ecology framework enables researchers to analyze and to explain 
why many different stakeholders can come into conflict with each other in the first place. It ma-
kes possible to trace the concrete mechanisms of (unfair) power distribution. This thesis therefore 
builds a bridge between different academic stands: public policy analysis (planning as a public 
policy), new institutional economics (property rights), and political ecology (power). Making expli-
cit the local governance mechanisms of possible sustainability trade-offs and power games among 
actors in densification procedures is a new contribution of this research project to neo-institutiona-
list political ecology research.
In chapters 3.1 to 3.4, I will explain the key concepts of the IRR theoretical approach and the rela-
tionship that binds them (local governance mechanisms) in greater detail. In particular, to answer 
the research questions, the theoretical point of departure is to start with the conceptualization of 
housing as a resource (section 3.1) and the concept of social sustainability in housing (section 3.2). 
Finally, out of theory, five broad working hypotheses are outlined (section 3.5) that explain the 
local governance mechanisms at play (relationship between institutional rules and actors’ strate-
gies) steering socially sustainable housing development in dense cities. Subsequently, the hypothe-
ses structure both the study design (section 4) and the conclusion (sections 10 to 13) of this thesis.
3.1 Housing stock as a resource
Although the IRR has traditionally been applied to the study of natural resources (e.g. land, water), 
the framework is also well suited for the analysis of non-natural resources. Because analytically, 
“neither the environment as such or parts of features of the environment per se are resources; they 
become resources only if, when, and in so far as they are, or are considered to be, capable of ser-
ving man’s needs. The word ‘resource‘ is an expression of appraisal and, hence, a purely subjective 
concept“ (Zimmermann, 1933:3). The IRR identifies the definition of resources as socially const-
ructed. A resource is acknowledged as inseparable from humans and their wants. It is defined by its 
use or its integration into an economic or political context (Kébir, 2010:70). The use of a resource 
is dependent on its use value that results from the respective social context within which human 
goals and capabilities are shaped (Bathelt & Glückler, 2005:1547). 
By following a resource-oriented approach, the IRR analytical approach enables to take multip-
le and conflicting resources use situations into consideration (see section 2.3). Each resource (be 
it housing or others such as water or green spaces) creates unique use(r) constellations in which 
various actors find themselves as rivals. The IRR thus follows a more comprehensive approach as 
it is capable of portraying the complexity of heterogenous use situations. This becomes all the more 
relevant in dense urban environments since resources such as urban land get scarce and contested, 
and various actors request use or disposal rights upon them. 
In this thesis, different goods and services produced by the resource “housing stock” – the use of 
which is significantly changed by densification – are analyzed in detail. While “housing” is ge-
nerally used to describe the construction and usage of buildings in which people live in, the term 
“housing stock” refers to the total number of dwellings (houses, flats, maisonettes, bed-sits etc.) in 
a given area (Balmer & Bernet, 2015).  
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Indeed, housing stocks as a resource may be used for different purposes: for shelter but also for 
non-residential services such as investment, energy supply, urban design or immigration. Energy 
suppliers, for example, rely on the demand created by housing stocks to sell their product. Urban 
designers rely on the physical characteristics of the buildings to create suitable urban space (Nicol, 
2011:459). Moreover, the housing stock is a resource that is unique in a few respects. It is a durable 
and long-lasting resource often existing for more than a century (Balmer & Bernet, 2015:181). It 
is also an economically significant resource. Traded on the free market, housing is a commodity 
with enormous economic potential which is why it is often treated as a highly valued collateral (e.g. 
Aalbers, 2017). 
Especially in cities, where demand for housing is high and the potential for capital accumulation 
is lucrative, the competition between actors interested in using urban land for housing investment 
is rising and rents increase simultaneously. The obligation to promote densification introduced by 
many states and cities has even reinforced this competition leading to scarcity of space and cor-
responding land and rent value increases (Breheny, 1992:143; Harvey, 2012:127). This financial 
potential of urban housing stocks is, however, in several ways juxtaposed with the role of housing 
to provide the basic necessity of shelter. According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights5 
(Article 25), housing represents a basic human need and essential good. When residents do not have 
the funds necessary to access housing provided by the free market then the provision of the basic 
human right for shelter is foregone un-less governmental action is taken (Brenner et al., 2012:224; 
Schönig et al., 2017; Schönig, 2020). 
Finally, the housing stock in many cities – due to increased CO2 emissions in old buildings – pre-
sents a target for energy policy efforts (see e.g. UN Agenda 21; UN Habitat Agenda). Through 
the renovation and conversion of existing apartments, the energy requirement per capita is to be 
reduced (e.g. Bhatti, 2001; Bhatti & Dixon, 2003; Priemus, 2005; Næss & Saglie, 2019). To limit 
energy emissions, an upgrading of existing, partially historically protected buildings is absolutely 
necessary, which in turn has a direct influence on rent prices after the reconstruction and the preser-
vation of the architectural heritage (Nicol 2013). In sum, housing has a crucial role to play in the 
sustainable development of cities due to its various functions for different groups and individuals. 
The decisions taken by actors involved in specific housing uses must be considered in detail if the 
question of housing sustainability is to be thoroughly addressed (Nicol, 2011:459). This objective 
can only be attained, however, if all users jointly ensure that the quantities they extract or withdraw 
from the stock do not reach the limit of the reproductive capacity of the resource system (Gerber et 
al., 2009:800). Otherwise, rivalries between different user-actors occur because the use of a good or 
service extracted from the housing resource interferes with the use of other goods and services by 
another actor (Nicol & Knoepfel, 2008:161). In the following section, the aim is to emphasize what 
a (socially) sustainable status of housing condition might look like so that user conflicts do not lead 




Even though the IRR analytical framework has always been closely linked to the political and 
scientific debates about sustainability, evaluating the concept in regard to the interactions between 
its three dimensions – ecological, economic, and social – has largely been missing so far (see e.g. 
Nicol, 2013; Hengstermann, 2019). Mainly because the IRR has an often-unstated bias toward 
ecological sustainability (reproduction of the capital) as it evolved out of environmental debates of 
the 1980s (Gerber et al., 2020). Its original focus built on a ‘hard or strong sustainability’ (Jacobs, 
1992) perspective which implies that renewable resources must not be drawn down faster than they 
can be renewed. Natural capital must not be spent, but we must live off the income produced by the 
capital. 
Sustainability, in other words, was understood as physical end-state of the environment that can be 
sustained over time, while sustainable development was seen a process of change towards achie-
ving sustainability goals (Marcuse, 1998). The primary attempt of the IRR approach was to regu-
late the emission of pollutants in a way leading to less environmental degradation. The presumed 
neutrality of ecology as a science when entering environmental debates was moreover seen illusory 
(Knoepfel et al., 2001, 2007) because political choices were identified as responsible for environ-
mental impacts and resources degradation. Hence, even though the evolvement of the IRR appro-
ach has always been strongly linked to Neo-Marxist political ecology perspectives (see section 2.4, 
e.g. Robbins, 2004), and the study of power relations in political decision-making. The connection 
between power and sustainability has not been made explicit since power was regarded an integral 
element of the rules in force (e.g. property rights). 
Therefore, in the light of this thesis, not only greater emphasis is put on the relationship between 
power and sustainability to understand which factors provide certain individuals with the power 
to defend their own interests of resource use. Furthermore, to understand this complexity, greater 
awarness is being put on the social dimension of sustainability that allows for capturing the origins, 
causes, and effects of socio-environmental disputes in more detail. This is done by the structured 
analysis of the actors’ constellations, their resource use strategies (of owners and non-owners), and 
their decision-making behavior within the agency.
In particular, my intention in the next chapters is to advance a conceptualization of social sustaina-
bility in regard to housing challenges in dense city areas (section 3.2.2) in order to “bring light into 
the dark” and to make a rather fuzzy concept feasible and transparent for my research. Stressing 
the unique social features of sustainable housing development presents my first step towards an 
interpretation that is sufficiently rigorous to provide useful tools for practical analysis and effective 
policy-making. 
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3.2.1 Social sustainability as an analytical framework of reference
Despite the nearly universal acknowledgement that sustainable cities are a desirable policy goal (for 
discussion, e.g. Barbier, 1987; Khan, 1995), there is still less certainty about what this might mean in 
practice and how to define the concept in any analytically rigorous way (Williams, 2010). Since the 
popular release of the Brundtland report in 19876 (WCED, 1987), many deductive approaches have 
been published on the conceptualization of sustainability (for discussion, e.g. Elliot, 1999; Redclift, 
2005b; Jabareen, 2008; Christen & Schmidt, 2012).
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the concept of sustainability has primarily been understood to 
endorse the pursuit of economic growth under the condition that the environment will not be damaged 
too much. The goal was to seek maximum economic growth while minimizing environmental degra-
dation (e.g. Cernea, 1993). The driving force behind the conception of sustainability was “the belief 
that if the environment continues to be degraded, economic growth will be stifled. Therefore, econo-
mic growth can only be sustained if attention is paid to sustaining resources and the environment” 
(Portney, 1994:830). In a second variation, academic literature mainly focused on the environment. 
A sustainable city was associated with efficient waste management, recycling opportunities, reduced 
car dependency and greater use of alternative modes of transport in order to limit cities’ ecological 
footprint (e.g. Bromley et al., 2005). The primary aim was to sustain the physical environment while 
economic growth was considered of secondary importance. 
In housing, for instance, the energy crises of the 1970s created awareness for building environmentally 
sustainably. Ideas of energy efficiency and concern about the wasteful use of fossil fuels became in-
creasingly promoted. Technological advancements with renewable material, energies, and construction 
techniques were introduced that helped to reduce the destructive environmental impacts of housing 
(Nicol & Knoepfel, 2008:158). The main intention was to prevent environmental damage by the ob-
servation that every action taken on behalf of economic growth should seek to be as environmentally 
sensitive as possible (Portney, 1994:830). Later on, this idea strongly influenced the development of 
the IRR approach, which has evolved out of the environmental debates of the 1980s. It intended to 
deal with the use of the environment as a sink for pollution, therefore attempting to regulate the emis-
sion of pollutants, but with considering resources use capacity as a whole (Gerber et al., 2020).
As this brief summary of the literature shows, however, the social dimension of sustainability has only 








 one hand, demonstrates their separate mechanisms and, on the other, reveals their integrating roles to   
	 constitute	what	is	being	termed	sustainable	development	(Khan,	1995).	
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forty years since the Brundtland report’s release (for discussion, e.g. Foladori, 2005; Manzi, 2010; 
Murphy, 2012; Woodcraft, 2012; Weingaertner & Moberg, 2014). Within the densification debate, for 
example, for many years the least explored and most ambiguous claim was that the compact city is 
socially equitable (Burton, 2003:538). During the 1980s, urban regeneration projects focused mainly 
on economic and environmental aspects of degraded inner-city areas while neglecting social aspects 
(Rérat, 2012:116). Nevertheless, emphasizing the environmental and economic spheres exclusively 
has been increasingly questioned during the 1990s (for discussion, e.g. Mitlin & Satterthwaite, 1996; 
Basiago, 1999; Redclift, 2005a; Crabtree, 2006; Budd et al., 2008). Mainly because the three sustaina-
bility dimensions were considered to be stronger interlinked. The diminishing of one affects that of the 
others. 
Until today, however, there is still no broad consensus on the meaning of the term “social sustaina-
bility”. The concept is far more difficult to quantify than economic growth or environmental impact 
(for discussion, e.g. Oxford Institute for Sustainable Development, 2007; IFHP, 2019). It is consi-
dered a vague and fuzzy concept that comes with a number of ethical, political, and methodological 
challenges (Davidson, 2010; Woodcraft, 2012). Moreover, the concept of social sustainability itself is 
culture-dependent (Chiu, 2003) and inherently normative in both the theoretical conceptualization and 
the pursuit of translating subsequent new insights into empirical research and effective policy agendas 
(Jonkman, 2019). A brief review of the literature shows how social sustainability has been conceptua-
lized over time (Table 1).
A clear distinction must be drawn between the two concepts of “social sustainability” and “social 
justice”. While the concept of “social sustainability” has evolved out of environmental debates and 
is strongly related to ecological issues such as land use planning (e.g. Elkin et al., 1991; Campbell, 
1996), the concept of “social justice” has mostly been addressed by philosophy (e.g. Rousseau, 1762; 
Polanyi, 1957) and critical social sciences (e.g. Rawls, 1972; Harvey, 1973; Sen, 1999; Fainstein, 
2001, 2010). In justice literature, the question of the ethical foundation of society has challenged 
mankind since the dawn of civilization. The idea of social justice has become a key element of the-
se reflections (Heidenreich, 2011). Concequently, the concept of social justice is closely linked with 
broader issues of social relevance such as migration or gender research resulting in insights that are 
extendable to a perspective on society as a whole, independently of individual preferences (Ketschau, 
2015). Justice incorporates a set of topics that could best be described as attempts to improve or 
maintain “the quality of life of people” (Weingaertner & Moberg, 2014:129) as well as social well-
being and freedom (Woodcraft, 2012:31). It constitutes an inherent part of sustainable development 
(Langhelle, 2000:296).
In contrast, “social sustainability” inherits both a perspective on the individual and on the socie- 
ty (Elkington, 1999). It places explicit value on the intergenerational stability of communities (Ket-
schau, 2015) and on the initial control over natural resources (Barry, 1991:238). While some social 
sustainability scholars concentrate on the long-term viable setting for human interaction (Yiftachel & 
Hedgcock, 1993; Biart, 2002), others emphasize context-sensitivity (Vallance et al., 2011) and com-
munity stability (Griessler & Littig, 2005; Colantonio & Dixon, 2009; Karlsson, 2018). Other resear-
chers focus more on pragmatic relative improvements of resource distribution (Portney, 1994; Polese 
& Stren, 2000; Chiu, 2003) (Table 1). In essence, the judgment, evaluation, and reflection on whether 
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social sustainability in urban development is given or not can be made along broader principles of 
social (in)justice. Hence, the two concepts – social justice and social sustainability – derive from 
different academic stands, but have always been closely related to one another. In sections 3.2.2 and 
3.2.3, I further emphasize social sustainability and explain how the concept is assessed and operatio-
nalized in terms of housing in this thesis. 
3.2.2 Social sustainability in housing
For the past twenty years, much quantitative (see e.g. Kyttä et al., 2013; Schmidt-Thomé et al., 2013; 
Broitman & Koomen, 2015; Bibby et al., 2018) and qualitative research (see e.g. Chiu, 2004; Bram-
ley et al., 2009; Colantonio & Dixon, 2009; Dempsey et al., 2011; Savini, 2011; Vallance et al., 2011; 
Mccrea & Walters, 2012) has been conducted on measuring the social impacts of urban densification. 
Different notions of “social sustainability” in relation to urban land use have emerged all aiming to 
(inter)link the stimulation of economic activities and environmental improvements with social and 
cultural elements of the city (Table 1). 
To strengthen the understanding of core issues related to the concept of social sustainability in 
housing, indicators of how socially sustainable processes and outcomes can be evaluated are intro-
duced (Table 2). The criteria figure as a well-founded and theory-based tool to operationalize and 
monitor the development of housing stocks (Christen & Schmidt, 2012:405). However, as remarked 
in the previous section, it is important to distinguish what is actually meant by social sustainability 
in housing and how the term is deployed to establish relational identities and perspectives by diffe-
rent stakeholders (Evans & Jones, 2008:1430). Otherwise, there is a risk that criteria based on solely 
individuals’ norms are introduced that do not allow for a more objective assessment.
 
Therefore, in Table 2, key themes and indicators of social sustainability performance in housing are 
introduced that enable a systematic evaluation of residential densification processes. The evaluative 
framework is based on a theoretical understanding of what social sustainability in housing means, 
and is analyzed in close connection with ecologic and economic sustainability. The definition of 
such indicators is always subjective and depends on different normative principles as well as specific 
perspectives taken (Khan, 1995:64; Fürst & Scholles, 2001:139). However, planning for sustain- 
able housing development does not work without the evaluation of conditions, processes, and 
outcomes in order to be able to assess what deficiencies might need to be addressed or what needs 
to remain because it corresponds with the targeted goals introduced (Curdes, 1995:54; Budd et al., 
2008:260). 
Only in doing so, planners and other practitioners are able to make a real judgement and validate the 
outcomes of their evaluations. This will reduce the degree of subjectivity in the policy analysis pro-
cess (for discussion, e.g. Alexander & Faludi, 1989; Baer, 1997; Norton, 2005; Laurian et al., 2010; 
Oliveira & Pinho, 2011). Nevertheless, criteria formulation is not merely a checklist design rather it 
is to be seen as a necessary skill of planning professions (Shahab et al., 2019:535). I therefore believe 
that the indicators introduced in Table 2 provide a valuable starting point for the assessment of social 
aspects of housing and for the detailed analysis of socially sustainable settlement transformation.
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- Rental costs in relation to monthly income ratio	[%]





-  Access criteria to housing units	[e.g.	access	criteria	related	to	
age,	gender,	income	etc.]




-  Perceived satisfaction of residents with the living quality of 




schools and child care; health facilities; waste and disposal 
options;	transport	nodes;		employment	opportunities;	perceived	
safety	during	nighttime;	perceived	level	of	cleanliness;	facilities	
for disabled people; perceived satisfaction with the urban cha-
racter	and	the	local	lifestyle]
- Residential stability [years	of	residency	in	the	neighborhood]
-  Level of discrimination and social exclusion	[socio-economic	
and	-demographic	mix;	legal	protection	of	social	mixing;	percei-
ved	level	of	discrimination]












ses takes place in close connection with ecologic and economic sustainability. While each criterion may 
be regarded as conceptually distinct, various reinforcing relationships link them together. 
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3.2.3 Social sustainability in housing as emic approach
To further operationalize and to provide a comprehensive and integrated framework for analyzing 
social sustainability in housing, in Article 2 an emic sustainability approach is introduced. This ana-
lysis approach addresses social sustainability concerns in housing from a perspective that emphasi-
zes community members’ views on participation, negotiation, and the extent to which they can in-
tegrate their own views into the institution-building process (for discussion, e.g. Dolsak & Ostrom, 
2003; Haller et al., 2016). The emic approach introduced works with the indicators presented in 
Table 2 on a broader scale but further considers the perspectives of communities and individuals’ on 
social displacement (McCrea & Walters, 2012:191). 
The understanding how residents involved perceive impacts of urban (re)development on their 
housing livability is considered as crucial to explain whether socially sustainable development is gi-
ven or not (Bramley et al., 2009:2129). Land use challenges, such as the shift towards densification, 
are analyzed from the ground up as they are experienced by local communities and people actually 
affected by consolidation projects. The added value and legitimacy of such an emic perspective is 
that it is clearly most sensitive to community, local needs, and values. Any action that renders the 
residential community worse off is not considered compatible with urban social sustainability since 
the principle source of evidence is constituted by the people themselves, particularly those living in 
the areas in question. In other words, dense cities are not considered socially sustainable if they are 
not acceptable to people as places in which to live, work, and interact, or if their communities are 
unstable and dysfunctional (Bramley et al., 2009; Vallance et al., 2011).
This approach derives from a broad body of policy ecology literature on “actually existing sustaina-
bilities” (for discussion, e.g. Cook & Kothari, 2001; Hargreaves, 2004; Krueger & Agyeman, 2005; 
Evans et al., 2006; Krueger & Gibbs, 2007; Evans & Jones, 2008). The authors of these studies 
claim that, regardless of whether development projects are obtained through intentions associated 
with achieving environmental justice or otherwise, they must be consistent with the goals of creating 
sustainable communities (Portney, 1994:838). Stated another way, “to be socially and culturally sus-
tainable, development must be gauged by the values that a society itself, or some member thereof, 
deems to be requisite for its health and welfare” (Goulet, 1971:333). If local community members 
believe that change detracts from their established and preferred ways of living, they may actively 
resist such changes (Newman & Wyly, 2006; Wyly et al., 2010). Therefore, understanding the impli-
cations of, and reasons behind such refusals is important in two aspects (Vallance et al., 2011:345): 
first, to effectively support bio-physical environmental goals (e.g. shift towards densification), and 
second to recognize that the pursuit of such goals might actually be counter-productive and hence 
unsustainable overall.
In housing, for instance, Jenks, Williams and Burton (1996:84) stated that to be truly socially sus-
tainable, the city must have a reasonable degree of support from local residents. If not, those who 
can will continue to live in the city, and only the most disadvantaged will have to leave. A scenario 
that is highly unsustainable. The applied emic approach and the criteria used to evaluate social sus-
tainability in housing are further introduced and conceptualized in Article 2.
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3.3	 Institutions:	two	sources	of	formal	rules	regulating	the	housing	stock
To understand how all shelter and non-shelter uses of the housing stock are governed, the IRR 
framework analyzes the ensemble of regulatory conditions that produce changes in the manage-
ment strategies of the actors involved (Nicol, 2013). The IRR distinguishes two main categories of 
formalized rules – public policies and property rights – that operate according to a different logic 
and rely on opposing legitimizations. These two sources of institutional rules form an institutional 
regime that regulates housing uses. A regime is understood as “the more or less coordinated com-
bination of public policies and property rights that relate to all user-actors of the housing resource, 
and thus affects the reproductive capacity of the resource and hence its sustainability” (Nicol & 
Knoepfel, 2008:161). An institutional regime defines an explicit (or implicit) structure of rights 
and duties, characterizing the relationship of individuals to one another with respect to a particular 
resource such as housing (Bromley, 1992:8). 
A regime creates exclusivity, adumbrates and demarcates how housing stocks can be used by whom 
and sets the rules as to how various actors can gain access, use, or exploit housing. The institutional 
regime also manipulates, restricts, or enhances actors’ use interests (Gerber et al., 2018:3). Regime 
types can be defined and categorized on the basis of two dimensions – extent (quantitative dimen-
sion) and coherence (qualitative dimension) (Hengstermann, 2019:101). Extent refers to the total 
number of regulations that influence the different uses of a resource at a given time (e.g. energy 
law, housing law, etc.). The criterion of coherence depends on the level of content and connection 
between public policies and property rights (external coherence), but also within public policies or 
property rights (internal coherence) (Gerber et al., 2009:8). The IRR analytical approach assumes 
that the extent and the coherence of resources use are intrinsically linked “because any increase in 
the number of regulations tends to generate inconsistencies. Conversely, when only a few uses are 
regulated, the coherence is likely to be much greater” (de Buren, 2015:16). 
Use situations in which the extent of regulations leads to internal or external incoherence are 
called “complex regimes”. In this situation, the majority of the goods and services provided by the 
resource are actually regulated, but in a way that is incoherent in part. The risk of overexploitation 
of resources increases. This situation corresponds to many resource regimes in liberal states becau-
se of the extensive development of largely uncoordinated policies since the 1950s (Gerber et al., 
2009:8). In contrast, a resource regime in which extent and coherence are balanced is likelier to be 
an “integrated” regime. Then, all goods and services produced by a resource are regulated in a co-
herent way, which increases the possibility that sustainable use conditions are created. The central 
and overarching assumption of the IRR analytical framework is that “high levels of regime extent 
and coherence are necessary preconditions for resources sustainability” (Gerber et al., 2009:798). 
In states based on the rule of law, it is therefore necessary to perform a close analysis of the legal 
foundations of the legal system as well as of its functioning and characteristics to understand the 
institutional regime in force. 
At this point, it must be noted that besides the analysis of formal institutions, the IRR also consi-
ders the impacts of informal rules such as social norms, conventions of social behavior, sanctions, 
31
or taboos. Informal institutions describe actors’ norms in a given context and the ensuing generally 
accepted rules-in-use (Thomann et al., 2018). Informal rules appear and thrive in the interstices 
left between formal rules (e.g. de Buren, 2015; Gerber et al., 2020). The IRR analytical framework 
assumes that informal rules, sooner or later, result in formal institutions to a greater or lesser extent 
(Gerber et al., 2009:803). While in situations of informality actors do not play by the formal rules 
they do it against the rules and thus, indirectly acknowledge them (ibid., 2009). Consequently, 
informal rules have a lasting impact on the ways a society conducts itself. This means that, even 
in “weak states”, the formal legal framework provides a strong reference that shapes individuals‘ 
actions (Hagmann & Hoehne, 2009). In any case, formalized institutions strongly and directly 
influence the use interests of all relevant stakeholder groups and embody the clearest expression of 
social will in dealing with a resource.  
In the next section, I explain these two categories of formal regulation – public policies and proper-
ty rights – in regard to housing in greater detail. First, I address how they constitute the institutional 
regime of the housing stock; second, how they influence the behavior of the housing stock owners 
and other user actors; and third, how incoherencies in regulations might occur that produce (social-
ly) unsustainable outcomes. 
3.3.1 Public policies
Public policy derives from the state’s attempt to solve what it considers a public problem and is 
expressed in the body of laws, regulations, decisions, and actions of the government (Nicol & 
Knoepfel, 2008:170). Following the IRR approach, public policy entails “a series of intentionally 
coherent decisions or activities taken or carried out by different public and sometimes private actors 
whose resources, institutional links and interests vary, with a view to resolving in a targeted manner 
a problem defined politically as collective in nature” (Knoepfel et al., 2007:24). This problem gives 
rise to the introduction of formalized acts of a more or less restrictive nature that are often aimed at 
modifying the behaviour of target groups (social groups presumed to be at the root of or able to solve 
the collective problem) in the interest of the social groups who suffer the negative effects of the pro-
blem in question (final beneficiaries) (ibid.:2007). Hence, through public policies the state receives 
the power to regulate the actions of those actors who are thought to be at the source of the collective 
problem, in the name of public interest. Public policies are regularly revised not only because the 
collective problem they are targeting constantly evolves, but also because changing political majo-
rities propose alternative solutions to the problem (Knoepfel et al., 2012:417). In daily practice, this 
makes it sometimes difficult to enforce public interests in a targeted manner since public policies are 
not as stable and resistant as private property rights (section 3.3.2).
Examples of public policies regulating housing under densification pressure include, for instance, 
housing, social welfare, environmental or land use policies (Figure 2). All of them simultaneously 
solve a public problem (urban sprawl) and draw its legitimacy from a legal basis (e.g. constitutional 
article). This legal basis not only defines the public actors in charge of implementation but also pro-
vides them with a budget, personnel resources, and so on (Gerber et al., 2017:1687). Moreover, pub-
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lic policies have a direct impact on both housing stock owners and other user-actors such as tenants 
or neighbors. First, because public policies can place limits and restrictions on the rights of stock 
owners accorded them by property rights. For example, housing policies that aim to protect tenants 
from social exclusion may prevent an owner from raising rents according to market prices. And se-
cond, such public policies can accord use rights to persons other than the stock owner, for example, 
tenants or NGOs. For instance, residents’ use rights can be obtained either directly from the property 
owner or as results of attribution or redistribution of rights resulting from the implementation of a 
public policy. For example, owners may be granted low interest loans with a long payback period via 
tax policy, but on the condition that they build affordable dwellings (Nicol & Knoepfel, 2008:170). 
Thereby, public policies can indirectly intervene into different actors’ housing use interests.
3.3.2	 Property	rights	–	a	chronological	review
The IRR analytical approach acknowledges that besides public policies, property rights play a 
decisive role in the regulation of housing stocks (for discussion, e.g. Demsetz, 1967; Steiger, 2006; 
Jacobs & Paulsen, 2009). In general, “property” does not describe an object such as land. Rather it 
is understood as a social relation that defines the property holder with respect to something of value 
(the benefit stream) against all others (Hallowell, 1943:115-138). The one holding said rights has 
the expectation, in both the law and in practice that, those with duty will respect his or her claims. 
As titleholders, property owners have the legitimate authority to act in a predetermined manner. 
Thus, property rights are identified as an exclusive, transferable, and legal right to the physical use 
of scarce resources, the returns thereon, and alienation thereof. The authority system legitimizing 
this behavior can either be a central government, or it can be a local village council. The important 
issue is that the individuals feel compelled to comply with the institution in effect (Bromley, 1991).  
Moreover, Bromley (1992:2) distinguishes between four different property regimes that structure 
resources use – common, state, private, and non-property (open access). He argues that property 
regimes represent human artifacts reflecting instrumental origins that provide owners the legally 
and socially sanctioned ability to exclude certain users and to force them to go elsewhere (ibid.:15). 
Consequently, particular property regimes prove to be chosen for particular purposes. For in- 
stance, concerning housing stock regulation, the importance of private property lies in the fact that 
the surrounding laws stipulate specific forms of tenure that enable residents’ entry or exit to/from 
the housing estate. Private rental, public housing, or tenants cooperatives are very different forms 
of ownership that include the potential for social exclusion to a greater or lesser extent (Blomquist, 
2012; Wimark et al., 2019:20). 
In the following section – still subsection to 3.3.2 – two instrumental conceptions of private pro-
perty are introduced. Historically, they have followed either classic liberal or reformist tradition. 
Both of them acknowledge private property as the most important source of economic activity (for 
discussion, e.g. Meyer, 2009). In this thesis, this chronological review helps to understand how 
property rights have evolved over time and how this background explains why property owners 
are able to defend their interests in dense urban environments in an effective manner in contrast to 
other user actors, such as tenants.
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Property	rights	in	the	rise	of	liberal	philosophy	–	protection	against	state	powers
During the 17th century in the rise of liberal philosophy, the conception of landownership was 
based on the idea of ‘‘private dominium’’ (Hobbes, 1651; Locke, 1689). It was handed down from 
Roman law, revived by the Napoleonic Code after the French Revolution, and subsequently spread 
within Europe and throughout the world, particularly through colonization. Following the princi-
ple of accession, individuals started to exercise dominion over several things they owned. They 
also became the owners of immovable objects such as buildings that were attached to the land (for 
discussion, Gerber et al., 2017:1687). By further tightening “the bundle of rights” (Commons, 
1893:263), the accession principle played a fundamental role in making property more exclu- 
sive and rigid. The metaphor of “the bundle of the rights” conveys that property rights are to some 
extent decomposable into elements that secure property owners‘ exclusive rights of resources use 
such as the Rights of Access, Rights of Withdrawal, Rights of Management, Rights of Exclusion, 
and the Rights of Alienation (Schlager & Ostrom, 1992:252). These rights derive their significance 
from the fact that they help an owner to form those expectations that he or she can reasonably hold 
in dealings with others.   
Specifically, in classic liberal perception, the purpose of property rights is to maximize the common 
good when socially integrated through the institutions of fair and free market exchange. The solu- 
tion to the problem of natural monopoly is to conduct an ex ante bidding competition and award the 
right to serve the market to the group that tenders the best bid. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) – Eng-
lish liberal theorist and philosopher – argued that a commonwealth is only produced through priva-
tizing competitive interests within a framework of strong state power. Private property was identi-
fied as an individual‘s right that arises when they create value by mixing their labor with the land. 
The fruits of their labor belong to them and to them alone. Market exchange socializes that right 
when each individual gets back the value they have created by exchanging it against an equivalent 
value created by another (Hobbes, 1651). In effect, individuals maintain, extend, and socialize their 
private property right through value-creation and supposedly free and fair market exchange.
Like Thomas Hobbes, John Locke (1632-1704) later on believed in a natural right to life, liberty, 
and property. However, according to his perspective, the right to property is guaranteed to pro-
tect individuals against possible interferences – from other individuals or the government – in the 
private sphere. The function of property is to protect individuals’ autonomy and freedom as citizens 
(Locke, 1689). Property rights make the private appropriation of goods and services provided by 
resources possible, as long as public policies do not restrict exclusive appropriation in the name 
of general interests(s) (Constant, 1988). This classical economists’ notion of property rights was 
articulated by many other liberal theorists such as Adam Smith (1776), Thomas Malthus (1789), or 
David Ricardo (1812), and found its ways into the state systems of most Western modern societies 
(Keynes, 1936). 
In sum, this classical liberal conception of property has always been very strongly linked to capita-
lism. The credo was and still is that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual 
and entrepreneurial freedom and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong 
private property rights, unencumbered markets, and free trade (for discussion, Miller, 1978). Poli-
tical sovereignty appears as a necessary evil that intervenes in and violates the pre-existing private 
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sphere of ownership (Meyer, 2009:104). Private property can only be infringed upon in very parti-
cular circumstances and when “fair compensation” is guaranteed (Cooter & Ulen, 2004; Hartmann 
& Needham, 2012). The role of the state, in turn, is to create and to preserve an institutional setting 
appropriate to such practices (Harvey, 2005:2-3).
Reformist	positions	–	towards	a	perspective	of	possession
During the 1870s, the classic liberal perception of property was questioned by those who pointed 
out that titleholders also have a social responsibility (Proudhon, 1840; Marx, 1868; Engels, 1872; 
Commons, 1893). By the early 20th century, urban growth, affordable housing crises, and severe 
hygiene problems have created reform movements. These proposed that one of the missions of 
private property is to promote societal goals that are intrinsically associated with a social obligation 
for the landowners (Sax, 1992; Jacobs, 1998). In response to the acute housing crises endured by 
the working class in many cities at that time, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels – two German follo-
wers of the French anarchist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon – proposed outlawing private landlordism and 
converting tenants’ rents into purchase payments on their dwellings (Hodkinson, 2012). This, they 
believed, would end the exploitative character of private property and transform the property-less 
tenants into a “totality of independent and free owners of dwellings“ (Engels, 1872 [1997]:28).  
Their proposal was based on the writings of Karl Marx (1859) – German philosopher, economist, 
and political theorist – who observed that the use of goods and services under liberalism was shaped 
by a process of “commodification”. This process perpetually aims to produce surplus products in 
order to constantly gain a surplus in economic profit. Market forces and profitability objectives 
determine not only how goods and services are used, but also how they are produced, managed, 
and distributed (for discussion, e.g. Harloe, 1982:40; Harvey, 2005:166). While commodification 
might be advantageous for those selected few who reap the disproportionate benefits of the capital 
gain, the vast majority and particularly those of lower income would have little ability to capture 
value from this development. Commodification, therefore, would sooner or later end in economic 
development that is (ab)used as a source for profit extraction by a small financial elite. Those with 
limited financial means, however, will be pushed out and excluded from this process. 
A sector in which “commodification” has become especially apparent was and still is the housing 
segment. According to Marx (1859), commodification of housing relies on the assumption that the 
market, including the profit-maximizing rationality of investors, is the most efficient solution to 
guarantee housing supply for all income segments. The role played by private landowners becomes 
particularly relevant in this matter. Due to the protection guaranteed by private property rights, 
landowners are free to define the profit margin to be targeted on their parcels and to set the rents 
according to market prices. Hence, commodification of housing not only results in a dominance 
of financial actors, markets, practices, and narratives at various scales and in a structural transfor-
mation of housing supply, demand, and households itself (Aalbers, 2019:4). It moreover leads to a 
general shift from housing treated by its use value to its financial value, meaning that housing is no 
longer considered a basic human need but rather more a commodity that must be traded or paid for 
in a globalized financial market (for discussion, e.g. Harvey, 1985; Marcuse, 2012; Rolnik, 2013; 
Schipper, 2014; Aalbers, 2017). Housing stocks, in other words, have become a lucrative investment 
outlet, a safe source of revenue, and a highly valued form of collateral. 
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Engels moreover argued that there was no such thing as a housing crisis, only a crisis of capitalism 
in which housing conditions formed just “one of the innumerable smaller, secondary evil“ caused 
by the exploitation of workers by capital (Engels, 1872 [1997]:18). The contradictory and uneven 
processes of capitalist development would, sooner or later, continue to generate housing questions at 
different points of the business cycle. From this observation derived one inescapable political con-
clusion: the only real alternative to the housing question was “to abolish altogether the exploitation 
and oppression of the working class by the ruling class (ibid.:17) through working class revolution 
and expropriation of private property. 
Later on, this classical Marxist orthodoxy that only proletarian revolution would be able to solve 
housing challenges has sparred with less rigorous interventions. Other reformist positions aimed at 
reconsidering the strategic importance of state intervention or the shift towards more self-organized 
solutions of property in the here and now, such as small-scale cooperatives or mutual ownership 
(for discussion, Hodkinson, 2012). Without denying the commodity character of housing that Marx 
and Engels have pointed out, these reform approaches have brought to the surface the use-value of 
housing both as an essential human activity and as a sphere of productive non-market activity.
3.3.3	 Conflict	relationship	between	public	policy	and	property	rights
According to Knoepfel (1986), the dialectical relationship between public policies and property 
rights in housing stock regulation can be summarized as follows: Public policies are crafted by 
democratically elected bodies to solve a politically defined public problem in the interest of the 
voting majority. Public policies are regularly revised and updated by political actors (Knoepfel et 
al., 2007:24). In liberal states, property rights protect the individual’s interest against the (poten-
tially absolutist) action of the state. Property rights are grounded in the Civil Code (or similar in 
Common Law countries) and are extremely stable over time because their definition hardly changes 
(Bromley, 1992:11; Savini et al., 2015). Within the constraints of the law, the holder of a proper-
ty right has the right to benefit as well as to freely and completely dispose of his or her property. 
For example, housing stock owners have (1) the right to control and to make decisions about the 
housing stock that belongs to them; and (2) the right to obtain at least a portion of the benefits pro-
duced by the housing stock. Owners are also legally bound to fulfil certain obligations. The Code 
of Obligations and supplementary contracts stipulated in private law describe the obligations of the 
stock owners regarding, for instance, contractual obligations, the sale of buildings, rental contracts, 
or the relationship to tenants (Nicol & Knoepfel, 2008:170).  
Consequently, especially public policies with a spatial impact often conflict with the property own-
ers’ freedom since their rights might be restricted. Among these public policies, land-use planning 
is the most obvious as it precisely aims to control how landowners use their land and the housing 
stock that is built on in the interest of the public. However, since private property rights are strongly 
protected by law and very inflexible, land-use planning seems to experience difficulty in implemen-
ting democratically accepted spatial development plans on titleholders due to conflicting interests 
(Needham & Verhage, 1998; Jacobs & Paulsen, 2009). For example, densification efforts to curb 
urban sprawl prove very tricky to implement (see next paragraph). Therefore, the real housing 
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challenge is not so much plan making, but rather plan implementation. Without heavy state inter-
vention such as expropriation, new housing regulations (e.g. new zoning) are only implemented 
when titleholders agree to undertake new developments, sell their stock or the land, or transfer their 
development rights (Gerber et al., 2017:1685).
The shift towards densification in land-use planning makes this conflicting relationship even more 
pronounced because densification inherently deals with the already built environment. Planning 
therefore takes place within a tight web of existing rights and duties engraved in complex institu-
tional norms and regulations. Potential for redevelopment is often given, but the land is frequently 
not accessible due to the land rights secured by strongly protected property titles. In this situation, 
planning often fails to deal with complex private property-right arrangements as most avenues of 
public intervention were crafted to handle simpler property-rights situations on unbuilt agricultural 
or former industrial land. However, in a context of land scarcity, land-use planning needs to cope 
with complex property-rights situations on already built land such as intermixed parcels of different 
sizes, co-ownership constellations, rights to object granted to neighbors, rights of way, mosaics 
of easements, etc. (for discussion, e.g. Blomley, 2008, 2017; Gerber et al., 2018). More than ever, 
therefore, a keen understanding of the close interactions between public policy and property rights 
is required to effectively steer (socially) sustainable spatial development.  
3.4	 Actors’	use	strategies
Ultimately, the IRR postulates that housing development is not only influenced by formal institu-
tions (Figure 2). Moreover, actors and their appropriation strategies do also play a significant role 
in this complex process of governance (Healey, 2007a). Even though formal rules (legally) frame 
resource users in their activities, users can simultaneously exercise their own agency within this 
frame of reference in order to take advantage of the opportunities granted by those rules. In other 
words, formal institutions are regarded as the product of a socio-political compromise crystallizing 
in space and time the complex power relationships shaping resource uses. This compromise is 
never stable, as laws and regulations are constantly revised, remain unimplemented, can be diverted 
or even hijacked by different actors involved (Gerber et al., 2020:157). The IRR analytical frame-
work aims to capture how these different actors use interests evolve within a given institutional 
setting in order to understand how sustainable outcomes are shaped. 
An actor describes “a unit that acts as a bearer of social roles with specific orientations (values, 
attitudes and motivations) in a social situation. The unit of action is carried not only by individuals, 
but also by social structures and collectives” (Parsons, 1986 in Hillmann, 1994:6). Hence, actors 
are not explicitly considered individuals. Individuals can be actors, but only if they represent inte-
rest groups or a unit with particular interests (Knoepfel et al., 2011:60). The most common case is 
that actors act collectively. This includes groups of individuals who are linked by the same interests 
such as legal collectives (legal entities, parties, associations, unions, social groups) or social entities 
(e.g. an administrative unit within the city administration) (Hengstermann, 2019:113). 
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On the one side, actors’ interests, ideas, and values depend on the configuration of the institutions 
in force. For example, landowners are in a position of power due to the protection guaranteed by 
private property rights. They can enact their objectives in a very targeted manner. On the other side, 
an actor’s behavior is itself goal-oriented and strategic (Hall & Taylor, 1996:955). Within a given 
institutional setting, actors develop strategies to defend their own interests in order to achieve speci-
fic goals. For instance, within the structure of incentives produced by formal rules and norms, actors 
regularize or adapt their plans and actions to defend their own interests and objectives (Ostrom, 
2007:23). Consequently, an actor’s behavior may be influenced both by reference to a familiar set of 
moral obligations and by strategic calculation about what others will do. This brings to the fore-
front that institutions themselves are never stable or predetermined. In contrary, they are the result 
of social practice and construction, strategic actors’ behavior, and decision-making (for discussion, 
e.g. Hess & Ostrom, 2003; Drahos, 2004; Fuys & Dohrn, 2010; Gerber et al., 2018) (see chapter 2). 
Actors can either (re)activate, change, or (re)formulate existing formal rules through targeted inter-
vention strategies in order to defend their own interests effectively. 
Another way to understand the relationship between actors, institutions, and strategies is the “ga-
me-actors-play” (Scharpf, 1997) metaphor. Players (actors) play on a joint playground (arena) and 
move within determined rules of the game (institutions). To understand the game, its processes and 
outcomes, players must not only understand the rules of the game, but also the strategies of the other 
players. However, these strategies are not made explicit but can be read and understood through 
each move and decision they make. To win, players must mobilize available “policy resources” such 
as capital, personnel, infrastructure, information or know-how7. Policy resources are understood as 
means “actors use to assert their values and interests in different stages of the process” (Knoepfel 
et al., 2011:86). The players can combine these policy resources depending on their availability 
and strategic background considerations. Simultaneously, they must also invest in the creation and 
maintenance of these policy resources to maintain or increase their availability in the long term. A 
rich equipment and skillful combination of policy resources by the players points to influential or 
powerful actors who, in principle, have a great chance to win the game (for discussion, Hengster-
mann, 2019:95-108).  
In general, the IRR distinguishes between regulators, owner-, and user-actors each of which can gui-
de, structure, or even determine housing use through their strategic behavior. In the following, the 
strategies employed by the actors involved in the decision-making process about residential densifi-
cation are outlined.
3.4.1	 Municipal	authorities’	strategic	activation	of	land	policy	instruments
Even though there are various public actors – at the national, regional, and local level – whose deci-




is the public actor mainly responsible for dealing with housing challenges (Rudolf et al., 2018:476). 
As regulator, municipal authorities (administrative level), on behalf of the city council (executive 
level) and the city parliament (legislative level), create, control, or dictate housing use rights. 
The public regulations they apply do not directly affect the housing stock itself but the actors who-
se actions have direct consequences upon the stock’s use and development (Nicol & Knoepfel, 
2008:166). More precisely, municipal authorities may (re)- or (de)activate different policy instru-
ments (Article 3) to alter land parcels in size and shape and to promote tenants’ social inclusion such 
as freehand purchase, expropriation, or pre-emption rights (e.g. Vollmer & Kadi, 2018; Schönig, 
2020). The selection of these instruments is never neutral but highly political in nature. The choice 
corresponds to a specific interpretation of the role played by the state and/or its private partners (for 
discussion, e.g. Needham & Verhage, 1998; Needham, 2006, 2014; Alterman, 2007; Hartmann & 
Spit, 2015; Needham et al., 2018). In making this choice, municipal administrations change the use 
conditions for specific interest groups. For example, shifts towards owner-occupied housing may sti-
mulate speculative activity and simultaneously undermine the availability and affordability of rental 
housing (Kadi & Ronald, 2014:271). In Article 3 of this thesis, I introduce and discuss four different 
types of intervention municipal authorities use to promote socially sustainable housing in dense 
cities. These intervention ways derive from the IRR approach. 
3.4.2 The power of property owners as titleholders
Property owners are the target groups of land-use policy (Knoepfel et al., 2003:337; Knoepfel & 
Nahrath, 2007). As such they play a central role in the institutional regime as they do not only have 
a right to use the housing stock built on their land but they also have a contractual obligation to 
maintanence it. They are entitled to the formal property rights and hence have the power to select – 
through contracting mechanisms – what user-actors have which use rights on the goods and services 
provided by the housing estate they own (Nicol & Knoepfel, 2008:166). Moreover, due to the strong 
position as titleholders, property owners are well equipped to resist public policy intervention. Con-
sequently, municipal authorities encounter difficulties in implementing their housing and land-use 
schemes due to the powerful resistance of private property owners (section 3.3.3).  
The push for urban density symbolizes enormous economic potential for private owners. They can 
increase their investment possibilities through the option to (re)construct at central locations and 
within city boundaries. Either they build on newly created plots or on existing plots where increased 
density is allowed (Charmes & Keil, 2015; Holman et al., 2015; Touati-Morel, 2015:606). Urban 
consolidation presents a real possibility for investors because rent revenue can be enhanced in the 
short term through targeted redevelopment and upgrading of existing stocks (Brenner & Theodore, 
2002; Harvey, 2005; Brenner, 2009; Theodore et al., 2011). Owners can realize an enhanced income 
stream over an extended time by virtue of their exclusive control over the land and the housing stock 
that is built on. 
Centrality to transport and communications networks, and general proximity within the financial 
center play a crucial role in this matter, not only because property owners can ask for higher prices 
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for the land and rents because of its accessibility (Theurillat et al., 2014:1426). Moreover, under 
scarce land conditions, speculating on future real-estate values becomes a lucrative investment asset 
(Harvey, 2012:250-252). The housing stock is being used by institutional investors as a value-enhan-
cing investment opportunity, especially given the current low or even negative interest rate situation 
on the capital markets. Property owners (particularly institutional investors) consider housing at 
central locations a safe investment and lucrative speculative object (Aalbers, 2017). 
While planners are typically interested in the use value of land and urban housing stocks as they have 
greater long-term responsibility to maintain and secure resources use, private investors primarily fo-
cus on its exchange value on financial markets (including speculation). Consequently, particularly in 
liberal states, private owners have a general tendency to consider real estate assets as an investment, 
while the municipality appears quite powerless (Gerber et al., 2017:1686-1699). 
In daily practice, three main categories of institutional ownership are differentiated into priva-
te foundations, private companies, and private investment funds (for discussion, e.g. Bord, 2006; 
Csikos, 2008; Theurillat & Crevoisier, 2013; Theurillat et al., 2014). In addition, pension funds and 
other small private investors are identified as intermediary groups that collect, manage, and invest 
the deposited funds of their clients (Hübschle et al., 1990). This includes investors such as banks or 
insurance companies, who invest their money into real estate to deposit their capital. The other three 
main categories of legal entities belong to the shareholders or the investors, founders, or fund owners 
who provide the capital for share or foundation creation. Furthermore, there are a variety of small 
investors (individual homeowners). 
Portfolio logic on the financial markets not only guarantees almost instantaneous reallocation of ca-
pital as results of the separation between the functions of the economic entrepreneur and the financial 
investor. Moreover, portfolio value reflects the mimetic behaviors of the shareholders as well as the 
broader systemic fluctuations on the various financial markets (Theurillat & Crevoisiers, 2013:2055). 
In case of private limited companies, general assembly meetings also participate in decision-making. 
By law, investment funds and private foundations do not have such a “ legislative“ body, but in case 
they obtain bank loans, the responsible bank as creditor is also involved in decision-making proces-
ses to ensure returns. All investor types are advised and supported by various private firms of the 
real estate industry such as private planning or architecture offices, developers, real estate managers, 
construction companies, or rating agencies. The formal owners usually outsource the management 
and planning of their properties to these specialized firms. Sometimes, these companies are subsidia-
ries of the landowning firm or belong to the construction companies that build the housing project 
(Knoepfel et al., 2012).  
3.4.3	 Tenants’	resistance	and	decommodification	strategies
Tenants represent the inhabitants or end-users living in the housing stock (Figure 2; middle row). 
They either have a right to use a dwelling described in a rent contract or they simply appropria-
te a housing use that is unregulated (e.g. in the form of squatting or temporary housing) (Nicol & 
Knoepfel, 2008:166). In the last two decades, a growing housing crisis has emerged in many cities 
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worldwide, which has strongly influenced how and where residents are able to house (Kemeny, 
2006; Lennartz, 2011; Matznetter & Mundt, 2012; Scanlon et al., 2015; Schönig et al., 2017). Many 
lower-income households no longer had the financial means to become owner-occupiers, to main-
tain mortgage burdens, or to access public housing (Harloe, 1982:41). 
The transition was further excerbated by state withdrawal, budget cuts, and a general shift away 
from subsidized rental housing towards market-based sustenance of housing provision (for discus-
sion, e.g. Hackworth, 2003; Aalbers & Holm, 2008; Andersen, 2017). This shift included the trans-
formation of the public sector itself, which in many states has become a market-oriented version. 
For instance, by introducing market principles into public administration (see “new public manage-
ment” literature, e.g. Harvey, 1989; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; Hughes, 2003; Dibben & Higgins, 
2004; Gerber, 2016). Consequently, housing supply has generally started to work in the interests 
of the profit-oriented property sector and not the public. This has led to rising social exclusion and 
inequality mechanisms in cities (Marcuse, 2009). 
However, to counteract trends of social exclusion and gentrification in housing, city residents 
have initiated resistance strategies that aim toward “decommodification”. Decommodification is 
a process that “seeks to get out of the logic of the market, characterized by monetary valuation 
and exchange, nowhere more prevalent than in property-based economies [and] seeks to leave 
the ‘exchange value’ of goods and services to focus more on their ‘use value’” (Gerber & Gerber, 
2017:553). In housing, decommodification stands for the residents’ attempt to create strong soci-
al entitlements and for the citizens’ degree of immunization from market dependencies (Kadi & 
Ronald, 2014:270). The central goal is “to provide every person with housing that is affordable, 
adequate in size and of decent quality, secure in tenure, and located in a supportive neighborhood of 
choice, with recognition of the special housing problems confronting oppressed groups” (Achten-
berg & Marcuse, 1986:476). 
In reality, residents often address such decommodification attempts through NIMBY (Not-in-my-
backyard) opposition. They experience asymmetric distribution of power and a loss of social sta-
bility resulting in social exclusion, polarization, and gentrification (for discussion, e.g. Dear, 1992; 
Kübler, 1995; Pendall, 1999; Burbank et al., 2000; Searle & Filion, 2011; Scally & Tighe, 2015). 
This NIMBYism can take different forms, for example, street rallies, petitions, social movements, 
or neighborhood-wide objections against city (re)development, (re)vitalization, or upgrading pro-
jects (Peck & Tickell, 2002; Holm & Kuhn, 2010). But also practices of cooperation, mutual aid, 
solidarity, as well as horizontality, non-hierarchy, and equality. In critical urban geography litera-
ture, such resistance strategies are generally summarized under the umbrella term “right-to-the-
city” movements (for discussion, e.g. Lefebvre, 1970; Harvey, 1973, 2008; Castells, 1977; Zukin, 
1982; Fainstein & Fainstein, 1985; Lowe, 1986; Mayer, 2003). Residents participating in such 
movements particularly seek affordable housing provision, a decent standard of living, and/or pro-
tection against displacement or income inequality. Moreover, many of them aim to raise awareness 
that housing should not be considered a commodity but as a source of basic need satisfaction upon 
which people depend absolutely (Hackworth & Smith, 2001; Scally & Tighe, 2015).
For example, many tenant activist groups have started to found cooperative housing associations 
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that bought dwellings (or land) to build new homes. As collective owners, they are directly involv- 
ed in the collective management of their homes with the freedom to physically modify their indi-
vidual dwellings as they wish. Rents are set at a level necessary to service any debts incurred (cost 
rent principle) and build up an equity share in the property so that when a tenant leaves, they recei-
ve capital returns based on their share (Hodkinson, 2012). By removing the land and the housing 
stock from the private property market and controlling its use in perpetuity and mutuality, collec- 
tive ownership becomes as attractive as individual home ownership. Any speculative and inflatio-
nary forces driving up the rents for the existing community can be stopped while any increase in 
value stays with the local community (Ward, 1974:131). This overview of literature indicates how 
tenants can develop effective resistance strategies to defend their own socially sustainable housing 
interests in dense city environments. 
3.5 Local governance mechanisms leading to social sustainability in housing in a dense  
	 city:	hypotheses
The IRR analytical approach makes it possible to analyze in detail how institutional rules are used 
by different resource users and how they contribute to potential positive outcomes in terms of 
social sustainability in housing. Densification projects “that are ecologically viably, but socially not 
accepted as places in which to live, work or interact cannot be acknowledged sustainable” (Bram-
ley et al., 2009:2125). Given this potential for trade-offs among goals, a choice must be made as 
to which objectives should receive priority and hence greater weight in the densification process 
(Barbier, 1987:104). However, these trade-offs are identified as the results of power games among 
actors. Densification objectives never get implemented on a one-to-one basis. Rather, power games 
influence the implementation process (e.g. Fainstein & Fainstein, 1979; Flyvbjerg, 1998; Fried-
mann, 1998). 
By combining approaches from public policy analysis (planning as a public policy), new institutio-
nal economics (property rights) with political ecology (power), this thesis enables to capture these 
power games among actors. Powerful actors are those who know how to influence the strategies 
and goals of the other actors in a targeted manner to promote and protect their own values, needs, 
and objectives. By making explicit the governance mechanisms of possible sustainability trade-offs 
and power games in densification procedures, this research project contributes to neoinstitutionalist 
political ecology research. It recognizes that many different resource users can come into conflict 
with each other and allows for a systematic analysis of how various actors behave in response to a 
specific socio-political setting.
In the following paragraph, I formulate five broad working hypotheses on the local governance 
mechanisms contributing to socially sustainable housing in dense city areas (Figure 3). I explain 
the power relations between actors involved in consolidation projects to understand the reasons for 
potential trade-offs between economic, environmental, and social dimensions. By nature, working 
hypotheses present a simplified statement about a complex reality. They are not to be “tested” in a 
quantitative manner (Gläser & Laudel, 2010); rather they are statements about possible causalities 
that guide and structure the research process.
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SQ1:  How do institutional rules affect the outcomes of densification in terms of social sustain-
  ability in housing?
H1:		 Institutional	incoherence	between	landowners’	and	tenants’	rights	prevents	social	
  sustainability 
In a context of densification, the Swiss legal regime in force is not able to secure the provision of all 
goods and services provided by the housing stock (e.g. energy, capital investment, affordable living 
space). The policy shift towards densification has changed the balance of power between different 
users, particularly between landowners and tenants: while the business interests of owner-actors 
remain strongly protected by law (through property rights), tenants are not in the legal position to 
be heard even though the land use conditions have changed. This institutional incoherence between 
landowners’ and tenants’ rights leads to the neglection of tenants’ affordable housing needs while 
owners’ profitability objectives take the upper hand. 
SQ2:	 What strategies do actors (owners and non-owners) follow to contribute to socially sustain- 
  able housing in a dense city?
H2:		 Resistance	power	of	landowners	prevents	social	sustainability	in	housing
In a context of densification, property owners (and the private real-estate industries working on 
their behalf) strategically activate their rights to private property to increase profit making. They 
use their rights to set the rents according to market prices and to increase the land rent. Further-
more, through strategic coalition of political forces (in legislative and executive committees), they 
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tentially harm their profit interests in housing (re)development. Thereby, they divert the original 
intensions of densification policy objectives (green growth) by using the legal provisions to achieve 
goals other than those originally planned by the law (Eco-Business). 
H3:		 Effective	tenants’	grassroots	resistance	leads	to	social	sustainability	in	housing
Densification triggers residents’ grassroots resistance for social sustainability goals in housing as 
well as political and public debates on alternative densification models because tenants suffer the 
negative consequences of the process (social exclusion). Tenants strategically participate to NIM-
BY-opposition (e.g. public rallies, legal objections, formal petitions) to increase the socio-political 
pressure on governments and owner-actors to obtain measures against dismissal and displacement 
(e.g. compensation payments, secure political support, reduction of local costs). If those entities do 
not agree to compromise with the tenants’ claims, landowners and public authorities risk that den-
sification as public policy objective as a whole will fail or come to a standstill because of tenants’ 
social resistance against (re)development.  
H4:		 Active	municipal	land	policy	strategy	leads	to	social	sustainability	in	housing
Densification forces municipal authorities to activate regulations and policy instruments that pro-
mote social sustainability goals in housing that are otherwise being put aside. Public-administra- 
tive actors are in the key position to strategically intervene on private development interests 
because land-use planning alone is unable to control how owners use their land in the interest of 
the public. They can prevent tenants’ social exclusion, but they must therefore know how to densify. 
To do so, they need to act strategically and activate public and private law instruments, which do 
not always need to limit property owners’ rights (e.g. through zoning), but also work with property 
rights (e.g. through public land acquisition). All the finesse and strategic competencies of planning 
administrations is required to implement planning measures that promote social inclusion, because 
landowners have the power to defend the status quo due to strong veto rights. 
SQ3:	 How does the implementation of densification objectives impact social sustainability in  
  housing?
H5:		 The	Business	of	Densification
Densification – as a core objective of Swiss planning policy – leads to the neglect of the social pil-
lar of sustainability in housing because owner-actors have realized that the shift towards densifica-
tion comes with real business opportunities rather than profit restrictions. Today, they acknowledge 
that densification is a profitable investment opportunity since more rent revenue can be realized at 
central locations through redevelopment and upgrading of existing stocks. Simultaneously, public 
authorities have started to promote the “Business of Densification“ too since they have noticed that 
property owners – due to their strongly protected property title – are in a strong legal position to 
resist socially sustainable densification efforts. However, within this trade- off of densification 
objectives, the three sustainability dimensions fall out of balance. Powerful economic actors (in-
cluding landowners, real estate industries) and public authorities put social criteria (e.g. social 




research design and methodology
To explain the governance mechanisms at play leading to socially sustainable housing development 
in dense city areas (main research question), the data of the four articles of this thesis is conducted 
through a qualitative case study design. A case study is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between the phenomenon and the context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2018:15). This qualitative 
approach makes it possible to uncover new trends and individuals’ motivations in order to grasp a 
largely unknown and barely quantifiable process of social origin (Taylor & Bogdan, 1998; George 
& Bennett, 2005). It acknowledges that social sustainability in housing is produced by a complex 
interplay of contextual (institutional setting) and behavioral factors (actors’ strategies). Housing 
development in dense urban environments cannot be separated from its context and thus requires 
a qualitative analysis (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Yin, 2018). By employing a qualitative case study design, 
the research questions (SQ1 to 3) are answered as results of human action and within its real-time 
socio-economic and -political context (Scholz & Tietje, 2002).
However, case study research also aims at generalization. It is connected to relational approaches 
in urban studies aiming to identify similarities and/or differences in local patterns of policy imple-
mentation (Ward, 2010; Robinson, 2016). Deductively developed research variables – such as in 
this thesis, housing as a resource, institutions, and actors’ strategies – postulate causal mechanisms 
(section 3.5) that are investigated in the light of the empirical material collected in carefully selec-
ted cases (section 4.2). Potential for generalization is not obtained through testing a hypothesis for 
general statistical significance but rather the results from the identified causal mechanisms, the re-
levance of which is expected to be broader than in the analyzed cases only (Flyvbjerg, 1998, 2006; 
Yin, 2018).  
In the following section, I describe the Swiss context of the empirical analysis (4.1), the detailed 
reasons for case selection (4.2), as well as the different data collection and analysis methods applied 
(4.3). I conclude this chapter by reflecting upon my own positionality in the research process and 
the various challenges encountered in the field (4.4). 
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4.1	 Challenges	of	housing,	urban	land	scarcity,	and	social	exclusion	in	Switzerland
The present research is first and foremost based on a Swiss case study. The country counts 8.6 Mio. 
residents in total (FSO, 2020b) and is internationally considered a small state of only 41.285 square 
kilometers located in the center of Europe. Given the fact that much of the land cannot be or is not 
used for residential purposes due to landscape protection or mountainous surfaces, the effective 
population density is substantially higher than is average across Europe (Bourassa et al., 2010:266). 
Consequently, Switzerland today has an urbanization level of about 73% (Weilenmann et al., 
2017:469).
 
The state makes a promising case study to gain knowledge on housing use conflicts as results 
of densification since the socio-economic challenges connected to urban growth have increased 
substantially in recent years (see Article 1 for details). Between 1935 and 2002, the degree of urban 
sprawl in Switzerland increased by 155%, and without effective policy measures, quantitative 
scenarios of future urban sprawl show that it is likely to further increase by more than 50% until 
2050. Between 2002 and 2010, moreover, the degree of greenfield development was around three 
times as high as between 1980 and 2002 (Jaeger & Schwick, 2014:294).
To reconcile concerns of urban sprawl, the Swiss federal government has introduced spatial de-
velopment guidelines (the revised Federal Spatial Planning Act [SPA] in 2013) more in line with 
environmental sustainability in a span of more than 20 years (Swiss Federal Council, 2002, 2016). 
General principles include the restriction of urban sprawl, the reduction of energy emissions, and 
the support of a more compact urbanization (Rérat, 2012:116-120). Stated another way, densifica-
tion has become a major issue in professional and planning circles as well as in the broader popu-
lation, but there is still much questioning and concern that stands in the way of implementation at 
the municipal level (see Articles 2 to 4 for details) (Rérat, 2012:129; Grams & Nebel, 2013; Nebel 
et al., 2017; Swiss Federal Council, 2017). In sum, we are in the light of facing severe socio-spatial 
challenges linked to the end of greenfield development in this country.
Furthermore, the social implications of densification have become predominant in Swiss cities in 
recent years (Figure 4). A general shift towards profit seeking in housing coupled with the obliga- 
tion to densify introduced by the revised Federal Spatial Planning Act in 2013 have reinforced 
trends of social exclusion and gentrification in Swiss cities. In particular, old housing stocks are 
being demolished and redeveloped with higher rents (FOSI & FOH, 2015; FOH, 2016). As a con-
sequence, a growing number of tenants living in urban rental housing stocks is confronted with 
eviction and displacement at short-notice as they cannot afford the rents after densification and mo-
dernization tasks anymore (FOH, 2019:4). Low- and middle-income households face difficulties in 
finding adequate housing as newly modernized apartments are primarily affordable for households 
with higher incomes, and non-profit housing suppliers have long waiting lists (Balmer & Gerber, 
2017; FOH, 2017). Within the rental market, 28.9% of households suffer from excessive housing 
costs in relation to income (FOSI & FOH, 2015).
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Simultaneously, population growth coupled with yield-oriented investments attracted by the state’s 
economic stability and wealth has reinforced the attractiveness of Swiss housing markets. 
Triggered by low-interest rates, urban housing stocks have become the main target of capital in-
vestment, especially for pension funds (Theurillat & Crevoisier, 2013; Theurillat et al., 2014). As 
a result, social resistance strategies against densification and large-scale investment projects have 
increased in Swiss cities because many tenants no longer accept the social implications caused by 
consolidation and upgrading (Swiss Federal Council, 2017; Maissen, 2018).
Due to these numerous reasons, Switzerland makes an interesting case study for the analysis of 
housing use conflicts and emerging socio-political challenges as results of densification. The federal 
state plays a crucial role in this matter in the sense that it signals how to deal with this issue also for 
cantons and municipalities. Switzerland is organised on three executive levels (municipalities, can-
tons, and the confederation) and characterised by a form of “cooperative federalism”. Legislation in 
favor of densification goals and/or social sustainability of housing is introduced by the federal state 
and is to be implemented by cantons and municipalities (Linder, 1994).
Hence, the three institutional levels are jointly responsible for sustainable spatial development in 
Switzerland, but have distinct areas of responsibility (principle of “subsidiarity”). The Swiss federal 
government is headed by the Federal Council (executive level), which is a collegial body consis-
ting of seven ministers. They are elected by both chambers of parliament (legislative level) which 
consist of the National Council (representing the people) and the Council of States (representing the 
cantons). In general, the Swiss political system is characterized by direct democratic rights inclu-
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To understand how housing is shaped in a context of densification, four Swiss case studies for de-
tailed analysis were selected. The four cities – Zurich, Basel, Köniz, and Kloten – were chosen due 
to multiple reasons. First, the four municipalities were selected along the dependent variable of the 
main research question (social sustainability in housing). At the time of investigation, all four cities 
had to deal with on-going housing challenges as results of urban densification projects. They all 
showed similar socio-economic characteristics such as strong population growth, scarcity of urban 
land, intensive densification pressure, affordable housing shortages, and challenges of new-built 
gentrification (Table 3). They moreover represented highly urbanized environments where most 
people live, where most economic development takes place, and where most housing projects are 
obtained. Hence, these cities are part of a highly integrated urban system in Switzerland in which 
the municipalities present regional centers for economic activities and living – similarly to the 
urban structure in Germany or the Netherlands (Figure 5). Therefore, by choosing these municipa-
lities, the governance mechanisms at play (independent variable) leading to socially (un)sustainable 
housing development in a dense urban environment (main research question) became easily visi- 
ble and graspable (Yin, 2018).
Table 3: Housing market characteristics in Zurich, Basel, Köniz and Kloten City (City of Kloten, 2020a; City 
of Köniz, 2020a; FOSD, 2017:25; FSO, 2020b; FSO, 2020b; Glattal Region, 2020; Nebel et al., 2017; Statisti-
cal	Offices	Zurich	&	Basel	City	2019;	2020).






































Switzerland  8.603 Mio. +21% by 2050 
 
1.66% - 37.1% 58.6% 4.3% 










+21% by 2030, 
significant 
increase of 10-









47.2% 28% 24.9% 















49 years old 
 
0.7% 4% (only 
housing) 
49.7% 36.1% 13.5% 
City of       
Köniz 
Suburban 42’694  +6% by 2030 0.5% 24% (only 
housing) 
 
15% 75% 10% 
City of 
Kloten 
Suburban 20’079 +15% by 2030 0.88% 24% (only 
housing) 
20% 71.3% 8.7% 
 
48
Second, while general densification objectives can be defined at a broader federal or regional scale, 
real-time implementation needs to be undertaken at the projects level, block by block, dealing with 
each impacted landowner one by one. To investigate concrete examples in the cases under scrutiny, 
I further selected cities that are currently challenged by concrete residential densification projects 
(opportunism). A (re)development area was defined as a set of buildings that belong to a private le-
gal body and for which this body has a certain strategy to manage them (Figure 6). In general, these 
densification areas were selected according to: 
• The type of dominant use: residential. 
• The type of landownership: private rental. Institutional investors own 63% of the housing  
 stock property in Swiss cities. This ownership type is identified to be representative for many  
 other residential housing areas in Swiss urban areas (FOH, 2017:14). 
• The project’s actuality: implemented	within	the	last	five	years	(2015-2020). Thereby, I was  
 able to directly confront the actors involved with their decisions and actions taken in order to  
 understand how they cope with social sustainability challenges in housing under scarce land  
 use conditions (see research questions).
Third, despite its similarities (e.g. housing challenges, densification pressure, population growth) 
the four cases also showed some distinct differences in terms of their local governance mecha-   
nisms (main research question). To compare and to assess the variation in their social, political, 
and institutional structures (independent variable), I selected municipalities in order to study and to 
understand differences in the local institutional context (SQ1) and applied actors’ strategies (SQ2). 
Even though there are various public actors – at the national, regional, and local level – whose deci-
sion-making directly shapes and (re)defines the housing landscape, in liberal states such as  
Figure	5:	Map	of	Switzerland	and	the	cases	conducted	within	the	country	–	Zurich,	Basel,	Köniz,	and	Kloten.	
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Switzerland, the municipality is the public actor mainly responsible for addressing social challen-
ges in housing (Rudolf et al., 2018:476; Schönig, 2020). As regulator, municipal authorities (admi-
nistrative level) on behalf of the city council (executive level), and the city parliament (legislative 
level) create, control, or dictate housing use rights. With respect to regulations on higher levels (e.g. 
Federal SPA), municipal authorities are in charge of granting the building permits for residential 
densification projects to private landowners and building applications always need to align with the 
municipal zoning plan and its associated building ordinance (Bühlmann et al., 2011; Muggli, 2014). 
I selected two urban core cities – the cities of Zurich and Basel (>100’000 inhabitants) – and two 
suburban cities – Köniz and Kloten (>20’000 inhabitants). While in core cities, authorities can 
usually rely on well-organized administrative units, smaller municipalities often have less capacity 
due to the lack of planning experts working in their administration. They are also confronted with a 
faster turn-over among politicians, at both executive and legislative levels (Rudolf et al., 2018:477). 
To understand how municipal governance works, I therefore selected four municipalities of diffe-
rent size and administrative structure to develop a broad understanding of the implementation of 




4.2.1 The Case of Zurich-City
The city of Zurich is a German-speaking city and the largest urban center in Switzerland (434.008 
residents; around 1 Mio. including the suburbs) (Statistical Office City of Zurich, 2020). The mu-
nicipality of Zurich represents both the core center of Zurich agglomeration and the capital of the 
canton of Zurich. Due to its steady population and economic growth and its function as internatio-
nal investment center, Zurich is considered Switzerland’s financial capital (Theurillat & Crevoisier, 
2013). It is moreover a metropolitan center characterized by a high degree of urbanity. For years, 
alongside Geneva, Zurich has been listed as one of the cities with the highest quality of life and at 
the same time the highest cost of living worldwide (Rérat & Lees, 2011:131).  
Since 1980, Zurich’s population has increased by +17% and investment into real-estate has cons-
tantly risen (Statistical Office City of Zurich, 2020). During the 80s and 90s, Zurich started to 
deindustrialize and some of the abandoned industrial land was transformed into office development 
or was taken over for cultural activities. A major process of reconstruction began in which the 
municipality started to transform from “no-man’s land” into a fashionable city. Many investors and 
developers have begun to recognize the city’s potential and started to reclaim the buildings they 
owned (Rérat & Lees, 2011:131).
Since the year 2000, however, the redevelopment of existing buildings or vacant plots has become 
increasingly challenging for investors due to conflicting land use interests at central locations. Only 
10% of all newly built apartments have been built on unbuilt parcels during the last two decades 
in Zurich. Most of the newly built dwellings have been created through reconstruction and densi-
fication of existing housing stocks on already built land (e.g. through renovation, transformation) 
since free inner-city greenfield and brownfield areas are missing (City of Zurich, 2020). Therefore, 
the tensions between densification and social exclusion mechanisms have increased significantly 
in recent years (Rérat, 2012a). The absolute number of social evictions in the city’s private rental 
sector has doubled within the period of 2006 to 2017 (Statistical Office City of Zurich, 2017). Bet-
ween 2000 and 2013, rental prices in the housing stock have increased by 37% while rental prices 
on the free market have risen even more drastically, by 75% (Balmer & Gerber, 2017:8). Moving 
to cheaper suburban areas has remained the main option to afford housing for many vulnerable and 
lower income groups living in Zurich. 
Zurich Brunau
Research conducted in the city of Zurich focused on a residential area close to the center called 
“Zurich Brunau”, a former clay pit and industrial zone (Figure 6). Like many other parts of the city, 
the area was deindustrialized and transformed during the 1980s (Rérat, 2012:119). Since then, a se-
ries of new housing developments of a hundred units and more have been constructed. Specifically, 
Zurich Brunaupark – a settlement built in the 1980/90s – is comprised of four residential buildings 
with 239 apartments and approximately 400 residents. It is situated next to the Sihlcity mega-pro-
ject, which opened 2007 as the first big urban entertainment center in Switzerland. Sihlcity is a 
shopping and leisure facility including almost 80 shops, nine cinema screens, a spa, a library, a 
hotel, a church, restaurants, several offices and apartments (Theurillat & Crevoisier, 2013:2062). 
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The pension fund of the bank “Credit Suisse” (CS) plans to demolish the inner-city location by 
replacing old buildings from the 1980s and 1990s. Four of the five buildings will be demolished 
and replaced by seven-storey residential buildings instead of today’s five-storey residential buil-
dings (potential for exploitation of + 30,000 m2). The number of apartments in the four new buil-
dings will increase from 239 today to 497 in the future (Schoop et al., 2020:18). In March 2019, the 
planning application was submitted to the Zurich Office for Building Permits. This was followed 
by the contract termination for a total of 239 tenant parties. Within a year, around 450 people would 
have to leave their homes (Schoop et al. 2020). In 2012, two of the four buildings in the settlement 
were refurbished, namely kitchens and bathrooms were redone. Following the planned demolition 
and new construction, rents are expected to rise by around +60%. According to the investor, a 3.5 
room apartment (75m2) will cost between 2’200 and 2’650 CHF monthly net rent (today about 
1500 CHF net).
4.2.2 The Case of Basel-City
The city of Basel is a German-speaking city and after Zurich and Geneva the third largest urban 
center in Switzerland (178.445 inhabitants; around 800’000 including suburban areas) (Swiss 
Cities Association, 2020). Basel-City is also the capital of the canton of Basel-Stadt, which it 
forms with the municipalities of Riehen and Bettingen. Basel is moreover a border town located 
on the Northern border of Switzerland at the triangle between Switzerland, Germany, and France. 
The city therefore has suburbs in all three countries. Basel is divided into “Grossbasel” on the left 
(Southwestern) side of the Rhine river and the area of “Kleinbasel” on the right (Northeastern) ri-
verbank of the Rhine. The municipality is considered a global center for the chemical and pharma-
ceutical industry. Two large international pharmaceutical companies “Novartis” and “Roche” have 
their headquarters in Basel. 
From a spatial development perspective, Basel city has undergone a period of structural change 
and intensive population growth since the 1990s (Ott, 2020). Since 2000, the city population has 
increased by +7% to 178.445 in total (Statistical Office City of Basel, 2020). By 2040, Basel‘s 
residential population is expected to increase by another 10%. The city currently faces a shortage 
of affordable housing. Between 2003 and 2013, rents in existing stocks have increased by 29%. 
Rental prices offered on the free market have increased even more dramatically, by 38% (Balmer 
& Gerber, 2017:8). An increasing number of socially disadvantaged groups find it difficult to find 
an apartment within city boundaries (Basel-City Council, 2018:6). To address these challenges, the 
city government has initiated the “1.000+“ housing program, which aims to create a total of 1.000 
newly-built affordable apartments in public ownership by 2035. In addition, many former industrial 
sites have been redeveloped or are currently being transformed into housing areas (Statistical Office 
City of Basel, 2019:6; Ott, 2020). 
Basel Schoren
The empirical analysis conducted in the city of Basel focused on a residential area close to “Ba-
sel Badischer Bahnhof”, situated at the Northeastern edge of the city center. The “Schoren” area 
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includes some newly built developments of different sizes on former brownfield sites or on vacant 
land, but also the redevelopment of already densified land. Around 1400 inhabitants currently live 
in the Schoren neighborhood, and the population is expected to grow steadily in the next few years. 
In particular, the relocation of the former Novartis office campus has created vacant industrial space 
that has now been designated to be transformed into a large-scale residential area. From 2012 to 
2018, an additional 800 residents moved to the Schoren area, which meant a population increase 
of almost +30% (City of Basel, 2015:2). Specifically, I focused on the Basel Schorenweg area – a 
settlement built in 1961 – which counts 196 apartments with around 300 residents in total. The Cre-
dit Suisse investment fund plans to densify the two buildings via total internal reconstruction with 
smaller housing units in 2021 (Laur, 2019:21). 
4.2.3 The Case of Köniz
Köniz is a German-speaking municipality in the “Bern-Mittelland” administrative district in the 
canton of Bern in Switzerland. The municipality is part of the wider agglomeration of the city of 
Bern. Köniz is located southwest of Bern center and is the fourth largest municipality in the can-
ton of Bern and the thirteenth largest town in Switzerland with 42.694 inhabitants in total (City of 
Köniz, 2020). Between 2003 and 2013, the residential population in Köniz increased by 7%, which 
is more than in the surrounding municipalities. The increase has primarily to do with the proximity 
of Köniz to Bern and immigration from abroad. In principle, the majority of the households living 
in Köniz can afford an apartment on the rental market. However, it is assumed that, due to high 
demand and scarce land use conditions in the municipality, the housing situation will worsen in the 
future. Prices on the housing market tend to rise, which primarily affects family households and 
lower income groups (Beck et al., 2016:14-15).  
Köniz Nessleren
Research conducted in the city of Köniz focused on the “Nessleren” area located in the Wabern 
district at the northeastern edge of the municipality. The settlement consists of 33 houses that were 
built between 1979 and 1982. The three-story buildings are arranged in 13 rows of two or three 
houses. The three institutional owners of the settlement (one private foundation, one private bank, 
and one private insurance company) decided to remedy the existing structural deficits, in particular, 
the insulation and heating system through reconstruction. The buildings were completely renovated 
and densified in 2018. The settlement now counts 60% additional residential units (Espace Suisse, 
2018).  
4.2.4 The Case of Kloten
The city of Kloten is a German-speaking city located about 10 km northeast of Zurich city center. 
The municipality is part of Zurich’s agglomeration and metropolitan area (AZMA, 2020). From 
1946 to 1948, Zurich-Kloten airport was built west of the village of Kloten. The city is also close 
to the airport motorway, which connects the town to the (inter)national highway system (City of 
Kloten, 2020).
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Since 1980, the city’s population has increased by 27%. It is estimated that Kloten will increase by 
another 15% until 2040 (Glattal Region, 2020). By 2020, the “Circle Project” will open at Zurich 
airport, which will create around 4.000 new jobs in the city. This population growth is difficult to 
combat within Kloten’s municipal boundaries. The city does not have any free unbuilt reserve zo-
nes left, and therefore must densify via soft measures (e.g. conversion). Most of the buildings were 
built in the 1960s and 1970s and need modernization. In addition, the city of Kloten with residents 
from around 120 different nations is confronted with a very high degree of residential fluctuation. 
About 50% of the population leaves Kloten within five years. The main reason for this is the 
airport: many international residents have temporary positions and are only in the country for a 
short period. Rents are affordable for most residents living in Kloten; however, confronted with the 
situation that old housing stocks are currently being demolished and densified, many tenants strugg-
le with social displacement because the upgrades lead to higher rents. In some city areas, a clear 
process of social segregation is occurring where particularly lower income groups can no longer 
afford housing (City of Kloten, 2019:1-12).  
Kloten Southern district
Empirical work conducted in the city of Kloten focused on the residential area at the southern edge 
of the city next to the municipal border to “Opfikon-Glattbrugg”. Due to the representative location 
at the entrance of the municipality, the city council decided to improve the urban situation in this 
area. It is planned that the district will transform into an attractive urban area in the next few years. 
Many new workplaces at Zurich airport have been created, which is why an increasing number of 
residents are expected to move to the Kloten Southern district (City of Kloten, 2019). The area is 
comprised of around 20 plots owned by private institutional investors and individuals. The “kloten.
milano” project – the settlement I investigated – was demolished and rebuilt with triple use density 
in 2016. The owner is an institutional investor and developer from the Zurich region. The around 
80 residents living in the former settlement had to leave their apartments in 2016 as most of them 
could not afford the higher rents in the modernized buildings anymore (City of Kloten, 2015).
4.3 Data collection methods
The empirical material of this thesis was conducted by the use of qualitative research methods. This 
was done in order to gain a detailed understanding of the governance mechanisms at play (insti-
tutional rules, actors’ strategies) leading to socially sustainable housing development (see main 
research questions) (Flick, 2007; Gläser & Laudel, 2009). More precisely, the three deductively 
developed key variables of the theoretical model – housing as a resource, institutions, and actors’ 
strategies – were analyzed by employing qualitative methods that facilitate gathering information 
of social origin (Yin, 2018). All data collection methods employed were intended to aid a better 
understanding of the complex relationships between housing and densification dynamics in order 
to answer the research questions. Specifically, the following research methods were employed: 
qualitative document analysis, participant observation, household surveys, semi-structured and 
expert interviews. The actual field research was carried out between August and September 2018 
(Articles 1 and 4) and between May and October 2019 (Articles 2 and 3). A comprehensive list of 
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all interviews is provided in Annex 1. The research process was moreover organized circularly. The 
phases of data collection, analysis, and interpretation were not necessarily regarded as conceptually 
distinct but as interconnected throughout the process (Behnke et al., 2010:42).  
4.3.1 Document and statistical data analysis
Since this research is concerned with housing, the first step of data collection before going to 
the field was a statistical data analysis (but qualitative in nature) focusing in particular on the 
socio-economic state of housing at the federal level as well as in each municipality (population dy-
namics, development of rents, vacancy rates, land and housing prices etc.). The analysis helped me 
to capture housing (re)development within its real-life socio-economic context and concerning po-
tential use conflicts. Moreover, the housing situation in each city was related to the general housing 
situation in Switzerland (George & Bennett, 2005). This step helped me to further elaborate upon 
the dependent variable of the main research question (social sustainability in housing). 
In a second step, I analyzed the regulatory institutions of the housing stock both at the federal, can-
tonal, and municipal level (sub-question 1). This helped me to understand the institutional regime 
governing housing under densification pressure. Since it was impossible to review the full extent 
of laws and policies that constitute the institutional regime, I primarily focused on regulations and 
policy instruments that were considered to have most effect on the housing stock’s sustainability. 
Besides housing, planning, and building laws directly impacting the extent and range of housing, 
these also included more indirect ways of public intervention such as environmental, monument 
protection, tax laws as well as property rights, contracts, and tenancy law. The aim of the content 
analysis was to structurally filter the documents in relation to certain topics and aspects of the prob-
lem of interest and to summarize them (Mayring, 2010). 
In all four papers, I performed a broad screening of policy documents at the interface between ur-
ban densification, housing, and social sustainability issues (affordable housing, social mixing etc.). 
The qualitative analysis included written sources such as government reports, legislation, strategy 
papers, and parliamentary debates that were primarily published within the last decade. I also 
incorporated newspaper articles, project documents, and ‘grey literature’ in order to understand the 
characteristics of the specific formal rules in force. 
4.3.2 Participant observation
A second important source of information was provided by participatory observations (Reuber & 
Pfaffenbach, 2005). I employed this step in order to better understand the research context and to 
gain knowledge prior to the interviews in which actors’ strategies and objectives were assessed 
(sub-question 2). To do so, I spent a lot of time visiting the cities and densification areas selected 
and sought to speak to as many people as possible in order to gain various insights from residents 
and other stakeholders. For instance, in Zurich Brunau, I spent a considerable amount of time at 
the playground and in the back-yard speaking to parents or elderly people who had only recently 
55
received their contract termination. A variety of people used to came to have a chat with me as they 
noticed that I was taking notes and documenting my impressions when visiting the place. 
In Basel Schorenweg, I visited an 86-year old female resident, who was living alone in her flat 
struggling to find an alternative dwelling. A nurse who helped her to cope with the situation suppor-
ted her. I spoke to both several times in order to grasp valuable insights how older people deal with 
densification challenges. While I was mostly just an observant on these occasions, I also participa-
ted in tenants group meetings led by the local tenants’ associations. These conservations revealed 
a lot about life in the densification area, about neighborhood relations or conflicts as well as inves-
tors’ and public authorities’ communication strategies with tenants. 
Furthermore, I attended opening celebrations of newly finished densification projects to gather 
back-ground information on how investors communicate and how their internal organizational 
structures work. Thereby, I also gained knowledge of how the relations between the investor, the 
developer, and other supplying firms of the real-estate industry such as private architecture or plan-
ning offices are managed. During my doctoral studies, I also attended a six-month program of ad-
vanced studies in urban management at the University of Zurich. In this course, I met professionals 
working for the private real estate industry and learned a lot about their decision-making behavior. 
These gatherings granted me important insights into the discourses of economic players that they 
use to legitimize their actions.  
During both research periods, I constantly wrote down my analytical thoughts and memos in my 
field book (Charmaz, 2008:162). I noted all observations and informal conversations and tried to 
record as many details as possible right after the informal discussions. I wrote down specific ques-
tions for which I ought to seek out specific respondents to constantly improve my knowledge and to 
precisely tailor my interview questions. 
4.3.3 Household surveys
As outlined in the theory part of this thesis, the principal source of evidence concerning socially 
sustainable housing development in densification processes is considered to be people them-
selves, particularly those living in the areas in question (Bramley et al., 2009:2129). With this in 
mind, I conducted a household survey with 412 households living in the settlements of Zurich Bru-
nau and Basel Schoren to gain a detailed understanding of the residents’ perspectives (sub-question 
2). The survey enabled me to determine the profile of the residents, their motivations, and the so-
cio-economic challenges they are currently confronted with. The two large-scale densification areas 
were selected for detailed comparative analysis of households’ perceptions as they are both owned 
by the same institutional investor (Credit Suisse [CS]; see Article 2). Moreover, CS’ projects in 
Zurich and Basel were both on-going at the time of investigation (between May and October 2019), 
which is why the tenants involved could be directly confronted with their decisions and actions ta-
ken. By following this project-based approach, I investigated social sustainability in housing “from 
the ground up, as it actually exists in local places, and as a set of evolving practices” (Krueger & 
Agyeman, 2005:416).
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The household survey incorporated the social sustainability indicators presented in Article 2 and 
included both open and multiple-choice questions. The open questions were used to gain a rich 
understanding of the households’ perspective on how tenants are affected by densification plans. 
The multiple-choice questions were used to further underline household positions, but the analysis 
remained qualitative in nature. I opted for a self-completion postal and digital survey method (with 
one reminder) and managed to achieve a respectable 25% response rate (101 responses in total). 
In designing the questionnaire, I considered the existing body of literature as well as a number of 
national surveys covering similar topics that helped me to identify whether and how questions have 
been shown to work.
4.3.4 Semi-structured and expert interviews
To understand the diverse strategies and the behavior of the actors involved in densification projects 
(sub-question 2), I employed 54 semi-structured interviews with representatives from both the pub-
lic and the private sector. These included policymakers from the national to the local district level, 
practitioners from public ministries, and representatives of homeowners’ and tenants’ associations, 
housing cooperatives, neighbors, and residents (Annex 1). 
Out of these, 42 were conducted as expert interviews and 12 as semi-structured interviews with 
residents. My intention in performing expert interviews was to gain detailed information about how 
specific individuals and activist groups perceive densification in relation to their particular functi-
on (Meuser & Nagel, 2009:57). Experts interviews are particularly useful in research settings that 
intend to identify causal mechanisms that are to be analyzed in a more detailed manner and from a 
range of different perspectives (Blatter et al., 2007:60). For example, I interviewed several politici-
ans due to their expert knowledge and professional position in parliament or in public administrati-
on. By conducting interviews, my goal was moreover to investigate the actors’ reasons and motiva-
tion to participate in residential densification (SQ2). All experts were chosen due to their detailed 
understanding and knowledge of the topic as well as based on their practical expertise related to the 
position they occupied within certain institutional structures. 
For the interviews, I prepared thematically structured guidelines in the format of a semi-structured 
questionnaire. I sent the guiding questions to the interviewees in advance so that they could pre-
pare for discussion. In contrast to standardized interviews, performing semi-structured interviews 
enabled me to explore the interviewees’ knowledge during the interview process in an explorative 
manner (Gläser & Laudel, 2010). All interviews were conducted in person and were mostly held 
in the offices of the respondents or alternatively at a location they chose (e.g. one politician was 
interviewed in a restaurant). All interviews were recorded with the permission of respondents. In 
the majority of cases, interview participants were alone, and the interviews could proceed undistur-
bed. All interviews lasted between 60 to 90 minutes. I stopped interviewing people when no further 
knowledge could be gathered or the same information was repeated by different sources.
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4.4 Data analysis methods 
The qualitative data material – either in the format of documents, surveys, or interviews – was 
analyzed by following general principles of qualitative content analysis (Gläser & Laudel, 2010:46; 
Mayring, 2010). The three deductive variables – housing as a resource, institutions, and actors’ 
strategies – and the mechanisms that bind their interaction (independent variable) were identified 
in the text via a code-based context analysis. First, the non-written data material (audio interviews) 
was transcribed into text using a professional transcription service and then coded with the help 
of MaxQDA as the data analysis tool. The software aided in deleting or rewriting specific codes in 
an effective manner. The text was then analyzed along the three variables at play and related to the 
specific themes the interviewees raised in each of the three subsections. I however did not only fo-
cus on deductive coding. Rather I combined inductive and deductive coding and remained open to 
emergent themes during the process of data analysis (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Emerson et al., 1995; 
Charmaz, 2008). In essence, I coded my data using thematic codes based on my research questions 
and theoretical concepts as well as more analytical codes that inductively emerged from the data. 
4.5	 Positionality,	reflexivity,	and	validity	of	the	data
The variety of data collection methods as well as the time spent in the municipalities and densifica-
tion areas strengthened the validity and reliability of the results. Risks of selective data acquisition 
were reduced through triangulating different qualitative methods. However, every method applied 
has its own limitations that I would like to briefly reflect on to arrange the results within an approp-
riate framework. 
The questionnaire conducted with tenants is based on the self-assessment of the respondents under 
the basic assumption that participants respond to the surveys according to their best knowledge and 
based on subjective perspectives. The qualitative statements, however, were not verified or com-
pared on a more general basis. Even though the variables incorporated in the questionnaire were 
justified by referring to theory, there is still a possibility that relevant data could not be effectively 
captured. The statements made in the questionnaire helped to interpret some of the results; howe-
ver, a closer examination (e.g. in-depth expert interviews or broader statistical analyses) is impera-
tive for more valid derivations.
When performing interviews, the validity of the data was increased by sending the questions to the 
participants in advance so that they could prepare for the task. In addition, training was carried out 
with the participants at the beginning of each interview in order to make the data collection process 
more transparent. I also paid particular attention to data documentation (e.g. in transcription, field 
notes) to make each step of data collection explicit and replicable (Gläser & Laudel, 2010:193). To 
guarantee data protection, I moreover asked all residents interviewed to sign a document for ethical 
approval to ensure that the data collected in their homes can—in an anonymous way—be used for 
publication. 
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Finally, my identity as a researcher played a key role in the data collection process and the interac-
tions with various stakeholders in the field. I noticed this in particular in discussions with institutio-
nal investors or politicians who, at the beginning, were very skeptical towards land policy research 
since they obviously perceived it as a left-wing policy. While trying to analyze densification from a 
social science perspective, I became aware that I myself am simultaneously an actor. Urban scien-
ce itself is a social area with its own power games. My scientific knowledge is always subject to 
strong uncertainty, positionality, but also subjectivity. Since I identify myself as a critical human 
geographer, it was very important for me to explain the background of my work in detail before ga-
thering data in order to create mutual trust and an open atmosphere. I made my research objectives 
very clear from the start and always explained my interests in analyzing (not judging) densification 
processes from a human geography and political ecology perspective, which includes a focus on 
power games. 
Furthermore, the sensitivity to the tenants’ housing situation was difficult to manage in many ways. 
It was never my intention to encroach upon their privacy, but to collect valuable insights I some-
times had to ask very personal questions, for example, concerning their future housing options even 
though they only recently received contract termination. In these situations, it was my impression, 
however, that my age or gender (or both) helped to establish a connection with them. They consi-
dered me more of a friend than a pure researcher and were very open-minded to tell me about their 
current living situation. After all, keeping a research diary was an important part of reflecting on my 
own positionality and the way it affected my interactions with different stakeholders involved in the 
process. 
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5.  Dissertation structure
The empirical analyses in the four articles that compose this thesis focus on social sustainability 
challenges of housing in a context of densification in Swiss cities. All four articles examine how 
consolidation leads to changing housing use situations in the Swiss urban rental sector, and how 
conflicting use interests between competing actors at different geographical scales evolve, and can 
potentially be solved. The theoretically determined variables – social sustainability in housing 
(condition of the housing resource) (section 3.2.2), institutions (section 3.3), and actors’ strategies 
(section 3.4) – and the local governance mechanisms that guide their interaction (section 3.5) are 
at the core of the analysis in each article. A strong theoretical connection therefore exists between 




In each article, I analyzed housing as a man-made resource that is governed by the regulatory re-
gime (SQ1) and the use strategies (SQ2) applied by different user actors (owners and non-owners). 
In each paper, my aim was to understand how and why power relations and games among these 
actors emerge to answer the main research question of how housing under scarce land conditions 
can be governed socially sustainably. Moreover, I organized this thesis from a “macro to micro” 
perspective, which means that, after having studied the institutional context of densification at the 
Swiss federal level, I conducted more detailed research at the municipal level. More precisely:
Article 1 starts with the analysis of the federal institutional regime in force to understand how the 
Swiss federal government defines policies for housing (re)development in dense urban en-
vironments (sub-question 1). Our goal was to investigate how different actors use their power 
position to influence rule definition and formulation at the Swiss federal level. In particular, 
Andreas Hengstermann, Jean-David Gerber and I investigated the implications of the Swiss 
federal policy context and the responsibility of national public actors (federal council, legis-
lative parliament, lobby groups, etc.) in urban housing provision. We discussed the role of 
the federal state in attracting foreign investment for densification projects and in the protec-
tion of private property rights. In addition, we analyzed Swiss federal land use and housing 
policies, which are crucial for enabling access to and distribution of housing as a resource. 
We examined the institutional challenges and historical context of housing supply in Switzer-
land with a special focus on the social sustainability aspects of housing. 
Thereby, the aim was to understand how the rights of private ownership are protected in the 
Swiss legal context and how this legal condition influences the use strategies employed by 
owner and non-owner actors. Finally, the analysis helped me to further elaborate how federal 
policy measures and instruments introduced trickle down and influenced housing develop-
ment also at the regional and municipal level. Conclusions were drawn regarding the extent 
to which the Swiss federal institutional regime exerts influence on the behaviors of specific 
actors, particularly on landowners. The article contributes to the critical examination of 
power relations in Swiss federal policy making and in relation to the densification strategies 
applied by municipalities in an advanced capitalist liberal economy. 
Article 2 first discusses the concept of social sustainability in housing from different theoretical 
perspectives. It then examines why an emic approach towards social sustainability in housing 
is an added value for urban research. Through a comparative case study design, Arend Jonk-
man, Jean-David Gerber and I empirically investigated how social sustainability in housing 
is acknowledged by residents living in two large-scale densification areas in Zurich Brunau 
and Basel Schoren. We compared the social sustainability performance of these projects by 
using qualitative research methodology. 
In this article, we brought together the different concepts – housing as a resource, institu-
tions, and actors’ strategies – and compared the local governance mechanisms for socially 
sustainable housing in two large-scale densification projects in the cities of Zurich and Basel. 
Besides the study of the strategies employed by public administrative actors, we also aimed 
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to understand the resistance strategies of landowners and tenants in this paper. Moreover, we 
added to the understanding of how different local regulatory regimes contribute to conflicting 
outcomes in terms of social exclusion. Finally, we drew conclusions regarding the role and 
responsibility of public and private stakeholders in the local governance process for socially 
sustainable housing development in densifying urban areas.   
Article 3 further investigates how densification materializes at the municipal level. It focuses on 
public policies and policy instruments that guide densification of housing stocks in munici-
palities. More precisely, through comparative case study analysis Thomas Hartmann and I 
analyzed how land policy instruments can strategically be activated by municipal planning 
authorities to effectively promote socially sustainable housing in dense cities. While much 
literature so far has focused on the functioning of individual land policy instruments (e.g. 
land readjustment, growth boundaries, long-term leases), we expanded the existing body of 
literature in this field. We investigated how different instruments can strategically be com-
bined and activated by local planning administrations. 
Empirically, our focus was on the role played by municipal authorities and their applied land 
use and densification strategies in four Swiss municipalities (Zurich, Basel, Köniz, and Klo-
ten). We concluded that municipal public authorities are indeed crucial for the decision-ma-
king process whether consolidation leads to social exclusion or not. They can alleviate rent 
level increases by strategically activating land policy instruments in favor of social inclusion, 
but they must therefore know how to densify. To prepare for future housing challenges, a sta-
ble “right-to-housing“ for all does not necessarily require the mere introduction of new po-
licy instruments, but the strategic activation of available instruments matters. By identifying 
the local governance mechanisms for social sustainability in housing, this article greatly  
helps municipal planners, practitioners, and policy-makers to prepare for future housing chal-
lenges in dense urban environments. 
Article 4 shifts the focus from the federal to the local level and examines in a single case study 
how private property owners respond to the policy shift towards densification. In particular, 
Jean-David Gerber and I investigated how conflicting housing use interests under scarce 
urban land conditions enhance the landowners’ interest to stay flexible in order to prevent 
building delays. We revealed that, when dealing with scarcity of land, landowners agree to 
enter a particular housing phenomenon. This model has evolved in the city of Zurich during 
the 2010s – the emergence of a profit-oriented temporary housing model that works under 
the rules of loaning law rather than rent. In this article, we analyzed an extreme example of 
precariousness in housing as results of densification pressure. To cope with planning insecu-
rity and building delays in a context of land scarcity, institutional owners (and the private real 
estate industry working on their behalf) drove the emergence of this new business model. 
By identifying the involved actors’ objectives and strategies under the given legal frame- 
work in Zurich, this paper contributes to understanding how densification affects the interests 
of the lowest income segments. It shows that even in a city like Zurich – one of the richest 
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globally – residents’ social inclusion is not only a matter of affordable housing policy, but 
effective local governance in general. Finally, this article extends the existing literature on 
temporary use and housing by shedding light on how specific public and private actors are 
influenced by densification policies and how they are able respond to it.
Table 4 provides an overview of the content investigated in each of the four research articles.
Article 1:      
The Business of 
Densification	–	
Distribution of 
Power, Wealth, and 
Inequality	in	Swiss	
Policy	Making	
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Abstract: In Switzerland, the fight against uncontrolled urban sprawl and the protection of agri-
cultural land have a long tradition. To reconcile these concerns, the Swiss voting majority agreed 
to introduce densification as a legally binding policy objective in 2013. Simultaneously, however, 
densification processes have started to threaten the housing situation of low- and middle-income 
tenants due to higher rents following redevelopment. In this article, we argue that the Swiss way of 
implementing densification is characterised by a systematic bypassing of tenants’ needs for social 
sustainability in housing due to the current political priorities of the Swiss federal government. 
Using an institutionalist analysis approach and a qualitative case-study methodology, we analyse 
the institutional mechanisms and the actors’ rationale behind this emerging business of densifica-
tion. Finally, we discuss the role of the nation state in the provision of the ‘right to housing’ for all 
income segments and its consequences for the country’s long-term sustainability performance. 
Keywords: densification, densification policy, housing, social sustainability, social justice 
Research	highlights:
The paper…
• … analyzes how the revised Swiss Federal Planning Act (2013) and the introduced obligation 
to densify for municipalities has affected the housing situation in Switzerland. 
• … summarizes the current state of densification policy making at the Swiss federal level.
• … applies an institutional analytical framework to identify intergovernmental elements of po-
licy making in Swiss cantons and municipalities confronted with scarce land conditions.  
• … questions the role of the Swiss federal council and the administrative offices working on 
their behalf in Swiss densification policy making;
• … examines how specific federal policies and instruments are implemented in favor of an 
“eco-business” of densification at the expense of its social side. 
•  … argues that a shift towards increased tenants’ inclusion in federal policy-making and plan-
ning is needed if public actors aim to support sustainable urban development effectively.
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6.1 Introduction
In Switzerland, the fight against uncontrolled urban sprawl and the protection of agricultural land 
have a long tradition (Gennaio et al., 2009). To reconcile these concerns, densification has been 
introduced as legally binding policy objective in the revised Swiss Federal Spatial Planning Act 
(SPA)8  in March 2013. Following the revised legislation, the 26 cantons and over 2000 munici-
palities must promote “inward settlement development, while ensuring an appropriate quality of 
housing” (Art. 1, para. 2, lit. abis SPA). Densification is thereby defined as a process leading to an 
increase in the number of housing units within existing municipal boundaries (Broitman & Koo-
men, 2015). It is hence assumed to play a decisive role in the fight against urban sprawl and the 
overuse of non-renewable resources (Swiss Federal Council, 2016). 
However, in the housing sector, densification arises with social challenges: considering the small 
size of the country and its constantly growing economy and steady population growth (+22% until 
2045 (FSO, 2015)), densification of existing built-up areas has remained the main option to recon-
cile these concerns as the majority of greenfield and brownfield sites have been densified already 
(Nebel et al., 2017; Swiss Federal Council, 2017). Densification therefore increasingly materialises 
via “soft measures”, e.g. in the form of total replacement constructions, modernisation, subdivision 
or conversion of existing buildings (Bibby et al., 2018). This soft way of implementing densifica-
tion, in turn, has caused social exclusion and gentrification processes of residents as old housing 
stocks are being demolished and redeveloped with higher rents after densification (FOSI & FOH, 
2015; FOH, 2016). Low- and middle-income households face difficulties in finding adequate 
housing as newly modernised apartments are primarily affordable for households with higher inco-
mes and non-profit housing suppliers have long waiting lists (FOH, 2016b). The situation is even 
more worrying considering that Switzerland has the lowest homeownership rate in Europe and is 
therefore regarded as a nation of tenants in a liberal housing market (Lawson, 2009; Bourassa et al., 
2010). Housing provision traditionally lies in the responsibility of the profit-oriented private rental 
sector. 58% of Swiss households live in apartments of the for-profit rental sector and remain de-
pendent on the private homeowner’s decisions (FOH, 2017). As a consequence, resistance against 
densification projects has increased in recent years as tenants do not accept the social consequences 
caused by densification (Swiss Federal Council, 2017; Maissen, 2018).
In this article, we aim to demonstrate that the Swiss way of implementing densification policy is 
characterised by a systematic bypassing of tenants’ needs for social sustainability in housing due to 
current political priorities of the Swiss federal government. We explain the reasons and key actors’ 
rationales behind this difference of treatment between tenants’ and homeowners’ rights. Finally, our 
objective is to discuss the role of the national state in in the provision of the “right to housing” for 
all income segments and its consequences for the state’s sustainability performance as a whole. 
To answer these research objectives, we rely on an institutionalist approach. This allows us to ana-
lyse densification as a process that emerges within a tight web of diverse and contradictory rights 
8	 Federal	Act	on	Spatial	Planning	(SPA)	of	22	June	1979	(CC	700).
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and regulations. Its performance and implementation depend on veto-rights controlled by powerful 
actors as well as intertwined private and public interests. We hence proceed in three steps to analyse 
these mechanisms between densification policy implementation and housing development at the 
federal level: (1) Through a broad screening of the institutional regime in force, we examine the 
policy measures taken in federal legislation promoting the tenants’ housing needs under densifi-
cation. (2) We reconstruct the rationale behind the policy measures applied through an analysis of 
actors’ interests, objectives, and policy strategies. (3) We evaluate how housing is being addressed 
in federal densification policy and draw conclusions on potential repercussions on spatial planning, 
social justice, and sustainable urban development.
6.2	 Densification	at	the	interplay	between	public	policy	intervention	and	property	rights
For portraying the housing challenges that arise through densification adequately, the article applies 
an institutionalist approach (Mandelbaum, 1985; Jessop, 2001; Healey, 2007). In general, this 
approach assumes that the actual spatial development (e.g. situation on the housing market) is to be 
seen as results of the institutional setting and vice versa actors pursuit their interests by activating 
specific formal and informal rules from this institutional regime (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Dembski 
& Salet, 2010; Hartmann & Gerber, 2018). Specifically, in this article, the intertwined relationship 
between densification and housing will be explained by an analysis of the Institutional Resource 
Regime (IRR) in which institutions – defined as a set of rules and regulations – their effectiveness 
and formulation process also play a central role (Gerber et al., 2009). Without denying the import-
ance of informal rules, focusing on formal rules in particular, the IRR builds on the assumption that 
– besides public policies – institutions in general (Hardin, 1968, 1991; North 1994; Williamson, 
2000) and property rights in particular (Demsetz, 1967; Ostrom, 1990, 2009; Bromley, 1992) are 
central for understanding (un)sustainability of resources. It hence postulates a causal relationship 
between institutions, actors’ behaviour, and condition of resource  and enables to explain the social 
consequences of densification as a result of behavioural patterns stemming from incentives of diffe-
rent policy fields – especially in regard to the attenuation of private property rights (Knoepfel et al., 
2007; Gerber et al., 2009). 
Following the IRR approach, two main categories of formalised rules guide the implementation of 
densification processes – public policies and property rights – that operate according to a different 
logic and rely on opposing legitimisations. 
• Public policies aim at solving a public problem recognised as such by democratic processes. 
Through public policies, the state receives the power to regulate the actions of those actors who 
are thought to be at the source of the problem, in the name of the public interest. Public policies 
are regularly revised, not only because the problem they are targeting constantly evolves, but 
also because changing political majorities propose alternative solutions to the problem (Knoep-
fel et al., 2011).
• Property rights protect individuals from the state (Rousseau, 1762; Marx, 1868). As such, they 
defend private interests against the (potentially absolutist) action of the state (Locke, 1689). 
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Property rights are grounded in the Civil Code. They are extremely stable over time because 
their definition hardly changes.
Property rights and public policies interact in a dialectical relationship. Property rights make the 
private appropriation of goods and services provided by resources possible, as long as public poli-
cies do not restrict exclusive appropriation in the name of the public interest(s). By doing so, public 
policies have a redistributive effect (Knoepfel, 1986). 
In the last three decades, densification as a public policy objective has found its way into legally 
binding regulations (Williams et al., 2000). Densification policies are defined as a set of rules, with 
the common interest to solve the politically defined problem of urban sprawl through the process 
of increasing density (number of housing units) within the existing boundaries of built-up areas 
(Knoepfel et al., 2007; Broitman & Koomen, 2015). Besides “command and control” policies 
directly addressing the extent, range, or type of uses, such as land-use planning, housing, environ-
mental and monument protection laws, also more indirect public interventions based on incentives 
or information play a role in densification (Hood, 1983). 
However, decision-making procedures in densification policy implementation are complex due 
to intricate small-scale ownership structures, veto rights controlled by landowners who can block 
(or slow down) implementation processes, and intertwined private and public interests (Dempsey, 
2010; Holman et al., 2015). Public authorities may influence the property owner’s decision whether 
to raise rents after redevelopment or not (e.g. through targeted policy intervention in housing, tax, 
or energy law) (Slaev, 2016), but it is ultimately on the landowner to decide on the level of profita-
bility to be targeted (Buitelaar & Needham, 2007). Without heavy state intervention such as expro-
priation, new planning regulations (e.g., new zoning) only get implemented when titleholders agree 
to undertake new developments, sell their land, or transfer their development rights (Davy, 2005, 
2012). Therefore, public policies with a spatial impact often conflict with the landowners’ freedom 
(Blomquist, 2012; Slaev, 2016; Gerber et al., 2017). 
In the formulation process of densification policy objectives, public and private actors strategically 
use their policy resources (such as knowledge, money, or personnel) to enforce their interests and 
to achieve their political goals. For instance, actors use their widespread network to achieve con-
sensus in the introduction of a new densification rule. Simultaneously, actors organise and develop 
political strategies within the given institutional setting to regulate their access to a resource (e.g. 
affordable housing). To reconstruct the rationale behind the densification policy measures applied, 
we examine the strategies of public and private stakeholders involved in the densification policy 
process at the federal level, their contribution to the formulation of institutional rules and policy 
objectives, as well as their ability to address housing needs in federal policy intervention (Knoepfel 
et al., 2007). 
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6.3 Housing from a social sustainability perspective
In this article, housing is regarded as a human-constructed resource (Kébir, 2010). According to 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Art. 25), having a home is a basic human need and an 
essential good. Its conditions of access, supply, management, distribution, and ownership structure 
need to be properly thought through to avoid conflicts between competing uses (e.g. affordable 
housing and lofts for couples with double income), which has consequences for its sustainability 
(Bathelt & Glückler, 2005). As a key element of the built environment, housing under densification 
also becomes particularly relevant for sustainable development as a whole (Chiu, 2003). 
In recent years, a number of government and academic reports have indicated that the different 
dimensions of sustainability in housing development have not been equally prioritised by policy 
makers (Chiu, 2004; Vallance et al., 2011; IFHP, 2019). The International Federation of Housing, 
for instance, only recently stated that “social sustainability is the most neglected element of the 
three because it is far more difficult to quantify, contextualize and develop than economic growth 
or environmental impact” (IFHP, 2019). It hence is an ambiguous and fuzzy concept that comes 
with a number of ethical, political, and methodological challenges (Weingaertner & Moberg, 2014, 
Woodcraft, 2012). 
Therefore, our objective is not to expand the list of social sustainability definitions (see for a 
discussion Polese & Stren, 2000; Chiu, 2003; McKenzie, 2004; Littig & Griessler, 2005; Demp-
sey et al., 2009; Bramley et al., 2009; Davidson, 2010; Vallance et al., 2011). Rather we argue that 
housing affordability is one of the key elements of urban social sustainability. Particularly, in a con-
text of densification, social displacement of low- and middle-income residents – as central defining 
trait and primary danger of gentrification – increasingly emerges due to higher rents after densifi-
cation processes (Lees et al., 2008). Through the affordability of rents, in contrast, residents get a 
chance to stay in their neighbourhood, which is why other social sustainability criteria of housing 
development such as accessibility, residential stability, tenure security, local identity or community 
cohesion also get preserved (Chiu, 2003; Bramley et al., 2009; Vallance et al., 2011). Therefore, 
housing affordability is a good indicator of social sustainability of housing as a whole. By defi-
nition, housing affordability relates to the cost of housing relative to household income and other 
legitimate expenses (Mulliner et al., 2013:275). Evidence from Switzerland additionally shows that 
housing affordability plays a central contribution to the people’s social acceptance of densification 
and hence to sustainable development as a whole (COSD & CSO Zurich, 2014). 
In the end, however, the judgement, evaluation and reflection on whether social sustainability in 
densification processes is given or not will be made along broader social (in)justice principles (see 
also Jehling & Hartmann, this issue). Rawls (1971:303), for example, states that a socially just city 
is designed in a way that equally and inclusively distributes the rights, chances, and opportunities 
among all people of a society. His understanding of social justice refers to the need to improve the 
life prospects of the least advantaged by fostering affordable and secure housing conditions, their 
involvement in formal decision-making, and their access to attractive open and public spaces to re-
duce social inequalities. In the conclusion section of this paper, we reflect on this principle of social 
justice related to the densification policy measures applied.
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6.4 Study design and methods
Switzerland makes an interesting case study to analyse the relationship between densification 
policy implementation and housing (re)development, as the challenge of coordinating the two has 
become critical in the country in recent years. Specifically, issues of housing affordability and gen-
trification have intensified in almost every Swiss city in recent years due to population growth and 
national densification objectives (Rérat, 2012; Wehrmüller, 2014; FOH, 2016a; FOH, 2016b). At 
the same time, yield-oriented investments attracted by the country’s economic stability and wealth, 
reinforced the attractiveness of Swiss real estate markets. Because of low-interest rates, housing has 
become the main target of capital investment, especially for pension funds (Theurillat et al, 2014). 
Consequently, in Swiss cities, the housing situation is characterised by an overheated housing mar-
ket (vacancy rates below 1% and rising rents) (Balmer & Gerber, 2017). Within the rental market, 
28.9% of households suffer from excessive housing costs in relation to income (FOSI & FOH, 
2015). 
Hence single case study analysis allows to assess and to explain the diverse mechanisms behind 
densification policy and housing (re)development in detail (Yin, 2018). The federal state plays a 
crucial role in this matter in the sense that it signals how to deal with this issue also for cantons and 
municipalities. Switzerland is organised on three executive levels (municipalities, cantons, and the 
confederation) and characterised by a form of “cooperative federalism”. Legislation in favour of 
densification goals and/or social sustainability objectives of housing is introduced by the federal 
state and is to be implemented by cantons and municipalities (Linder, 1994).
We employed qualitative methods to understand the relationship between densification as a core 
objective of public policy and its consequences for social sustainability in the housing sector. In the 
first step, about 40 policy documents were analysed. Legally binding documents (e.g. acts, ordinan-
ces, changes in legislations and vote results) were considered as well as policy documents without a 
legally binding nature (e.g. strategy papers, government reports, parliamentary debates and position 
papers) disclosing the composition of political arenas, leitmotifs, and parliamentary debates. In the 
second step, the political negotiations behind federal legislation were revealed by conducting nine 
semi-structured expert interviews with public and private representatives at the federal level from 
three federal offices, the Swiss homeowners’ association, the Swiss tenants’ association, the Swiss 
association of the building industry9, as well as the Swiss association of institutional investors. Two 
members of the national council were additionally interviewed because of their detailed understan-




 and social sustainability in the Swiss housing sector 
In this section, we analyse the institutional regime (stressing both public policies and property 
rights) regulating densification processes in Switzerland. Densification is addressed in several 
public law areas. We start with the Swiss housing policy. Then, we emphasise aspects of planning 
policy because of their significant impact on housing (re)development. Three additional sectoral 
policies that influence sub-aspects of housing densification are also explored. Finally, the role of 
private law will be addressed. In section 6.5.2, we reconstruct the rationale behind federal policy 
measures through an analysis of actors’ interests, objectives, and policy strategies.
6.5.1 Screening of institutional rules addressing social sustainability of housing under densi 
	 	 fication	in	Swiss	legislation	
Housing policy 
Unaffordable housing prices are a central problem targeted by housing policies. Swiss housing 
policy is anchored in two constitutional articles. They prevent abuses in tenancy matters (Art. 109 
CSC)10 and regulate the supply of affordable housing (Art. 108), particularly for disadvantaged 
groups (e.g., elderly, disabled, and low-income households). In 2003, based on the constitutional 
mandate “to meet the housing needs” (Art. 108), a new Federal Housing Support Act (FHSA)  was 
introduced to support the construction and renewal of affordable housing, as well as the activities of 
non-profit housing organisations (Art. 2 FHSA)11 (Balmer & Gerber, 2017). However, direct loans 
granted by the federal government were suspended due to the 2003 “federal budget relief program” 
(Swiss Federal Council, 2014). 
Since then, only indirect support mechanisms in favour of non-profit housing organisations (e.g., 
housing cooperatives) and state guarantees on bonds issued by non-profit housing developers have 
been implemented. These loans or advantageous mortgages can only be obtained if the non-profit 
housing organisation commits to the cost-rent principle and belongs to an umbrella association that 
promotes non-profit housing (Lawson, 2009). In total, the share of non-profit housing developers in 
Switzerland (public and cooperative) reaches 6% of the total housing stock (FOH, 2017). Benefit 
payments for tenants (demand-side housing subsidies) exist in Switzerland, but only in the con-
text of social assistance and state supplementary benefits to old age and disability insurance. In the 
absence of additional public subsidies, since construction costs cannot be reduced directly, newly 
built non-profit housing is only affordable to households with a medium income, not to the poo-
rest segment of the population (Balmer & Gerber, 2017). Due to long waiting lists, the time to get 





Through land-use planning policy, the state aims to promote the sustainable use of land in its eco-
nomic, social, and ecologic dimensions. In Switzerland, as a reaction to the immense construc- 
tion activity in the decades following the Second World War, the need for coordinated spatial 
development became predominant. In 1969, Swiss citizens therefore approved a constitutional 
amendment adding spatial planning to the list of official state powers. The overarching planning 
objective and legitimacy is “to ensure the appropriate and economic use of the land and its proper-
ly ordered settlement” (Art. 75 CSC). Thereby, planning gained the competence to limit private 
construction activity. Zoning plans became mandatory throughout the country, separating building 
from non-building areas. In recent years, political and professional debates questioned whether this 
approach of outward limitation was sufficiently effective. In March 2013, the Swiss voting majority 
therefore agreed to a reinforcement of the Federal Spatial Planning Act (SPA)  introducing, inter 
alia, densification as a legally binding policy objective. Following the revised legislation, cantons 
and municipalities must arrange “settlements according to the needs of their inhabitants and their 
expansion must be limited” (Art. 3, para. 3 SPA).
Energy policy
Through its energy policy, the state coordinates the use of energy in settlements and controls forth-
coming environmental and socio-economic consequences. Switzerland’s “sustainable use of ener-
gy” is anchored in two constitutional articles (Art. 89, 91 CSC). To meet this objective, Switzerland 
revised its Federal CO2 Act (2011)12  and Energy Act (2016)13 promoting the shift towards sustain-
able energy transition. In total, by 2020, domestic greenhouse gas emissions are to be reduced by a 
total of 20% as compared to 1990 (Art. 3 CO2 Act). To achieve this goal the country must renovate 
its existing building stock as a whole to successfully reduce its energy depletion by 2050. This can 
either be done through total replacement constructions or energetic renovations (Vonmont, 2016).
This quantitative policy goal directly affects densification processes in the built environment as 
existing buildings have to be redeveloped to fulfil the emission limit. Therefore, the CO2 Act was 
supplemented by two policy programmes, namely, the “building programme” (in force since 2010) 
and the “Federal Energy Strategy 2050” (in force since 2018). The building program is financed 
via the CO2-levy on fuels (Art. 34 CO2 Act) and serves as a public subsidy pool promoting energy 
efficient building renovations. Private homeowners can submit funding proposals to municipalities 
and, in return, are directly funded by the federal state (e.g. for the insulation of windows, facades 
or photovoltaic systems up to 30% of their total investment). Today, Switzerland’s granting of 
subsidies is explicitly based on criteria improving energy efficiency. The market situation and the 
different needs of investors or residents are not included in the analysis (FOH, 2016a).
Tax policy
Equal treatment in the provision of taxes to the community is the core objective of the state’s 




between the confederation, the cantons, and the municipalities, is anchored in several constitutio-
nal articles (Art. 3, Art. 126-135 CSC). Based on the Federal Act on Direct Federal Tax14 , private 
investments carried out in buildings to improve energy efficiency have been considered equivalent 
to maintenance costs and are therefore seen as tax-deductible for a long time (FOH, 2016a). With 
the implementation of the new Energy Act, by the year 2020, it will even be possible to deduct 
taxes for renovations, redevelopments, and demolitions up to three years after completion. The aim 
here is to encourage total renovation instead of partial renovation, which until 2018 has been more 
attractive in fiscal terms (Federal Tax Administration, 2017). Moreover, investors can additional-
ly benefit from so called “deadweight loss effects”, meaning that they declare tax deductions for 
renovations although their investment would be profitable without public support. According to a 
federal interdepartmental study of 2009, these deadweight loss effects amount to 70-80% of the 
total amount of tax reliefs for energy-saving measures in Switzerland (FDF et al., 2009). 
Heritage protection policy
The heritage protection policy aims to preserve buildings, sites, or landscapes with a specific value 
for society. These values can be of historic, architectonic, aesthetic, political, ideologic, or econo-
mic nature. In Switzerland, “the protection and preservation of historic landscapes and buildings” 
is anchored in two constitutional articles (Art. 10 & 78 CSC). It is stipulated in the Federal Act on 
the Protection of Nature and Cultural Heritage (NCHA)15  that three federal inventories regulate the 
fulfilling of this task: the federal inventory of landscapes and natural monuments, the inventory of 
Swiss cultural heritage sites, and the inventory of historic pathways and transport routes. In recent 
years, however, the scarcity of land for development, population growth and increasing mobility 
have started to threaten the existence of preserved and historic sites in Switzerland. Heritage con-
servation objectives are increasingly under pressure, both for economic and environmental reasons: 
protective inventories hinder the full use of economic potentials and energy objectives are more and 
more aimed at being achieved regardless of the protection status of the area (Swiss Federal Coun-
cil, 2018). According to a recent study of the Federal Office for Culture (2018), however, heritage 
protection massively influences the social dimension of urban development. Through the protection 
of monuments, social livelihoods, the cohesion of neighbourhoods and the local identity tend to 
remain preserved. This, in turn, can also have an influence on housing prices as older buildings are 
generally more affordable to low-income segments than modernised units (FOC, 2018). 
Property rights
Property owners’ rights are well protected in Switzerland. The Swiss Constitution protects the 
“right to own” as a fundamental right (Art. 22ter CSC) that can only be restricted if (1) a legal basis 
and an overweighing public interest exist, (2) the measure is proportional, and (3) a full compensa-
tion is paid (Art. 5, Art. 36 para. 1-3 & Art. 26 para. CSC). In practice, the weight of public interest 
is interpreted narrowly by courts so that property restrictions are limited and expropriations are rare 




Swiss tenants’ rights are protected by articles for tenancy matters in the Swiss Constitution (Art. 
109 CSC) as well as the Federal Obligations Code16 of 1911 (Art. 253-274 OC). Swiss tenancy 
law is acknowledged to be weak in comparison to neighbouring states (e.g. Germany) (GFOBRP, 
2016). For instance, private landlords are allowed to terminate an open-ended rent contract without 
any legal restriction at any time. Swiss tenancy law also allows property owners to pass energy 
saving investments on to the tenants for up to 50-70% of the total costs. Although it is stipulated 
in the implementing legislation (Art. 14 OC) that landlords who have received public subsidies 
for renovations must deduct them from the new rent, in practice, energy-related renovations are 
considered to be equivalent to maintenance costs and legitimise rent increases (FDF et al., 2009). 
In addition, besides the investment costs, homeowners can also pass energy costs (e.g., for heating) 
and the CO2-levy to the tenants (FDF et al., 2009). Nevertheless, within the existing housing stock, 
tenancy law does not allow for continuous rent increases. Landlords have to align their existing 
rents with the current interest rate that corresponds to the average mortgage rates. Interestingly, 
since the newly introduced densification rule in planning law in 2013 (Art. 1, para. 2, lit. abis SPA), 
the number of demolitions and replacement buildings has increased significantly as this proce- 
dure has remained the only chance for property owners to bring the rent to a higher level within the 
existing housing stock. 
After all, Swiss tenancy regulation works on the basis that tenants have to claim their rights in the 
cantonal tenancy court. Only if they defend their rights in court, can they make themselves visible 
to landlords and public authorities. In practice, however, tenants often do not use this option becau-
se they need to remain on good terms with their landlord to secure further housing offers or they do 
not have the resources to do so. 
To sum up, the analysis of public policies reveals that so far the social sustainability dimension 
of housing development has been neglected in Swiss densification policy implementation. While 
planning and energy policy exclusively pay attention to the ecological dimension of densification, 
e.g. by introducing new legislation that enshrines energy objectives, legal amendments addressing 
socially sustainable densification were not made – neither in housing, tax, nor heritage policy. This 
observation can also be confirmed when looking at private law regulations: property rights remain 
strongly protected in Switzerland and no changes in tenancy law have been made although the 
conditions for tenants in the housing segment changed significantly in recent years. Especially since 
new densification and energy policy objectives have been introduced in 2013. In other words, the 
legal regime in force does not adequately accredit the housing needs of the people mostly affected 
by densification – the tenants. 
Table 5 summarises the federal policy instruments in force addressing social sustainability of 
housing in a context of densification. Additionally, Table 5  incorporates political arguments and 
policy initiatives in the national council aiming to introduce instruments in favour of such social 
sustainability measures. In section 6.5.2, we discuss the reasons and actors’ rationales for the rejec-




Table 5: Formal federal institutions and policy instruments impacting social sustainability of housing 
under	densification.	The	data	analysis	is	based	on	an	in-depth	study	of	policy	papers,	legislations,	and	
parliamentary debates (Fluri, 2017; FOC, 2018; FOE, 2018; FOE & FOH, 2015; FOF et al., 2009; FOH, 2012, 
2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2016a, 2016b, 2017; FOSD, 2016a, 2016b, 2018; 2018a; FOSI & FOH, 2015; FTA, 
2017; Hardegger, 2017; von Graffenried, 2014; Swiss Federal Council, 2014, 2016, 2016a; 2017, 2018).
 
Formal institutions Federal policy instruments in force impacting 
housing development under densification  
Federal policy instruments in favour of 
socially sustainable housing 
development that are not in force but 
have been politically debated 
Housing policy 
 
Swiss Constitution (Art. 2, 41, 
108, 109): Social objectives, 
housing construction, tenancy 
matters 
 
Legislations: Federal Housing 
Support Act (2003) 
- Supply-side subsidies (“fond de roulement” and 
direct loans for non-profit housing developers) 
- Increase of the direct loans provided in 
the Federal Housing Support Act in 
favor of low-cost housing 
- Introduction of supply-side subsidies 
for all non- and for-profit  developers 
- Introduction of a fixed minimum share 




Swiss Constitution (Art. 75): 
Spatial planning 
 
Legislations: Revised Spatial 
Planning Act (SPA) (2012, Art. 1, 
3, 8a, 15, 15a, 38a) 
 
- Mandatory conformity to cantonal plans and local 
zoning regulations 
- Densification as legally binding planning objective 
for all cantons and municipalities  
- Sustainable housing development (ensuring 
adequate quality of housing) 
- Capturing planning-related added value  
- Building defined as subject to approval 
- Introduction of low-cost housing in SPA  
- Introduction of municipal pre-emption 
rights in favor of low-cost and non-
profit housing construction 
- Introduction of a minimum densification 
quota in renovation and new 
development projects 
- Introduction of occupancy rules to 




Swiss Constitution (Art. 74, 89): 
Environment protection and energy 
policy 
 
Legislations: CO2 Act (2011); 
Revision of Energy Act (2018) 
- Direct supply-side subsidies for private 
homeowners when doing energetic renovations 
via the federal building program (Art. 34, CO2 
Act) 
- Introduction of mandatory “building 
energy certificates” in all cantons 
- Introduction of the mandatory 
disclosure of “consumption-based 
heating and hot water costs” in all 
cantons 
- Public subsidy support only if certain 
rental rates are achieved (e.g, no 
dismissal after redevelopment)  
Tax policy 
 
Swiss Constitution (Art. 3, 126-
135): Federal tax system 
 
Legislations: Federal Act on Direct 
Federal Tax (1990) 
- Tax relief on home ownership and private 
property (assets) 
- Tax relief for self-occupied property (“own rental 
value”) 
- Will be introduced in 2020: Tax relief for 
renovations, redevelopments and demolitions of 
buildings up to three years after having finished 
the task 
- Obligation for private homeowners to 
pass tax benefits for energetic 
renovation to the tenants 
- Cancelling deductions from taxable 
income when doing energy renovations 
- Trading with emission certificates 
between the cantons 
Heritage protection policy 
 
Swiss Constitution (Art. 10,78): 
Preservation of Landscape and the 
built environment 
 
Legislations: Federal Act on the 
Protection of Nature and Cultural 
Heritage (1966) 
- Federal Inventory of landscapes and natural 
monuments 
- Federal Inventory of Swiss heritage sites 
- Federal Inventory of historic pathways and 
transport routes 
- Facilitation of protective measures in 
the Federal law (would lead to less 
heritage protection in settlements) 
Property rights 
 
Swiss Constitution (Art. 26, 36, 
109): Property guarantee, Tenancy 
matters 
 
Legislations: Civil Code (1907, 
Art. 641), Obligations Code (1911) 
- Property rights, leases, mortgages 
- Tenancy law: Obligation to terminate an open-
ended rent contract with a minimum of 3 months 
before dismissal (but: at any time and with no 
reason possible; no mandatory right for rent 
extension or compensation for the tenants) 
- Obligation for homeowners to pass received 
public subsidies for renovation to the tenants;  
- But: the costs of the whole renovation can at the 
same time be passed to the tenants up to 50-70% 
of the total investment 
- Reduction of the transfer rate from 
owners to tenants in case of renovations 
- Introduction of a mandatory disclosure 
of the former rent on behalf of the 
tenants 
- Introduction of a dismissal protection of 




In the following section, we reconstruct the rationale behind the Swiss densification policy measu-
res applied. The involved actors’ motivations for the introduction of the policy instruments descri-
bed above will be explained in detail. Moreover, the actors’ objectives when rejecting proposed 
initiatives in the national council in favour of social sustainability of housing densification will be 
made intelligible.
The	private	for-profit	rental	industry
Since 2014, the private for-profit rental industry (including for-profit investors as well as private 
planning, building, and architecture professionals) has increasingly started to appreciate densifica- 
tion as a profitable investment market. Reasons are that they (1) are publicly subsidised for carrying 
out renovations, (2) do not face any obligations to pass on received subsidies to the tenants and (3) 
simultaneously can take advantage of higher rents after redevelopment. Institutional investors, for 
example, have intensified their work with professional planning, building, and architectural teams 
to better exploit the new use potentials and to increase their land rent in the existing housing stock. 
Through densification, they can enlarge the rentable floor space on a parcel and expand their in-
vestment opportunities at central locations. The better they understand how to use and upgrade the 
existing housing stock through densification, the higher the prices that will be paid. 
»Extensions to existing buildings, additional floors, or total replacement constructions with double volume. On 
the same property, owners can suddenly realise a lot more things. In the end, it’s all about the land price and 
about making money« (Vice-director Swiss Association of the Building Industry, August 2018).17
Therefore, densification measures have provided a clear legal and economic incentive for the priva-
te for-profit rental industry to increase rents. 
Interestingly, private small-scale owners expanding and renting out their owner-occupied properties 
have recognised their economic advantages too. Before 2013, this share of private homeowners 
strongly criticised the shift towards densification as they feared the loss of property value, privacy 
and autonomy. This scepticism has waned in recent years, mainly due to the mentioned institu-
tional rules and amendments applied in energy, tenancy, and tax law (see §6.5.2). As a result of 
these legislative changes, property owners of the for-profit rental industry (both institutional and 
owner-occupied property) assess the economic benefits of densification higher than the risks and 
costs, which is why they both increasingly agree to densify their parcels. In fact, densification under 
the new legal framework and in the absence of further restrictions (e.g. in tenancy law) fulfils a 
specific function on real estate markets in the sense that it increases planning and economic security 
through the increased opportunity to invest into real estate. In an environment where land is scarce 
and competition to use this land is high, property owners reinvest their assets into stable and safe 
investment markets. In the end, because of the weak protection of tenants, owners enjoy maximal 
planning flexibility and decision-making power in densification projects. 
17	 All	quotes	have	been	translated	to	to	English	from	German	by	the	authors.	
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This economic interest also explains why political efforts to change the institutional rules in force 
in favour of protective and price-regulating objectives (e.g. in housing or planning policy etc., see 
Table 1) have been rejected by the private for-profit rental industry. From a private landowner’s 
perspective, further regulation would make the planning process too complicated, time-consuming, 
and costly. This would reduce their investment security and their willingness to densify their par-
cels. 
»You cannot have both without restrictions: densification and heritage protection. Thereby, densification will be 
more difficult to implement because for ¾ of the projects a special legal approval would be needed. Therefore, at 
the national level, we demand for a weakening of the monument pro-tection regulations. For instance, that buil-
dings from the 1960s no longer need to be preserved« (Head of the legal and planning department of the Swiss 
Homeowners’ Association, August 2018). 
In other words, the private for-profit rental industry tends to support a way of implementing densifi-
cation that guarantees economic growth and income at the expense of preserving social values (e.g. 
cultural heritage). 
In addition, in recent years, this industry has increasingly realised how to use their legal power 
position when negotiating with public authorities about densification projects. Due to the strong 
protection of their property title, they hold the power of disposal and grant the use rights. Therefore, 
public authorities are increasingly dependent on the private owners’ agreement when aiming to im-
plement densification objectives. Urban planning regulations such as zoning, capturing of planning 
related added value, or tax relief suddenly become negotiable for private individuals and do not 
represent binding rules any longer.
»Yes, we [public with private actors] negotiate with each other. […] However, one would first need to think about 
whether this [the legal obligation to densify] still is a binding rule if the best solution becomes negotiable for both 
sides« (Vice-director Swiss association of the Building Industry, August 2018).
As a matter of fact, this power position in the negotiation process results in densification measures 
primarily being implemented along market-oriented principles in Switzerland. 
The Swiss federal government
After the Swiss voting majority agreed to introduce densification as a legally binding planning 
objective in 2013, Swiss federal government have become responsible for the fulfilling of this 
task. Since 2014, the responsible federal offices (mainly the office for spatial planning, but also for 
housing and energy) have started to convince the private for-profit rental industry to support the 
implementation of densification as a policy objective through dedicated policy measures. Concre-
tely this means that although several new densification objectives in planning and energy law have 
been introduced during the 2010s, federal administrative authorities have not obligated the private 
for-profit rental sector to return any of the received public subsidies to the tenants. For example, 
private landowners do not have to fulfil a certain quality related to socio-economic living standards 
(e.g. house prices, social mixing, residential stability) or to pass on tax savings or direct subsidies 
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to the tenants. Social issues such as housing affordability, social mixing or security of tenancy have 
not gained political attention even though the housing situation for low-income has worsened in 
recent years. Swiss tenancy law, in addition, has not been revised even though owner-related and 
tenant-relevant legislative changes have been made in energy and planning law. Furthermore, the 
private for-profit rental industry has neither been forced to protect tenants from dismissal or rent in-
crease after redevelopment, nor have political efforts in favour of monument conservation policies 
received support of the political majority (e.g. to preserve architectonic and social qualities within 
the built environment). 
The rejections of such initiatives were justified by the fact that federal authorities feared a decrease 
in the property owners’ interest to renovate and to carry out energy-saving renovations. It was also 
argued that private property owners would not have been able to use the existing economic poten-
tials on their parcels the same way anymore. The legal support of residential stability and heritage 
protection in the built environment would have led to increasing financial expenses, distorted mar-
ket conditions, and the loss of the country’s position as an attractive real-estate market for interna- 
tional investment. As a result, social sustainability objectives such as housing affordability, residen-
tial stability, and neighbourhood cohesion have not gained the support of the national council due to 
the strong liberal interests of the private for-profit rental sector. 
»For densification you get a political majority anyway. But for social sustainability you get none. […] Because 
densification brings money and investment opportunities. […] As long as one can make economic profit, densi-
fication will be supported by the majority of people. There is a coalition be-tween ecologic Switzerland and the 
liberal interests, and if both can be combined, a political majority prevails« (Member of National Council and 
former director of the Swiss Tenants’ Association, August 2018).
The tenants’ needs related to social sustainability have remained bypassed under the new rules of 
the game (densification). This prioritisation in policy making is also connected to the poor repre-
sentation and lobbying position of the tenants’ interests in the national council.
»The stepchild in the whole debate is the social dimension. From a political point of view also badly organised. 
People suffering from poverty do not have a political lobby at the federal level […]. Bringing the losers together 
to defend their political interests is difficult« (Director of the Swiss Federal Office for Housing, August 2018).
In fact, the tenants’ and property owners’ rights are unequally represented in the national council. 
This imbalance of power distribution due to the tenants’ lack of access to formal decision-making 
(missing lobbying position) reinforces the trade-off in favour of the economic and ecologic dimen- 
sions of sustainability in densification processes at the expense of its social side. As a result, densi- 
fication policy measures leading to higher income, use potentials, and increased land value for 
private property owners (through economic and ecologic densification policy measures) remain 
prioritised. 
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6.6 Discussion and Conclusion
In this article, our aim was to demonstrate that the Swiss way to implement densification is charac-
terised by a systematic bypassing of tenants’ need for social sustainability in housing due to present 
day political priorities of the Swiss federal government. Even though the Swiss federal council pub-
licly commits to socially equitable sustainable development (Art. 2, 41, 74 CSC and Art. 1 SPA), in 
densification measures, it deliberately assists in bypassing the social dimension of sustainability in 
favour of eco-economic development objectives. This strategy is connected to the fear that densifi-
cation might not be effective due to the power position of the landowners involved in the for-profit 
rental industry. For instance, federal administrative authorities have recognised a decline in the 
private for-profit rental industry’s willingness to invest into (re)development projects, if they would 
further limit and regulate densification at the federal level. Therefore, they follow a strategy that 
is profitable enough for the profit-oriented rental sector to get densification implemented. Simulta-
neously, the landowners’ profit margin in densification projects has increased significantly in recent 
years due to the economic and legal security, stability, and predictability provided by the national 
state. It appears that the powerful lobby of property owners was able to promote specific policy 
measures (e.g. in the domain of environmental sustainability) to reinforce their own benefit and 
financial returns. Consequently, in comparison to the 1990s and 2000s, the private for-profit rental 
sector has started to acknowledge densification as a new, safe, and profitable investment market, 
which is why they represent the winners of the emerging “business of densification”. The tenants, in 
contrast, remain excluded from the compromise made by powerful actors and embody the losers of 
the new rules of the game (densification). In particular, low-income tenants such as elderly people, 
families, and migrants cannot afford higher rents after densification measures and are increasingly 
being excluded from the housing market. Because only a small share of Swiss tenants gets pub-
licly subsidised through social aid, or benefits of public or cooperative housing supply, a growing 
percentage of the Swiss population suffers from inadequate housing supply in relation to income. 
The emergence of the business of densification is related to a general shift towards the commodifi-
cation of housing in many Western societies: the value of housing is more and more considered by 
its financial value at the expense of its use value (Harloe, 1995; Rolnik, 2013). This supports the 
constant erosion of stability and security in housing. An increasing number of households lack ac-
cess to adequate housing on the regular rental market. Regarding the future increase of densification 
projects, these vulnerable groups will be caught in a vicious situation and depend on housing solu-
tions that will inevitably lead to the erosion of their social rights, stability and protection in housing 
(Brenner et al., 2012; Harvey, 2012; Marcuse, 2012). The Swiss case additionally shows that the 
tenants’ lack of access to formal decision-making at the federal level (missing lobbying power) 
reinforces social inequalities in Swiss housing development: tenants have to live with a double bur-
den as they increasingly pay for environmental costs even though they are not the only producers 
and suffer the related quality of life burdens such as rising rents, the instability of tenancy, and the 
potential loss of neighbourhood cohesion. In the meantime, the federal state withdraws from its re-
sponsibility to cover the housing needs for all income segments and passes the duty to the cantons, 
the municipalities and, ultimately, to the individual households. As a consequence, municipalities 
are increasingly responsible for mitigating social risks, challenges, and problems (Heeg, 2013). 
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Overall, we argue that the Swiss federal government tends to underestimate the potential conse-
quences and challenges for future sustainable development as a constitutional objective resulting 
from neglected social sustainability – especially in housing as a key component of the built en-
vironment. Sustainability only makes sense if its social dimension is taken seriously. Otherwise the 
sustainability objective as a whole is missed. The way densification is currently being implemented 
in Switzerland leads to an exacerbation of landlord–tenants relations, but this is seen as the neces-
sary price to be paid for improving energy efficiency and environmental development objectives. 
The social living quality for all segments of the population, however, can only be maintained if 
future densification projects are compatible with the interests of culturally and socially diverse 
groups, and at the same time encourage social integration and more equitable distribution of decisi-
on-making power. Otherwise, short-term profitability objectives will take the upper hand and rents 
will increase in such a way that densification will be rejected by the majority of the population due 
to the lack of affordability and social acceptance. We identify an evident risk that the implementa-
tion of sustainable development objectives through densification initiatives might slow down – or 
even come to a standstill – because the residents’ housing and social needs are not seriously taken 
into account. We argue that new legal ways need to be found to better consider the housing needs of 
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Key words: Densification; New Institutionalism; Housing; Social Sustainability; Gentrification
Research	highlights:
The paper…
• ...introduces an neoinstitutional analytical framework and explains how this helps to systemati-
cally analyze housing challenges in a context of densification. 
• ...performs a comparative case study approach to compare the land policy strategies of two 
Swiss cities – Zurich and Basel – both confronted with scarce urban land conditions, affordable 
housing shortages, and increasing densification pressure. 
• ...introduces criteria for the evaluation of densification projects from an emic housing sustain- 
ability perspective. 
• ...compares the sustainability performance of two large-scale densification projects in the cities 
of Basel and Zurich. 




In many cities of the global North, tensions between densification as a policy goal and its social 
implications on housing affordability, residential stability or community cohesion have intensified 
in recent years (UN Habitat, 2016). In Switzerland, for example, municipalities have become obli-
ged to promote densification within existing municipal frontiers to protect agricultural land and to 
prevent urban sprawl since May 2014 (Art. 1 SPA ). Simultaneously, a growing number of tenants 
living in rental housing stocks is confronted with the situation of being evicted and displaced at 
short-notice as they cannot afford the rents after densification and simultaneous modernization 
anymore (FOH, 2019:4). 
We identify two lines of research related to the social implications of urban densification in the ren-
tal segment: first, a broad body of literature reflecting on the pros and cons of densification, both as 
a process and policy objective (e.g. Holman et al., 2015; Touati-Morel, 2015). And second, scien-
tific work discussing the role of social sustainability in urban regeneration in general (e.g. Burton, 
2000, 2003; Arthurson, 2001; Bramley & Morgan 2003; Chiu, 2004; Ancell & Thompson-Fawcett 
2008; Bramley et al., 2009; Vallance et al., 2011; Marcuse, 2016). However, a critical analysis 
which focuses on the socio-political dimensions of densification and its effects on tenants from a 
social sustainability perspective is largely missing (Pérez, 2020). As we will argue in the following 
sections, such understanding is crucial so that densification projects are actually designed in a way 
that takes into account the needs and capabilities of those affected – the residents – and involve 
them into decision-making. Otherwise, especially low-income groups will not be able to participate 
in urban development without being vulnerable to discrimination and likely to suffer displacement 
and exclusion from their communities (Jenks et al., 1996:84; Scally & Tighe, 2015).  
In this article, our goals are twofold: first, we aim to explain how tenants are affected by densifica- 
tion from a social sustainability perspective to understand the social consequences at the house-
holds level. Thereby, we are in line with emic research approaches that argue that the principal 
source of evidence concerning the sustainability of cities should be people themselves, particularly 
those living in the areas in question (Jenks et al. 1996; Zukin, 2009; Bramley et al., 2009; Vallance 
et al. 2011). Second, our goal is to detect the reasons for tenants’ social exclusion in densificati-
on projects from a neoinstitutional perspective. More precisely, we analyze the local regulatory 
framework and the strategies of the actors involved (local authorities, investors, tenants, NGOs) to 
understand the mechanisms at play that potentially hamper a socially-sensitive implementation of 
densification. Specifically, we ask: 1) How are the impacts of urban densification on tenants to be 
analyzed from a sustainability perspective? and 2) How do the institutions in force contribute to 
explain the outcomes of urban densification projects in terms of social exclusion?
These questions require the use of qualitative case study methodology (Yin, 2018). We conducted 
a comparative analysis of two Swiss cities – Zurich and Basel. Both cities are confronted with 
increasing densification pressure and tenants exclusion due to rising rents after redevelopment. 
By analyzing the institutional rules and decision-making behavior of the actors involved in two 
large-scale densification areas, we explain the reasons for possible trade-offs between economic, 
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environmental and social goals of densification. We show that preserving the cities’ social quali-
ties is in acute danger when competing with short-term economic interests of investors and local 
authorities. Finally, we discuss our results in regard to arising repercussions for Swiss urban policy 
making and planning. 
7.2 Planning for social sustainability in a dense city
Densification is defined as a process leading to an increase in the number of households living wi-
thin existing city boundaries (Broitman & Koomen, 2015:32). In many cities, the process has been 
introduced as a legally-binding policy objective during the 1990s to effectively steer efficient use of 
natural resources and ‘smart growth’. In daily practice, densification within municipal boundaries 
may materialize in different forms: for example, via infill on empty sites, conversion of buildings 
used for other functions or complete demolishment and reconstruction including more housing 
units of existing housing stocks (Touati-Morel, 2015). In municipalities in which free inner-city 




‘Sustainability’ depends on the interaction of economic changes with social, cultural, and ecologi-
cal transformations. If one of the dimensions is not adequately secured, the development cannot be 
considered sustainable (Barbier, 1987:103).
Vallance, Perkins and Dixon (2011:344) argue that the residents’ interpretation of the local environ-
ment is central for measuring sustainable development. They state that if the social preconditions 
to support densification are not given – resulting in rising housing prices – an urban development 
scenario is highly unsustainable (Jenks et al., 1996:84). Densification, in other words, needs to 
respect the “places” and “spaces” in which tenants live and are socially embedded in to preserve the 
city’s long-term social stability and capital (Lefebvre, 1991). “[C]ities cannot be considered sus-
tainable if they are not acceptable to people as places in which to live, work, and interact or if their 
communities are unstable and dysfunctional” (Bramley et al., 2009:2125). Thus, for densification 
to be truly sustainable, it has to esteem tenants basic needs and the specific social relations, values, 
customs, and structures of the place they live in (Chiu, 2004:66). This residents-oriented sustaina-
bility approach (Townroe, 1996; Chiu, 2004) is linked to actual urban development practices at the 
local level rather than to broad initiatives, policy agendas, or policy objectives. It acknowledges 
that social sustainability is indeed a community level concern, but depends on the extent to which 
individuals can contribute to it (Elsinga et al., 2020). The approach is guided by the conviction 
that the principal source of evidence concerning the social sustainability of cities should be people 
themselves, particularly those living in the areas in question (Zukin, 2009; Bramley et al., 2009). 
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Although we agree that it is impossible to provide comprehensive universal sustainability standards 
given the socio-cultural and geographical diversities of human settlements (Chiu, 2004:75), we 
argue that a more detailed understanding of the social side of densification is crucial in reconci-
ling the often competing demands of the society–environment–economy tripartite (Vallance et al., 
2011:342). Although it is more than thirty years since the Brundtland report’s release and exten-
sive academic literature has been published on the concept of sustainable development, its social 
dimension has only received little attention in policy, academia and practice (Manzi, 2010; Mur-
phy 2012). However, social sustainability research is needed to add to existing understanding and 
perceptions of sustainable development as all three dimensions of sustainability are interlinked. The 
diminishing of one affects that of the others (Khan, 1995; Mitlin & Satterthwaite, 1996; Williams et 
al., 2000; Chiu, 2003). 
While each of the indicators of social sustainability (Table 2 of this thesis) may be regarded as con-
ceptually distinct it is clear however that there exist various reinforcing relationships between them 
(Chiu, 2004:65). The indicators introduced were obtained by synthesizing selected academic and 
policy literature with the ambition of highlighting key aspects of interest for social sustainability 
in relation to densification and urban housing development from a tenants perspective. They were 
supplemented by our own experience working with residents, local authorities, housing suppliers, 
and community organizations in Switzerland and the Netherlands. 
(see Table 2 of this thesis)
The affordability of housing is the key dimension with regard to the social sustainability of housing 
for households (Yung & Lee, 2012; Jonkman, 2020). A household’s ability to meet the cost of 
housing is the core limiting factor as to whether they can access adequate housing or not (Ancell & 
Thompson-Fawcett, 2008:432). Moreover, the availability and quality of housing are also crucial to 
assess (Mulliner et al., 2013). For example, in many cases, residents are able to afford housing but 
they still remain excluded from the housing market, e.g. through the limited availability of housing 
or discrimination. Housing availability refers to the situation whether apartments in the required 
price range are also available at the time designated. This issue becomes particularly relevant 
when many rental contracts have been terminated simultaneously in the same area (IFHP, 2019). In 
addition, the quality of housing is of central importance when issues of overcrowding, inadequacy 
and poor design impact people’s lives (Ancell & Thompson-Fawcett, 2008). It describes whether 
residents live in housing conditions that fail to meet physical standards of decency or to be situated 
at unsafe or inaccessible locations (Stone, 2006). Moreover, it expresses an array of attributes (e.g. 
access to services and facilities), in addition to purely economic factors that can influence a house-
hold’s perception of affordability (Mulliner et al., 2013). Finally, community cohesion is used as 
indicator to describe the level of residents’ social attachment to the local community. Particularly, a 
stable community is regarded as necessary capability of a community to sustain itself (Chiu, 2004; 
Dempsey et al., 2009). Citizenship describes the residents inclusion to local decision-making which 
provides information whether the tenants’ needs and perspectives are integrated also on a formal 
level (Bramley & Power, 2009; Fainstein, 2010).
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7.2.2 Explaining social exclusion from an neoinstitutional perspective
Supporting tenants’ social inclusion in densification projects has largely been assumed to be the 
responsibility of the public sector, more specifically of local authorities as they guide, structure or 
even determine the use of urban space (Holman et al., 2015). As Healey (2007) highlights, how- 
ever, the social impacts of densification are to be seen as results of a complex process of governan-
ce which is to be understood as the interplay between the local regulatory framework and the de-
cision- making behavior of the actors involved. Following the neoinstitutional perspective, human 
actions take place within a tight web of institutional rules which structure humans’ expectations 
about what others will do (Hall & Taylor, 1996:956). Institutions are defined as shared social values 
stipulated in formal laws and ordinances (e.g. in planning law) which guide social interaction and 
practices (Dembski & Salet, 2010:612). Within this institutional setting, actors (e.g. local autho-
rities, landowners) develop strategies to defend their own interests in order to meet a particular 
policy goal (e.g. densification) (Gerber et al., 2018:11).
Besides public officials, other groups such as lobby parties, landowners, developers and residents 
do also play a crucial role in the decision-making process. These actors influence whether gentri-
fication processes after modernization of housing stocks emerge or not. Each of them can support 
social issues through the strategic activation of specific formal rules. Landowners, for instance, are 
most often in a position of power due to the protection guaranteed by private property rights. On 
private plots, public action only gets implemented when titleholders agree to undertake a new de-
velopment, sell their land or transfer their development rights (Gerber et al., 2018). Consequently, 
in many cases, the landowner is free to define the profit-margin to be targeted on the parcel and can 
set the rents according to market-prices. Such commodification strategies (Marcuse, 2016, Aalbers, 
2017), however, may hamper tenants’ social inclusion and result in the promotion of housing based 
on its financial value rather than its use value (Rolnik, 2013). 
To sum up, the socially-sensitive implementation of densification is the result of a socio-political 
negotiation process which is shaped by the local regulatory framework stipulated in formal rules 
(e.g. legislations, codes, ordinances) and the strategic behavior of the actors involved (Nicol & 
Knoepfel, 2008). Codominant use interests between residents, investors, and local authorities and 
their strategic formulation and activation of specific formal rules result in benefits for some (e.g. 
increased housing options, business opportunities) and losses for others (e.g. displacement, insecure 
tenure, community disruption) (Brenner et al., 2012; Marcuse, 2016). 
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7.3 Study design & methods
To analyze a contemporary phenomenon – the challenging implementation of densification objecti-
ves in terms of social sustainability – within its real-world context, we conducted in-depth qualitati-
ve case studies (Yin, 2018). 
7.3.1 Case selection
In Swiss cities, the tensions between densification objectives and tenants’ interests have become 
predominant in recent years, especially since the revision of Federal Spatial Planning Act (SPA) in 
2013 obliging the over 2000 municipalities to densify within city boundaries. An increasing num-
ber of people suffer from social displacement after modernization as a consequence of densification 
(FOH, 2019:4). As the country is regarded as a nation of tenants with the lowest homeownership 
rate in Europe (Lawson, 2009), a growing number of inhabitants living in the private rental market 
is at risk to be evicted at short notice due to decisions taken by the landowner (Rérat, 2012). In 
Switzerland, the municipality is the actor responsible to coordinate densification. Local planning 
authorities grant the building permits to private landowners. Building applications need to align 
with the Local Zoning Plan. 
We selected two comparative cases – the Swiss municipalities of Zurich and Basel – to analyze 
two different governance approaches towards socially-sensitive densification. In both cities, the 
pressure on housing development under scarce land conditions has risen in recent years: in Zurich, 
for example, where 28% of the population live in apartments of the private rental market (Table 
6), the number of densification projects of private investors has quadrupled since 2006 (from 9 to 
36 projects in total). The absolute number of dismissals due to densification measures in the city’s 
private rental sector has doubled within the period of 2006 to 2017 (Statistics City of Zurich, 2017). 
As a result of increasing housing prices after modernization and densification, moving to cheaper 
suburban areas remains the only option for lower income groups in both municipalities (Balmer & 
Gerber, 2017). 
Table	6:	Housing	market	characteristics	in	Zurich	and	Basel-City	(Statistical	Offices	Zurich	and	Basel	City	
2019, 2020; FOSD 2017:25). 
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To evaluate the social sustainability in urban densification from a tenants’ perspective (research 
question 1), we further selected two large-scale densification areas within Zurich and Basel city 
area. In this project-based approach, we investigated social sustainability “from the ground up, as it 
actually exists in local places, and as a set of evolving practices” (Krueger & Agyeman, 2005:416). 
Specifically, the densification projects – Zurich Brunaupark and Basel Schorenweg – were selected 
as they are both owned by the same institutional investor (Credit Suisse bank [CS]). This player is 
representative for many urban residential areas in Switzerland since the share owned by institutio-
nal investors such as CS makes 63% of the total housing property in Swiss cities (FOH, 2017:14). 
CS’ projects in Zurich and Basel were both on-going at the time of investigation (between March 
and November 2019) which is why the actors involved (local authorities, investors, tenants, NGOs) 
could be directly confronted with their decisions and actions taken.
Zurich Brunaupark – a settlement built in the 1980/90s – compounds of four buildings with 239 
apartments and approximately 400 residents. The investor plans to densify the area through demo-
lishment and total reconstruction of the existing buildings in 2023. The new settlement will count 
an additional 258 apartments, 497 in total (Schoop et al., 2020:18). Many households (47%) consist 
of multiple adults without children. 42% of the households have been living in the project for over 
15 years. Basel Schorenweg – built in 1961 – counts 196 apartments with around 300 residents in 
total. CS plans to densify the two existing buildings via total internal reconstruction with smaller 
housing units in 2021 (Laur, 2019:21). In March 2019, the approximately 1085 tenants in total were 
informed of the termination of their rental contract by CS. A high share of the residents can be cla-
ssified as old-aged and/or as single-households (Table 7).
Table	7:	Socio-economic	profile	and	household	types	of	tenants	in	Zurich	Brunaupark	&	Basel	Schorenweg.
 Zurich Brunaupark Basel Schorenweg 
Socio economic-profile and household types   
Single person, under 35 3% 7% 
Single person, 35 to 65 15% 10% 
Single person, 65 or older 8% 43% 
Two or more person household (no children), all under 35 7% - 
Two or more person household (no children), not all under 35 or over 65 25% 12% 
Two or more person household (no children), all 65 or older 15% 12% 
Couple with children, youngest child 6 or younger 12% 7% 
Couple with children, youngest child 7 or older 8% 7% 
Single parent, youngest child 6 or younger - 2% 
Single parent, youngest child under 7 or older 5% - 
   
Years of residence in the settlement   
<1 year 7% 5% 
1-4 years 5% 24% 
4-10 years 25% 24% 
10-15 years 20% 17% 




The data of our study was conducted through qualitative methods. We proceeded in two steps: first, 
we analyzed how tenants living in the areas in question (Brunaupark and Schorenweg) are affected 
by densification from a social sustainability perspective. We conducted a household survey with 
412 households living in the settlements in total to gain a broad understanding of their perspec-
tives. The survey incorporated the social sustainability indicators presented in section 7.2.1 and 
included both open and multiple-choice questions. The open questions were used to gain a rich 
understanding of the households’ perspective on how tenants are affected by densification plans. 
The multiple-choice questions were used to further underline household positions, but the analysis 
remains qualitative in nature. We opted for a self-completion postal and digital survey method (with 
one reminder) and managed to achieve a respectable 25% response rate (101 responses in total). 
In designing the questionnaire, we considered the existing body of literature as well as a number 
of national surveys covering similar topics which helped us to identify whether and how questions 
have shown to work. 
In a second step, we analyzed the reasons for possible trade-offs between the tenants’, landowners’, 
and local authorities’ interests focusing on institutional rules and actors decision-making behavior 
(neoinstitutionalist perspective). In this step, we started with a broad screening of local policy docu-
ments to analyze the interface between urban densification and social sustainability. We included 
government reports, legislation, and parliamentary debates primarily being published within the 
last decade. We also incorporated newspaper articles, project documents, and ‘grey literature’ to 
understand the actors’ strategies and objectives behind specific formal rules activated. Finally, we 
employed ten semi-structured expert interviews with representatives from five local public autho-
rity departments, three local tenants associations, and two CS portfolio managers. All experts were 
chosen due to their detailed understanding and knowledge of the topic. The data was evaluated 
using qualitative analysis methods. 
7.4	 The	tensions	between	densification	and	social	exclusion	in	Swiss	urban	policy	making
In the following section, first, we show how tenants are affected by densification from a social 
sustainability perspective in Zurich Brunaupark and Basel Schorenweg (section 7.4.1). Second, to 
understand the reasons for specific decisions and policy measures taken in each institutional setting, 
we analyze what strategies local authorities, property owners and tenants develop to defend their 
interests in urban densification (section 7.4.2). 
7.4.1	 Impacts	of	densification	on	tenants	from	a	social	sustainability	perspective
Community cohesion
In Zurich Brunaupark and Basel Schorenweg, the majority of the residents has lived in the settle-
ment for over 15 years (Table 7). Many of them state that they feel strongly socially-embedded in 
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the neighborhood as they have spent their everyday life with families, children and friends together 
and share a lot of memories. In particular, families with children as well as old-aged fear to lose so-
cial support and contacts through dismissal. They perceive a common sense of home, local identity 
and embeddedness and are not willing to leave (see Figures 8.1 and 8.5). 
»We live in a small village here. People know each other. Everyone helps each other, talks together, meets in a 
coffee shop or in the local grocery store. We have a good social life and connectivity.[…] We live together very 
peacefully and quietly« (Tenant Zurich Brunaupark, 73 years, June 2019).  
Housing affordability
According to Credit Suisse’ marketing department, the rents after densification and modernization 
in Brunaupark will increase by 60%. For example, a 3.5 rooms apartment (75m2) which today costs 
1700 CHF per month (gross rent) will be offered for 2720 CHF. In Basel Schorenweg, the rents for 
the new apartments will rise by +50%. Here, a 3.5 rooms dwelling which costs today 1200 CHF 
per month (gross rent) will be offered for around 1800 CHF. In both projects, the bank legitimizes 
the rent increase with the argument that the dwellings are centrally-located and substantial moder-
nization resulting in higher living quality for the residents will be obtained (Credit Suisse Zurich & 
Basel, 2020).  
As a consequence, tenants in Brunaupark and Schorenweg state that they will not be able to afford 
a new apartment in the modernized housing project anymore. Especially low-income and old-aged 
which have lived in their dwellings for many years indicate that they will have to move to cheaper 
areas outside city boundaries. 
»I will lose my center of life. I will not be able to find an affordable apartment at such a central location any- 
more« (Tenant Basel Schorenweg, 55 years, June 2019).
Housing availability and -accessibility
In Zurich, evicted tenants which are in need to find something at low-cost within the city (e.g. due 
to their workplace) rely on the support of non-profit housing associations. Otherwise, rents on the 
regular housing market are too expensive for them. In the city of Zurich, however, waiting lists for 
social housing units are long. People sometimes have to wait for several months to years to get ac-
cess to an available low-cost apartment (Martel, 2020). Even if they are old-aged or in a precarious 
living situation, available apartments in the social housing sector are not offered to socially-evicted 
tenants immediately or with prior access criteria. Consequently, for the majority of tenants living in 
Zurich Brunaupark, moving to cheaper suburban area remains the only option to find housing.  
»We will not find such an affordable flat in the city center anymore. All cooperative housing associations have 
long waiting lists and for some it is even not possible to apply anymore. […] We are a community which is now 
being disrupted« (Tenant Zurich Brunaupark, 42 years, June 2019). 
Even tenants with higher incomes who would be able to afford higher rents are not allowed to 
stay in Brunaupark. They do not receive prior access to the new dwellings even though they have 
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lived in the settlement for many years since CS has decided to start with new residents from anew 
regardless of the former residents’ family situation, age, gender, income or workplace (Interviewee 
39, CS portfolio manager Zurich, July 8, 2019). 
Similarly as in Zurich, in Basel it has become difficult for evicted renters to find something adequa-
te within the city center (Statistics Basel-City, 2019:13). To find affordable housing at short-notice, 
tenants also rely on the support of Basel’s social housing associations. These social organizations, 
however, have long waiting lists too and do not prioritize old-aged, families or socially-dismissed 
households (Martel, 2020). Similarly as in Zurich, even tenants who would afford the new rents 
in the densified settlement will not be able to stay in Basel Schorenweg. Neither they receive an 
alternative apartment which they could move to during reconstruction nor will they get prior access 
to a new dwelling. Therefore, regardless of being high- or low-income, moving to retirement homes 
(which have long waiting lists too) or to cheaper suburban areas remains the only option for tenants 
living in Basel Schorenweg (Beck & Schulthess, 2019). 
Housing	quality	in	and	around	the	building
From a socio-ecologic point of view, tenants living in Zurich Brunaupark do not recognize a need 
for energetic modernization. The buildings have been internally renovated eight years ago. Speci-
fically, in 2012, new sanitary facilities (kitchens, bathrooms) as well as new floors were installed 
(Schoop et al., 2020:18). Therefore, tenants perceive the physical condition of their dwellings and 
the surrounding neighborhood as of high quality. In particular, they are satisfied with the size, the 
location, and the services within and around Brunaupark (see Figures 8.2 and 8.3). 
»I totally cannot understand why these buildings which are in a very good physical shape will be demolished. 
Especially in Zurich municipality which aims to reach the goals of a green and sustainable city« (Tenant Zurich 
Brunaupark, 78 years, June 2019). 
Similarly as in Zurich Brunaupark, residents in Schorenweg do not understand why urban regene-
ration of their apartments is needed at all. In 2002, the buildings have been fully internally renova-
ted. The modernization included the installations of new bathrooms, kitchens, floors, and windows 
insulation to improve energy efficiency. In 2010, in addition, the roof and gutters were renewed 
and in 2015 the eight elevators have been fully refurbished (Laur, 2019). Hence, residents living in 
Schorenweg perceive the physical condition of their apartments of high construction and housing 
quality. They also appreciate the access to green and open spaces as well as to services in the sur-
rounding neighborhood (Figures 8.6 and 8.7). Thus, overall, “no construction measures are effecti-
vely needed” (Interviewee 37, Head of Local Tenants Association Basel, February 13, 2019). 
»The building is in a very good condition. Densification will lead to modernization which only rich people can 
afford« (Tenant Basel Schorenweg, 65 years, June 2019).
Citizenship & Decision-making
Finally, tenants of Zurich Brunaupark and Basel Schorenweg do not feel being adequately involved 
in the local decision-making process (Figures 8.4 and 8.8). Neither have they been informed about 
the up-coming dismissal in advance, nor have they been involved in the negotiation process bet-
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ween the city government and the investor from the beginning. For example, until contract termina-
tion, they have not known about the up-coming densification procedure and rent increase at all. The 
communication explicitly took place between CS and the city authorities. 
»The property owner only communicates with the city council. The developer communicates with the tenants but 
only little and in a non-sympathic way« (Tenant Zurich Brunaupark, June 2019). 
Therefore, tenants in both settlements do not feel adequately supported by the city council (execu-
tive) and local public administration. They feel to be left alone in finding a new apartment and in 
coping with their current living situation. 
»We were surprised when we received the contract termination. Our government just observes and does not inter-
vene« (Tenant of Basel Schorenweg, June 2019). 
Overall, the results of the surveys show that the indicators of social sustainability are not met in 
both densification areas. The tenants are neither able to afford the apartments after densification, 
nor do they manage to maintain their social networks and acquaintances. They are forced to leave 
their dwellings even many of them face difficulties to find alternative housing options in the city. 
The densification procedures strongly disrupt their social stability and cohesion in the neighbor-
hood. Results also show that tenants‘ perspectives have not been formally addressed either. The 
decision whether, how, and for the benefit of whom densification was actually needed was expli-
citly made between the investor and the city council. This shows that urban planning in the age of 
densification does not or only insufficiently take the interests of the residents into account, even 
though they are very vulnerable to spatial changes.
7.4.2	 Institutional	rules	and	actors’	strategies	in	Zurich	and	Basel-City
In the following section, we analyze the institutional mechanisms leading to the situation presented 
in the previous section. To understand the reasons for the social outcomes identified, we analyze the 
institutional rules and the involved actors decision-making behavior. For each city, first, we empha-
size aspects of planning and energy policy because of their significant impact on housing (re-)
development. Second, objectives of housing and social welfare policy are also explored. Finally, we 
address the role of private law (property rights, tenancy matters).  
Zurich-City government
On November 1st 2018, the revision of Zurich’s Local Zoning Plan18 came into force. Based on the 
revised legislation, the city council initiated planning measures such as the introduction of densi-
fication zones19 to effectively promote population growth through internal settlement development 
and the efficient use of energy (Zurich City Council, 2013:5). In Zurich Brunaupark, for example, 
18	 Zurich	Local	Zoning	Act	of	30	September	2016	(LZA	700.100)
19	 In	these	zones,	landowners	can	realize	higher	exploitation	rates	(more	apartments)	in	comparision	to		





the revised zoning plan has led to a situation in which the investor became allowed to double the 
number of apartments on the same parcel (by +258 additional apartments to 496 in total). The city 
council legitimized the introduction of these planning measures with the political aims to support 
future population growth through densification and to meet green policy objectives. In particular, 
the redevelopment of existing housing stocks is needed since free inner-city brownfield areas are 
missing in Zurich and new construction on greenfield has become restricted since the introduction 
of the revised Federal SPA (City of Zurich 2016, 2019a). 
»In future terms, and nowadays already, population growth is only possible through demolition and reconstructi-
on of existing housing stocks in the city of Zurich. The municipality has to ensure that sufficient housing units will 
be provided« (Interviewee 40, City of Zurich, Urban Development Department, July 31, 2019).
Simultaneously, the fulfilling of social policy objectives such as the provision of affordable, stable, 
and secure housing is guaranteed by the “Housing Article” in the Constitution of the Municipality 
of Zurich [MC 2013]20. According to the Municipal Constitution (Art. 2, Para. 4), by 2050, the city 
council must ensure that a third of the total housing stock will comply in non-profit housing proper-
ty and align with cost-rent principles to counteract social exclusion processes. 
»There is a process of social exclusion going on in Zurich. If housing property has been renovated, demolished, 
and brought to the market again, the price for the same apartment with a higher standard has doubled. […] We 
have a constant struggle of gentrification in the city« (Interviewee 35, City of Zurich, Housing Department, May 
3, 2019).
To achieve this goal, during the last decade, the city government has followed an interventionist 
housing policy strategy to promote affordable housing e.g. by purchasing private land for public 
housing or by providing long-term building leases on public land and supply-side subsidies to 
non-profit cooperatives (Interviewee 40, City of Zurich, Urban Development Department, July 31, 
2019). Overall, with these housing and planning policy measures, Zurich’s local government aimed 
to constantly increase the share of social housing property within city boundaries (Zurich City 
Council, 2017:4ff). 
»The municipality of Zurich follows an active housing policy approach. We are strongly linked to investors, pri-
vate homeowners, and housing cooperatives and aim for frequent exchange« (Interviewee 45, Head of Planning 
Department, October 24, 2019). 
As our analysis reveals, however, in daily practice, the promotion of ‘social sustainability’ crite-
ria (e.g. residential stability) does not only rely on local housing and planning policy. In Zurich, 
the building permit for each private housing project is approved and controlled by the municipal 
planning department. In case the project is of certain importance (e.g. due to its location) and size, 
the authority may receive recommendations of the Local Building Committee [LBC] which is 
part of the planning department (Art. 53 MC). The committee consists of external experts (mainly 
20	 Zurich	Municipal	Constitution	of	24	November	2013	(MC	101.100)
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architects) as well as employees of the local administration. Its role is to advise the city council and 
the local planning department in questions of urban planning, design and architecture. In Zurich 
Brunaupark, for instance, the committee advised the authorities to approve a total area reconstruc-
tion rather than partial redevelopment to ensure an improved and uniformed architectural quality 
of the settlement (Zurich City Council, 2019). The fulfilling of social (and distributive) tasks e.g. 
in relation to tenants inclusion, community cohesion or housing affordability was not part of their 
project evaluation.  
»In Zurich, this [the collaboration with the local building committee] is called ’cooperative planning‘. However, 
in Brunaupark, they only evaluated the projects based on design standards. Social parameters were not included 
at all« (Interviewee 31, Head of Local Tenants Association Zurich, April 18, 2019). 
Moreover, the implementation of social objectives does not rely only on the local government’s 
own prerogatives. This is because in Switzerland, in general, the rights of private homeowners 
are strongly protected by law in international comparison (Property Rights Alliance, 2019). At the 
municipal level, this means that the right to own property is protected as a fundamental right which 
can only be restricted if an overweighing public interest exists (Art. 22ter CSC21). As holder of pro-
perty rights, CS not only has the right to control and to make decisions about the housing stock in 
Brunaupark. It also has the right to obtain at least a portion of the financial benefits produced by the 
housing stock. In the rental sector, Swiss courts interpret the weight of public interest narrowly so 
that property restrictions or expropriations are rare in international comparison (Alterman, 2010). 
The rights of tenants (Art. 253-274 OC), in contrast, are regarded as weakly protected by law in 
comparison to neighbouring states such as Austria or Germany (GFOBRP, 2016). For example, 
landowners are allowed to terminate an open-ended rent contract within three months without any 
specific reason. So regardless of the tenants’ strength of social integration, age, or years of residen- 
cy in the neighbourhood. In Brunaupark, CS does not need to introduce rent levels for the new 
housing construction and is allowed to set the new rents according to market prices. They also do 
not need to follow legal restrictions for dismissal of old-aged or economically weak households. 
»Swiss tenancy law has one fundamental problem: in case of renewal, there is a divided housing market in 
Switzerland between tenants which have lived in their apartments for many years and the ones moving into new 
housing units. The former will not be able to move out of their current apartments since they will not be able to 
afford the rents offered on the regular housing market anymore« (Interviewee 31, Head of Local Tenants Associa-
tion Zurich, April 18, 2019). 
Finally, these private law restrictions have led to a situation in which the local planning department 
is only able to guide housing development to a limited degree. To a large extent, it relies in the res-
ponsibility of CS to decide on the profit margin and social goals to be targeted on the private parcel. 
»Normally, the property owner has already decided whether they demolish the housing stock or not. The only 
thing we can do is to advise them in case the location is sensitive. We cannot do more than this« (Interviewee 45, 
Head of Planning Department, October 24, 2019).
21	 Swiss	Civil	Code	of	10	December	1907	(CC	210)
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Based on these legal conditions, on June 12, 2019, Zurich’s executive city council decided not to 
approve the objections submitted by the municipal parliament and the local tenants association (see 
following sections). Their decision based on the argument that “the introduction of a special land 
use plan would be equal to a restriction of private ownership. Such restriction of property rights, 
however, would be disproportionate and therefore illegal” (Zurich City Council, 2019b:3). Finally, 
on March 10, 2020, the city council fully approved CS’s building permit for Brunaupark (Huber, 
2020). 
Basel-City government
In the year 2018, Basel-City has started its political debates on the revision of the Local Zoning 
Act22. The city council aimed to introduce “planning measures which lead to a density increase at 
inner-city locations to promote housing space for additional 5000 residents under the paradigm of 
green energy consumption” (Basel-City Council, 2018a:1). To meet this goal, the local government 
has introduced a progressive housing policy strategy. In practice, this means that the city coun-
cil (executive) tries to purchase land for public housing and has expanded its collaboration with 
non-profit housing associations to increase the share of affordable housing (Basel-City Council, 
2016:38). Furthermore, the municipal government provides demand-side subsidies to low-income 
residents (Basel-City Council, 2016:38). 
»In addition to demand-side subsidies, the city of Basel has increased its supply-side subsidies to support the 
city’s non-profit and affordable housing supply. For instance, the city provides long-term building leases on 
public land to non-profit cooperatives« (Interviewee 41, City of Basel, Head of Housing and Urban Development 
Department, August 20, 2019).
In Basel Schorenweg, however, the above mentioned local planning and housing policy measures 
have not succeeded in preserving the social qualities of the area. Tenants are being dismissed even 
though the city council has tried to purchase the land in Basel Schorenweg for the provision of 
social housing units. In fact, they could not accomplish the purchase as CS’s price request was too 
high for the city government (Interviewee 43, Credit Suisse portfolio manager Basel, September 12, 
2019). In spring 2020, the city council granted the building permit and rejected the objections sub-
mitted by residents and the local tenants association. The decision was legitimized by the argument 
that Schorenweg is in private property and the densification measures announced by CS would take 
place within the regular Local Zoning Act (Basel-City Council, 2020).
Credit	Suisse’s	development	strategy
In Zurich Brunaupark and Basel Schorenweg, Credit Suisse has decided to densify the existing 
housing stock as both areas are centrally-located. The possibility to rise density stipulated by the 
Local Zoning Acts has opened attractive investment conditions in both cities for them (Interviewees 
39 and 43, CS portfolio managers in Zurich, July 8, 2019 and Basel, September 12, 2019).
22	 Basel-City	Local	Zoning	Act	of	17	November	1999	(LZA	730.100)
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»We decided to create more housing units at the same location. For us as pension fund this was all the more inte-
resting. Because: where can one invest money nowadays anymore? We prefer to invest money at central locations 
which are well connected to transport nodes« (Interviewee 39, Credit Suisse portfolio manager Zurich, July 8, 
2019).  
In Basel Schorenweg, for instance, by 2040, it is estimated that the area will grow by +1000 new 
housing units. In 2009, the local planning authority has authorized the construction of two new 
housing skyscrapers in the area as well as a new school (Basel-City Council, 2009). By the end of 
2018, these two high-rise buildings were finished (Oppliger, 2016). In March 2019, CS then deci-
ded to densify Schorenweg area as they aimed to benefit of these improved urban development and 
asset conditions (Interviewee 43, Credit Suisse portfolio manager Basel, September 12, 2019). 
»Schoren area is an attractive city neighborhood with leisure and green facilities nearby. The area has been 
strongly developed in recent years. [...] However, even if the area would not have been developed, it would still 
be Basel center and attractive for investment. The area’s upgrading clearly had a positive effect« (Interviewee 43, 
Credit Suisse portfolio manager Basel, September 12, 2019).
Even though CS in both settlements was aware that they renovated the buildings only a few years 
ago and a lot of criticism against the planning procedure was raised, they aimed to modernize the 
apartments to invest money at central location. The overall aim was to benefit of high return of 
investment through increasing rents at an attractive urban place.   
»It is a fact that the rents will increase. [...] In the end, however, the buildings are newly renovated with less 
financial expenses for maintenance costs. For us, as investors with a long-term perspective, this is important« 
(Interviewee 43, Credit Suisse portfolio manager Basel, September 12, 2019). 
Interestingly, in Zurich Brunaupark, CS states that they initially planned to densify via partial rede-
velopment rather than total reconstruction to protect social qualities (Interviewee 39, CS portfolio 
manager Zurich, July 8, 2019). This proposal, however, was disapproved by the Local Building 
Committee. As a consequence, CS decided to dismiss the residents and to demolish the existing 
housing stock to be able to build a totally new and architectonically homogenous settlement. 
»The local building committee told us that Brunaupark settlement is too heterogenous. [...] Therefore, we chan-
ged our decision and aimed to perform a more homogenous and uniformed area redevelopment« (Interviewee 39, 
Credit Suisse portfolio manager Zurich, July 8, 2019).
Tenants’	and	local	NGOs	resistance	strategies
As a result of the socio-economic challenges tenants are confronted with due to densification and 
up-grading, in Zurich Brunaupark, on March 12, 2019, a group of tenants founded a local self-
help initiative to make their protest visible. Today, ‘Brunaupark tenants association [BTA]’ counts 
around 120 members and aims “to secure stable, affordable and socially-mixed housing for all 
income segments in the settlement” (BTA, 2019a). The association has organized street rallies and 
initiated a local petition which over 5700 citizens signed within one month (Interviewee 37, Head 
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of Brunaupark Tenants Association, June 13, 2019). Specifically, the local petition called for a legal 
rejection of the contract terminations (BTA, 2019b). Simultaneously, left-wing parties of the muni-
cipal parliament (strongly supported by the local tenants association) initiated a referendum which 
aimed to introduce a ‘special land use zone’23 for Brunaupark area. Legally, the introduction of such 
a zone would have put the municipal parliament in charge of approving development projects rather 
than the city council only (Zurich Municipal Parliament, 2019). 
Similarly as in Zurich, in Basel Schorenweg, in March 2019, 96 households submitted a lawsuit 
against unfair contract dismissal to make their rights visible (Interviewee 38, head of Local Tenants 
Association, June 26, 2019). Moreover, in June 2019, Leilani Farha, UN housing expert, visited 
the settlements of Zurich Brunaupark and Basel Schorenweg as part of her Europe tour. To help 
the residents, she wrote an advisory letter to the Swiss Federal Office for Foreign Affairs on behalf 
of UN. Main topic of the letter was the unfair treatment of tenants, particularly, in regard to their 
social eviction at short-notice and the precarious housing situation for old-aged and low-income 
households (Sturzenegger, 2020). As we have described above, however, none of these attempts 
were supported by the city authorities in Zurich or Basel.
7.5	 Explaining	the	mechanisms	at	play	leading	to	residents’	social	exclusion	in	Zurich		
 Brunaupark and Basel Schorenweg
In this article, first, our goal was to explain how tenants are affected by densification from a social 
sustainability perspective and to understand how their positions are integrated into local decision-
making. Second, we analyzed the strategies developed by local authorities, property owners and 
local NGOs to defend their interests in each institutional setting. This allows us to explain how 
and why trade-offs between environmental, economic and social goals of densification take place. 
More specifically, we could highlight the institutional mechanisms at play leading to tenants’ social 
exclusion in urban densification projects. 
Our analysis reveals that in Zurich Brunaupark and Basel Schorenweg, municipal authorities appro-
ve CS’ plans since the investor acts within the regular zoning plan. According to the protection 
guaranteed by the Swiss Constitution, no legitimate reason for private housing property restriction 
exists. In other words, in both cities, CS acts within the limits of the law – a law that is not targeting 
the protection of tenants’ interests – and the authorities in charge of granting building permits do 
not try to interfere. CS hence seeks to benefit of the densification potentials guaranteed by the Local 
Zoning Act. The bank acknowledges densification as lucrative business as mortgage rates are low 
at the moment and the pressure to invest capital is increasing. Under the premise that the demand 
for housing will continue to be high, investment risks are minimal and urban densification is all 
the more profitable. Investment costs, in turn, can be amortized in very short-term (Harvey, 2012; 
Brenner et al., 2012; Marcuse, 2016; Aalbers, 2017). As a result, under the ‘flag’ of densification 
23 Special land use zones are designated to areas of increased public interest in which spatial develop 
	 ment	can	take	place	outside	the	regular	zonig	plan.
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as a public policy goal, CS realizes redevelopment projects with high return of investment. As long 
as they are not legally restricted to do so, neither in Zurich nor Basel, CS will feel compelled to 
support tenants’ social inclusion.  
To counteract private investors’ development practices, municipal authorities have started to inter-
vene more proactively into housing development in Zurich and Basel. For example, city authorities 
in both municipalities have introduced new housing policy measures such as increased subsidies 
for social housing associations. Moreover, local planners have also worked with property rights. 
In Basel Schorenweg, for example, the planning administration tried to purchase the private plot 
in Schorenweg but the price requested by CS was deemed too high. To legitimize such acquisition 
strategy, broad political support is needed which is not always given, even in big and wealthy cities 
such as Basel or Zurich. As a consequence, city authorities have neglected the social dimension of 
densification in Zurich Brunau and Basel Schoren. 
To be more precise: in contrast to social objectives, which investors and municipal authorities 
perceive as a barrier to the economic development of cities, ecologic goals of densification bring 
investment opportunities, which explains why both parties are willing to agree with the new con-
straints at the expense of its social side. In fact, social inquiries make planning procedures more 
expensive for investors and public actors and potentially prevent the comprehensive urban renewal 
projects that planning administrations are supporting (see Brunaupark case). As a result, the Swiss 
legal context characterized by strongly protected property rights and weak tenancy law has led to 
a situation where the real estate industry and municipal authorities work hand in hand to promote 
densification as “Eco-Business” at the expense of its social dimension.  
As a consequence, our results show that long-term residents in Brunaupark and Schorenweg find 
themselves evicted as they are no longer able to afford the new rents of their modernized and densi-
fied dwellings. They are forced to leave urban centers because of the lack of affordable alternatives. 
This process of social exclusion contributes to the constant erosion of social relations and contacts 
to family members, neighbors and friends. In the Brunau and Schoren areas, residents feel that 
their perspectives as tenants have not been respected by municipal authorities, particularly, since 
their legal objections (e.g. against unfair dismissal) have been rejected in both cities. Even though 
they tried to resist through street rallies, formal petitions, or the collaboration with the local tenants 
association, they did not succeed in defending their interests and faced discrimination because of 
their low-income status. 
99
7.6 Conclusion
Even though densification has become a core objective of urban policy agendas across the globe, 
critical analysis of its socio-political limitations, challenges and contradictions, particularly in 
regard to its effects on tenants from a social sustainability perspective is largely missing (Burton, 
2003; Ancell & Thompson-Facett, 2008; Scally & Tighe, 2015; Pérez, 2020). This article addresses 
this gap in the literature and focuses on the social implications of densification, therefore indirectly 
contributing to understand how the social qualities of a city can be sustained effectively. 
Based on two Swiss examples, we show that the current way of implementing densification objecti-
ves can be far from socially sustainable. A powerful coalition between private landowners and mu-
nicipal authorities promote densification as an “Eco-Business” by coupling urban competitiveness 
with ecologic viability goals, while neglecting social aspects. This coalition tends to jeopardize the 
very social qualities which are a city’s basis of community-based initiatives and solidarity-creating 
capacities. Low-income groups, including old-aged, young families or student households, find 
themselves in a vicious circle in which they do not have other alternatives than to move to cheaper 
suburban areas. Hence, those being displaced have become the victims of powerful forces of capita-
list urbanization and differential spending power. 
Even though our results are limited to two Swiss cities, potential for generalization to other urban 
contexts results from the identified causal mechanisms which explain why the social dimension of 
sustainability tends to be bypassed in densification processes. On this basis, we can formulate diffe-
rent strategies to make densification more social (e.g. quota for affordable housing, public subsidies 
for non-profit housing cooperatives, eviction controls, etc.). An effort can also be made to properly 
activate existing instruments: making densification more social is not only a matter of political will, 
but also of the ability of public administration to familiarize with all the range of existing interven-
tion possibilities. Sometimes the implementation of more social measures might have to be done 
at the expense of architectural quality and homogeneity, but there might be good reasons to do so. 
Residents could also be involved more actively into decision-making and stricter control mechan- 
isms in relation to occupancy rate rules or income levels in social housing units could be activa-
ted. Greater awareness of the detrimental social implications of densification and implementation 
of proactive measures to counteract them could also improve the acceptance of densification and 
prevent NIMBY-responses (Scally & Tighe, 2015). 
The findings of this article call also for a greater involvement of city governments to counter-
act trends of increasing commodification of urban housing stocks (Rolnik, 213; Marcuse, 2016; 
Aalbers, 2017) by systematically promoting new and/or available policy measures which incorpo-
rate how residents interpret the places in which they live and embedded in order to include their 
perspectives into local decision-making procedures and regulations. Only in doing so, cities will 
succeed in promoting densification projects that are designed to the needs and capabilities of people 
who are actually supposed to benefit from them – the residents. Presumably, sustainable urban 
development calls for economic stability, environmental protection and social sustainability not just 
the one or the other.
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Abstract:	For decades, many cities have introduced densification policy objectives to stop urban 
sprawl or to promote efficient use of natural resources. In the urban housing sector, however, densi-
fication projects often intensify social challenges. Due to rising rents after modernization of existing 
housing stocks as a consequence of densification, low-income tenants are forced to leave their apart-
ments. Risks of social exclusion and segregation increase simultaneously.  
In this paper, we analyze how local planning authorities cope with affordable housing shortages in a 
context of urban densification. Specifically, we ask: How do municipal planning authorities promote 
affordable housing in densifying cities? To answer this research question, we apply a neoinstitutio-
nal analysis approach to better understand (1) the basic mechanisms of how land policy instruments 
impact affordability, and (2) why specific instruments are activated to defend affordable housing ob-
jectives. Through qualitative case study analysis of four Swiss urban municipalities, our results show 
that the mere availability of land policy instruments is not sufficient but that the strategic activation 
of specific instruments matters. 
Keywords: Land policy; Affordable Housing; Densification; Gentrification
Research	highlights:
The paper…
• … applies a comparative case study approach to analyze the municipal land policy strategies for 
affordable housing in four Swiss cities.  
• … analyzes how Swiss municipal authorities in charge of land-use planning promote affordable 
housing in a context of densification. 
• … explains what kind of policy instruments they can use to promote affordable housing effecti-
vely. 
• … argues that effective municipal land policy in favor of housing affordability (as key element of 
urban social sustainability) does not only involve the mere introduction of new instruments but 
the strategic activation of available instruments matters.
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8.1 Introduction
For decades, many cities have introduced densification policy objectives to stop urban sprawl or 
to promote efficient use of natural resources (Daneshpour & Shakibamanesh 2011; Touati-Morel 
2015). Densification is defined as a process leading to higher exploitation (number of households) 
within existing city boundaries (Boyko & Cooper 2011:47). The implementation of this process, 
however, is a contested procedure as it requires to deal with the already built environment (Ger-
ber et al. 2018). In the urban housing sector, for example, the compact city may improve public 
transport use, while at the same time it is likely to mean less domestic living space and a lack of 
affordable housing. A rising number of tenants suffer from social eviction, contract termination 
and dismissal due rent increase after modernization as a direct consequence of urban densification 
(Burton 2003; Chiu 2003; Bramley et al. 2009). 
In Switzerland, for instance, a legally-binding densification policy objective has been introduced in 
the revised Federal Spatial Planning Act (SPA) in 2013. Swiss municipalities are obliged to densify 
through inward settlement development to protect agricultural land and to preserve natural habitats 
(Art. 1 SPA). However, since the majority of Swiss cities lacks of free inner-city plots, the process 
is primarily being implemented through redevelopment of existing housing stocks e.g. in the form 
of total replacement construction, renovation, or compaction of existing buildings (Nebel et al. 
2017). Simultaneously, affordable housing shortages for low- and middle-income households have 
intensified in almost every Swiss city in recent years (FOH 2016a). The current housing situation 
in urban areas is charaterized by an overheated housing market with vacancy rates below 1% and 
rising rents (Balmer & Gerber 2017). Consequently, municipal authorities are increasingly confron-
ted to deal with tenants suffering from social exclusion due to rising rents after modernization and 
densification. Particularly, low-income old-aged, migrant and family households are affected from 
social displacement as newly renovated buildings are only affordable for middle and high-income 
groups and non-profit housing suppliers have long waiting lists (FOH 2016a). The current situation 
is even more worrying considering that Switzerland is regarded as a nation of tenants with having 
the lowest homeownership rate in Europe (Lawson 2009). Housing provision traditionally lies in 
the responsibility of the profit-oriented private rental sector (Bourassa et al. 2010). In Swiss cities 
(where over 70% of the population lives), 63% of households live in apartments of private investors 
and are strongly dependent on the housing stock owners’ decisions (FOH 2017).  
In this article, we analyze how municipal planning administrations cope with affordable housing 
shortages in a context of urban densification. Specifically, we explain the strategies implemented 
by municipal authorities in order to deal with affordable housing provision when confronted with 
scarcity of land. We ask: How do municipal planning authorities promote affordable housing in 
densifying cities? To answer this research question, we apply a neoinstitutionalist analysis approach 
and proceed in two steps to better understand (1) the basic mechanisms of how policy instruments 
impact affordability, and (2) why local planners activate specific instruments to defend housing 
affordability objectives. These questions require the use of qualitative case study methodology 
(Yin 2018) employed in four Swiss municipalities which are all confronted with rising affordable 
housing scarcity and densification pressure. This article brings together examples of local practices 
to raise awareness how planners can strategically activate different policy instruments to promote 
affordable housing in urban areas. 
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8.2 Affordable housing provision at the interface between public policy intervention and  
 property rights
Housing affordability refers to a situation in which households are able to pay a certain percentage 
of their income for housing costs so that they will have enough left for other necessities of life (Sto-
ne 2006). In Switzerland, for instance, it is generally assumed that a quarter (25%) of the monthly 
net household income can be spent on the monthly gross rent without negatively impacting other 
dimensions of life (FOH 2014)24.
 
To understand the diverse mechanisms that influence the status of housing affordability, we apply a 
neoinstitutionalist analysis approach (Mandelbaum 1985; Williamson 2000; Ostrom 2007; Gerber 
et al. 2009). In general, this approach focuses on the relationship between institutions and actors’ 
decisions observing that human actions take place within a tight web of formal rules which struc-
ture individuals’ expectations about what others will do (Hall & Taylor 1996:956). Institutions are 
thereby understood as shared social values stipulated in formal laws and ordinances which guide 
social interaction and practices (Dembski & Salet 2010:612). Following the neoinstitutional per-
spective, housing affordability is hence regarded as the result of human actions. The key attributes 
of individuals’ behavior - both the institutional setting and the actors’ self-interestedness and stra-
tegies of action - need to be addressed for understanding the (un)sustainable use of urban housing 
stocks (Williamson 2000:600).  
8.2.1 Strategic activation of land policy instruments for affordable housing provision
Housing is a resource that is economically significant. Traded on the free market, housing is a com-
modity with enormous economic potential which is why it is often treated as a highly valued colla-
teral. Especially in cities, where demand for housing is high and the potential for capital accumula-
tion is lucrative, the competition between actors interested in using urban land for housing is rising 
and rents constantly increase (Aalbers 2017:543-544). In addition, in many cities, the prohibition to 
build outside municipal boundaries and the obligation to densify within the built environment has 
even reinforced this competition. Due to scarce land resources, the prices for land and the housing 
stocks which are built on intensively increase (Burton 2000:1976).
Consequently, the provision of affordable housing in dense city areas is to be regarded as a land 
policy issue since owners can ask for higher land prices due to increased proximity within the 
financial center, centrality to transport nodes, or accessibility to services which directly influences 
the rental cost level (Theurillat et al. 2014:1426). In this context, “land policy” encompasses all the 
political-legal measures implemented by the municipality to deal with the issue of land use regu-




 Therefore, a quarter is considered to be appropriate. 
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and measures that have an influence on the way land is used, distributed and valued to implement 
the politically defined spatial development goal” (Hengstermann & Gerber 2015:246). This active 
definition of land policy (see for discussion, Healey & Barrett 1985; Needham & Verhage 1998; 
Knoepfel et al. 2012; van der Krabben & Jacobs 2013; Hartmann & Spit 2015) differs from a pas-
sive land policy understanding (e.g. Davy 2005:117) that focuses not only whether land is changed 
(passive) but also in regard to achieve a specific spatial development goal (e.g. affordable housing 
provision) (active) (Hengstermann 2019). 
In practice, such state interventions appear in the form of public and private law instruments that 
operate according to a different logic and rely on different forms of legitimacy (Hood & Margetts 
2007; Needham et al. 2018). In general, policy instruments are defined as intervention ways or 
measures that are needed to achieve a certain public policy goal (Knoepfel et al. 2007:156-157). To 
provide affordable housing, for instance, different intervention ways for municipalities exist inclu-
ding the increase of social housing (public ownership) or a shift towards project-based subsidies 
that may stimulate the affordability of rents (Kadi & Ronald 2014:271). 
• Public law instruments derive from public policy including regulatory statues, penal laws 
and other laws of public order. They aim to solve a political problem that was defined as such 
by the voting majority e.g. urban sprawl. Public law instruments such as subsidies or zoning 
measures are regularly revised, not only because the problem they are targeting constantly evol-
ves, but also because changing political majorities propose alternative solutions to the problem 
(Knoepfel et al. 2012). 
• Private law instruments derive from private law including property law, the law of contracts, 
torts and obligations. Their aim is to defend private interests against the (potentially absolutist) 
power of the state (Locke 1689). Property rights are grounded in the Civil Code (or similar in 
common law contexts) and are extremely stable over time because their definition hardly chan-
ges (Bromley 1992; Savini et al. 2015). Without heavy state intervention such as expropriation, 
therefore, new planning regulations only get implemented when titleholders agree to undertake 
new development, sell their land or transfer their development rights (Gerber et al. 2017).  
Under scarce land conditions, city authorities frequently fail to cope with complex property-right 
arrangements as most instruments were crafted to deal with use situations on unbuilt greenfield. 
Densification, in contrast, implies to deal with the already built environment and with complex 
property situations (e.g. small-scale ownership, veto-rights controlled by power actors). Therefore, 
in a densifying city, planning for affordable housing requires a keen understanding of the instru-
ments available to govern the close interactions between land-use planning (public policy) and 
property rights (Dawkins & Nelson 2002; Blomquist 2012). Planners have to understand that the 
selection and combination of policy instruments is never neutral. Rather the choice corresponds to a 
specific interpretation of the role played by the state and/or its private partners (Salamon 2000). An 
active land policy strategy, in other words, requires planning administrations, which are capable to 
develop intervention ways to reinforce their position in front of powerful landowners or economic 
interests to address complex and rivalrous land use situations (Alterman 1990). These strategies are 
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deliberate and goal-oriented applications of certain instruments or the combination thereof (Gerber 
et al. 2018). For example, as densification implies a form of planning that goes beyond zoning in 
order to deal with complex property rights situations, strategic competencies of municipal authori-
ties include e.g. amicable purchase, building leases, public-private-contracts, and so on. Moreover, 
because property titles give additional power to their holders to shape housing development, public 
actors too can use them to reinforce their position (Gerber et al. 2017:1687).
8.3 Study design
To investigate a contemporary phenomenon in-depth - the provision of affordable housing in den-
sifying urban areas - and as results of human action, the empirical material of this study is conduc-
ted through qualitative case study methodology (Yin 2018).
8.3.1 Case selection & methods
The study is conducted in two steps: in a first step, we investigate the wide range of available po-
licy instruments to promote affordable housing in cities under densification pressure (sub-question 
1). Following this objective, Switzerland makes an interesting case study to analyze the relationship 
between land-use regulation, densification, and housing affordability as the challenge of coordina-
ting the three has become predominant in the country in recent years (Gennaio et al. 2009; Rérat 
2012; FOH 2016, 2016a). Especially since the approved revision of the Federal Planning Act in 
2013 which enforces the 26 cantons and over 2000 municipalities to promote “inward settlement 
development, while ensuring an appropriate quality of housing” (Art. 1, para. 2, lit. abis SPA). 
Simultaneously, population growth coupled with yield-oriented investments attracted by the state’s 
economic stability and wealth reinforced the attractiveness of Swiss real estate markets. Triggered 
by low-interest rates, urban housing has become the main target of capital investment, especially 
for pension funds. As a result of increased commodification, modernization, and densification of 
housing stocks, the provision of affordable housing has increasingly become difficult for Swiss 
planning authorities in recent years (Balmer & Gerber 2017).  
The country is organized on three executive levels - municipalities, cantons, and the confederati-
on - and is characterized by a form of “cooperative federalism”. Local zoning plans are prepared 
by municipal authorities but must comply with cantonal and federal plans (Linder 1994). In any 
case, local zoning regulation is binding to private property owners. Investors and developers can be 
asked to prepare and to fund specific plans, however, the final validation of the local plan and the 
provision of building permits always relies in the responsibility of the municipal planning authori- 
ty (Gerber et al. 2017:1690). Methodologically, in this step, we performed a broad screening and 
analysis of policy documents at the national and local level. We analyzed articles published within 
the last decade, including government reports, vote results, legal documents, parliamentary debates, 
newspaper articles and ‘grey’ literature which documented the use and range of available policy 
instruments for affordable housing provision. Our goal was to detect the wide range of policy inst-
ruments available for Swiss municipalities. 
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In a second step, we analyzed the municipal authorities’ strategies when activating specific policy 
instruments for affordable housing provision (sub-question 2). Therefore, we selected two cases 
in urban core areas – the cities of Zurich and Basel – and two cases in suburban areas – the cities 
of Köniz and Kloten – to gain a broad understanding of the strategies applied in different urban 
contexts. Whereas the cities of Zurich and Basel face a period of severe urban housing shortage, in 
the cities of Köniz and Kloten the pressure on affordable housing provision is not as profound but 
is constantly rising. In Zurich, for instance, rental costs on the private rental market have increa-
sed by +75% since 2000 (Balmer & Gerber 2017:8). On average, a 90m2 apartment offered on the 
rental market costs more than 2000 Swiss francs net-rent per month which is only affordable for 
middle and high income households (Schmid 2020). Hence, moving to cheaper suburban areas has 
remained the only option for many vulnerable and lower income groups in Zurich.  
The four cases were selected as they all show similar socio-economic characteristics (population 
growth, vacancy rate, land scarcity, densification pressure, affordable housing shortage) and, at the 
time of investigation, had to deal with on-going densification projects in the urban housing sector 
(Table 3). Thereby, we were able to directly confront the actors involved with the decisions taken in 
relation to affordable housing provision and densification. To achieve this goal, we conducted ten 
semi-structured interviews with eight experts from the public sector (local planning, housing and 
social welfare departments) and two local tenants associations. In addition, we analyzed for each 
case 20-30 policy and project documents to gain a detailed understanding of the applied municipal 
authorities’ interests and strategies. 
(see Table 3 of this thesis)
8.4 Strategic use of land policy instruments for affordable housing
As mentioned in section 8.2, municipal authorities may activate different policy instruments to 
alter land parcels in size and shape in order to promote affordable housing. In doing so, they aim to 
change the use conditions for specific groups. In the following section, we present four strategies 
which Swiss municipal authorities follow to promote affordable housing (Figure 9). These interven-
tion ways derive from the neoinstitutional analysis approach (Gerber et al. 2018) and structure both 
the empirical analysis and the discussion section of this paper. The four strategies were selected 
along their characteristics (either deriving from public or private law), and their potential to defend 
municipal interests in front of powerful landowners. In particular, we distinguish between, first, 
instruments that regulate land uses by using public policy with no direct impact on the use rights of 
land such as economic incentives for landowners (see (1) supply-subsidies). Second, instruments 
using public policy leading to a regulation of use rights on formal ownership ((2) zoning). Third, 
instruments leading to a legal redefinition of property rights in the Civil Code ((3) contracts). And 
forth, instruments that redistribute property rights such as expropriation or targeted purchase of 
land ((4) property rights).
For each policy instrument, we briefly explain how they work in the Swiss context (section 8.4.1). 
Then, based on our qualitative case study analysis, we investigate how the policy instruments are 
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used for affordable housing provision in the four cities (section 8.4.2). Third, we explain why local 
planners activate specific policy instruments to promote affordable housing in order to understand 
the strategy behind the policy measures applied (section 8.4.3). As the process is ongoing, the list is 
neither to be evaluated as complete nor exhaustive.
8.4.1 The basic mechanisms how policy instruments work in the Swiss context
(1)	 Supply-side	subsidies
In general, the granting of supply-side subsidies does not target the individual tenants, rather 
individual buildings. In the housing sector, Swiss municipalities provide supply-side subsidies in 
the format of economic incentives such as direct loans, tax relief, bank guarantees or advantageous 
mortgages to private third parties e.g. to non-profit associations or private individuals. 
For non-profit housing associations: Private homeowners have to belong to a federal umbrella 
organization to benefit from public supply-side subsidies for housing purposes. The organization 
controls that its members (mainly non-profit cooperatives and foundations) provide affordable 
housing according to the cost rent principle and based on non-profit objectives only (Balmer & 
Gerber 2017).
For private individuals: Moreover, each Swiss city (based on the Federal Energy Act) does not 
only provide supply-side subsidies to the non-profit housing sector. They are also obliged to grant 
subsidies in the form of direct grants, financial incentives, tax relief, and free consulting to private 
individuals (including institutional investors) to improve energy efficiency standards e.g. for insu-
lation, windows or heating. So far, the granting of energy subsidies for private individuals has only 
been determined by technical criteria and has not been attached to the fulfilling of social objectives. 
However, in recent years, the federal government has started to investigate whether such gran-
ting of subsidies could be coupled to social tasks too e.g. to the requirement to provide affordable 
housing if one aims to benefit of subsidies (FOH 2016).
(2)	 Zoning
In Swiss municipalities, zoning is a relatively new land policy instrument for the provision of affor- 
dable housing. However, zoning measures have gained in strategic relevance to steer affordable 
housing development in recent years since urban land has become scarce and increased flexibility 
is needed (FOH 2012). The policy instrument allows municipal authorities to directly intervene into 
private development plans because zoning regulations are binding to landowners.
Zones for affordable housing: In these zones, the municipality can oblige private landowners to 
provide a minimum share of affordable housing (e.g. 50%). Thereby, the amount of affordable 
housing can be raised effectively since all private landowners are legally obliged to follow this 
objective in these zones. 
Zones for the protection from redevelopment: Landowners only receive a building permit to (re-)
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develop, renovate, modernize or replace existing housing stocks in these zones if tenants will have 
the opportunity to stay in their apartments afterwards. For example, property owners must approve 
that the rents will not exceed a certain level up to three years after the renovation task is finished. 
The primary political objective behind this measure is to keep the rents low when demand is high 




Special land use zones: The introduction of special land use zones is designated to areas of increa-
sed public interest in which municipal planning authorities can encourage spatial development out- 
side the regular zoning plan. These zones are legally-binding for public authorities and landowners 
but the private parcel’s development terms and conditions are still negotiable for both sides e.g. 
regarding use density requirements, energy efficiency standards, urban design or housing affordabi-
lity objectives. So far, in many Swiss cities the instrument has primarily been used for unbuilt in-
dustrial zones (e.g. for the transformation of former train station areas) as well as for greenery and 
infrastructure projects (e.g. lake shores, hospital areas, education facilities). In the housing sector, 
however, the instrument has gained new strategic relevance too since local planners are obliged to 
increase density within municipal boundaries and increased flexibility is needed (Knoepfel et al. 
2012:423). Particularly, through the use of this instrument, city governments try to couple density 
goals with housing affordability objectives. For example, in these zones, the municipality can ob-
lige the private investor to provide at least 40% affordable apartments, and in turn, landowners can 
benefit of a density increase of +10% outside the regular zoning plan. 
Quotas: The introduction of quotas for affordable housing is a quantitative zoning mechanism 
which assures municipalities that the ratio between low-cost housing supply and demand does not 
exceed a certain level. Through the use of quotas, planning authorities can steer affordable housing 
provision effectively as the output is regularly controlled and monitored by quantitative guidelines. 
In particular, quotas help planners to have a clear vision and goal what type and size of housing 
units needs to be built within a specific timeframe e.g. by 2050. The instrument also helps city au-
thorities to legitimize the use and introduction of additional policy instruments (e.g. the purchase of 





(1) Supply-side    
subsidies 
− Direct loans 
− Tax relief 
− Advantageous 
mortgages 
− Bank guarantees 
− Issues on bonds 
(3) Contracts (Public-
Private partnerships) 
− Ground leases 
− Urban development 
contracts 
− Tenancy matters  
Public law instruments Private law instruments 
(2) Zoning 
− Zones for affordable 
housing 
− Zones for the protection 
from redevelopment 
− Special land use zones 
− Quotas 
− Pre-emption right (right 
of first refusal) 
− Added land value 
capturing 
(4) Property rights 
− Expropriation 
− Targeted purchase 
of land 
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Added land value capturing: The policy instrument of added land value capturing is a zoning me-
chanism with which municipal governments reap some of the increment in land value attributable 
to planning decisions (Alterman 2012). According to the revised Federal SPA, Swiss municipalities 
are obliged to capture a minimal taxation rate of 20% of the added land value for new-built housing 
on unbuilt land. The tax is due when the land is developed or sold (Art. 5, par. 1 SPA). Optionally, 
municipalities can also capture added land values that occur through densification measures on al-
ready built land (up-zoning) (Viallon 2018). The funds collected by the instrument grant municipal 
authorities the possibility to distribute, remove and relocate private development rights according to 
societal needs. For example, municipalities can capture a minimum share (e.g. 40%) of added land 
values that evoke through planning measures for affordable housing provision. 
Pre-emption rights: A public pre-emption right (stipulated in the Local Zoning Act) assures the mu-
nicipality the right of first refusal when private property is sold. Planners apply the instrument for 
the construction of, among other purposes, social housing units. In planning practice, the municipa-
lity makes use of a pre-emption-right if a private parcel has strategic relevance for the city’s urban 
development as a whole e.g. for the construction of schools or to intervene into socially segregated 
areas. It also provides municipalities the capacity to prevent land speculation which could hamper 
affordable housing provision in general (Nahrath 2018).  
(3)	 Contracts
According to Swiss private law (see Swiss Civil Code  and Federal Obligations Code ), a contract is 
defined as a legal agreement between two or more parties, enforceable by law, to perform a speci-
fied act. In case one of the two is a public actor, the contract is to be considered as “public-priva-
te-partnership” (Nicol & Knoepfel 2008:172). 
Long-term ground leases: Ground leases grant the landowner the right to retain legal ownership 
while transferring the right to use his/her land to a private third party (Gerber 2018). In Switzer-
land, ground leases are granted for up to 100 years in exchange for annual rent payment. At the end 
of the lease period, all improvements made to the land by the owner of the building revert back to 
the landowner, according to the terms of the initial contract (Gerber et al. 2017:1690). With re-
gard to affordable housing provision, Swiss cities often use the instrument for collaboration with 
non-profit housing associations (Balmer & Gerber 2017). In practice, the municipality remains 
the landowner while the ownership of the building is transferred to a private third party such as a 
non-profit housing cooperative. The municipality as landowner benefits from a stable source of in-
come over time through lease revenue but does not bear the financial risks to manage the use of the 
building. The municipality remains in charge to determine special use requirements on their plots 
e.g. related to social mix rules, income levels or housing affordability objectives.
Urban development contracts: In urban development contracts, another form of ‘planning by 
contract’, a private landowner aims to improve the use requirements that are set on his/her private 
parcel in the regular zoning plan through a renegotiation of the terms and conditions with the muni-
cipal planning authority. Planners may agree to such (re)negotiations with the private investor, for 
instance, to promote affordable housing. Under scarce land conditions, in particular, the municipali-
ty prefers to influence the development terms on private land on soft scale rather than not having an 
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impact on private land at all. Through development contracts, planners can change the ‘rule of the 
game’ quickly, flexibly and for specific private locations only (Feldges 2019).
Tenancy matters: Ultimately, the support of affordable housing can also be promoted via tenancy 
law. Swiss tenants’ rights are protected by the articles for tenancy matters in the Federal Obligations 
Code (Art. 253-274 OC) as fifth part of the Swiss Civil Code. In international comparison, tenants 
in Switzerland are considered to be weakly protected by law in relation to neighboring states (e.g. 
Austria, Germany) (GFOBRP 2016). For instance, landowners are allowed to terminate an open-en-
ded rent contract within three months without any specific reason. So regardless of the tenants’ 
strength of social integration, age, or years of residency in the neighbourhood. Residents do also 
not need to be informed about upcoming densification tasks before receiving the contract termina- 
tion which leads to social eviction at short-notice. Tenants may counteract in court, however, in 
most cases they do not use this option as they neither have the financial means nor the expert 
knowledge to do so. Therefore, some Swiss cantons (e.g. Zurich, Fribourg, Basel-City, Geneva) 
have revised its Cantonal Tenancy Act to better protect tenants from rent increase and dismissal 
(FOH 2018).
(4)	 Property	rights
Expropriation: In Switzerland, the “right to own“ property is protected as a fundamental right by 
the Swiss Constitution (Art. 22ter CSC). As such it can only be restricted if (1) a legal basis and an 
overweighting public interest exist; (2) the measure is proportional; and (3) a full compensa-
tion is paid (Art. 5, Art. 36 para. 1-3 & Art. 26 para. CSC). Especially in the housing sector, Swiss 
courts interpret the weight of public interest narrowly so that property restrictions are limited and 
expropriations are rare in international comparison (Alterman 2010). As a consequence of this legal 
situation, the political legitimacy to make use of expropriation for affordable housing provision is 
low as expropriation is politically contested, long and expensive.
Targeted purchase of land: The targeted purchase of land guarantees the municipality the full right 
of disposal and the power to grant the land use rights on their plots. Through public ownership, 
the city as landowner is in charge to develop housing according to public preferences e.g. to fulfill 
social objectives such as the provision of affordable housing, the protection of tenants’ rights or to 
ensure residential stability of old-aged. However, in daily planning practice, the purchase of urban 
land is expensive and political majorities for the support of such acquisition strategy is not always 
given. Therefore, many Swiss municipalities have started to intervene into private developers rights 
in other ways, especially through zoning measures. 
8.4.2 The use of the policy instruments for affordable housing provision in each city
In the following section, we explain how municipal planning authorities in the four cases investi-
gated used which land policy instruments for affordable housing provision. Thereby, we identify 
differences but also similarities in Swiss local affordable housing practice. The data of the table 
(Table 8) derive from intensive literature and policy documents review and was supplemented by 
qualitative interview data.
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municipal level. However, based on the approved local referendum on June 10th 2018, the 
city	government	now	plans	to	initiate	the	introduction	of	such	a	right	to	increase	the	share	of	
affordable housing in the long run. 
The	city	of	Basel	provides	long-term	ground	leases	on	public	land	to	non-profit	associations	

































































































































  tives in each city
In the following section, we explain why municipal planning authorities in the four cities activate 
specific policy instruments to defend affordable housing objectives.
The Case of Zurich
To reach the Constitutional mandate of 33.3% social housing property by 2050, Zurich’s munici-
pal planning authority makes not only use of public law instruments (e.g. supply-side subsidies, 
zoning). But the city council also commits to find other ways to increase the share of affordable 
housing effectively, particularly, by activating private law instruments too (e.g. land acquisition, 
long-term ground leases, changes in tenancy matters). Overall, the quota introduced in the Local 
Constitution helps the city government to legitimize the activation of additional policy measures 
such as the purchase of private land even though such acquisition strategy is expense and politically 
contested in the local legislative parliament. 
»The city of Zurich is committed to promote affordable housing in all its neighborhoods through zoning measu-
res, supply-side subsidies for non-profit cooperatives, and the purchase of land for public housing to reach the 
constitutional mandate of 33.3% non-profit housing property by 2050« (Zurich City Council in Regional Zoning 
Act25  2019:109). 
Moreover, to effectively control the quantitative output and the affordability performance of each 
publicly-subsidized housing association, the municipality initiated the founding of municipal foun-
dations (e.g. “Stiftung Einfach Wohnen” in 2014). Thereby, the municipality seeks to raise aware- 
ness for social interests such as the introduction of social-mix, income and occupancy rate rules 
(Interviewee 40, City of Zurich, Urban Development Department, Expert in housing issues, July 
31st 2019). The municipal authority has also intensified the use of ‘special land use zones’ in recent 
years to provoke “room for negotiation” within building zones. In particular, to force private inves-
tors to promote social objectives. For instance, in relation to construction quality, urban design, and 
affordable housing goals if investors aim to benefit of a density increase outside the regular zoning 
plan (Interviewee 45, City of Zurich, Head of Planning Department, October 24th 2019).
The Case of Basel-City
To boost business and urban growth, so far, the city of Basel has primarily activated policy instru-
ments which do not hamper private developers’ interests to invest. 
»So far, we have not had the same densification pressure as Zurich. We had the possibility to redevelop many un-
built industrial zones. In fact, after the 80s and 90s - a period of structural decline - we have promoted population 





However, as tenants’ social exclusion processes have increased in the last decade, Basel’s local 
tenants association has initiated two local referendums to revise the Local Constitution in order to 
promote affordable housing (Interviewee 38, Head of Basel Tenants Association, June 26th 2019). 
Both initiatives aim to improve the living conditions for low-income and vulnerable groups such 
as old-aged and young families. Following the revised Constitution which was approved by 62% 
of the voting majority on June 10th 2018, the following changes must be incorporated in the Local 
Planning and Housing Act: 
• Increase in the provision of supply-side subsidies to non-profit housing associations through the 
initiation of a municipal foundation for affordable housing. 
• Introduction of a min. quota of 25% non-profit housing property by 2050 in the Local Constitu-
tion. 
• Introduction of a more progressive land acquisition strategy for affordable housing.
• Stronger protection of tenants in case of rent increase after modernization through the introduc-
tion of rent levels which landowners must follow up to five years after the densification task is 
finished.
Through obtaining these measures, the city government promotes a more active land policy strategy 
in order to increase the share of affordable housing in the long run.  
»In Basel-City, the political intention with the two constitutional initiatives is to introduce higher legal require-
ments for private homeowners for modernization and to hinder social exclusion of tenants that have lived in their 
dwellings for many years« (Interviewee 44, City of Basel, Planning Department, September 20th 2019).
In addition to the introduction of new instruments, the municipal planning authority uses available 
zoning measures (e.g. urban development contracts) in a more strategic way for effective affordable 
housing provision. 
»In future terms, we will use urban development contracts more frequently to remain flexible and because we do 
not need a parliamentary decision to change something all the time. We do not want to dependent on the ideas 
of current political majorities in every project« (Interviewee 44, City of Basel, Planning Department, September 
20th 2019).
The Case of Köniz
To promote affordable housing, on February 12th 2017, Köniz’ voting majority agreed to revise 
the Local Zoning Act by adding two mandates. First, the city council must ensure that long-term 
ground leases on public land are provided to non-profit coops and that subsidized associations 
approve to the cost-rent principle. Second, on private plots larger than 4000m2 floor area, the city 
can oblige the investor to provide min. 20-40% of the newly built apartments created through den-
sification measures for affordable housing. Otherwise, a density increase outside the regular zoning 
plan is not being approved.  
»For us, socially-sustainable densification does not only mean higher quantity but also higher social quality« 
(Interviewee 42, City of Köniz, Local Planner, August 20th 2019).
116
Moreover, to effectively steer local housing development, the city of Köniz has strategically 
purchased centrally-located parcels. 
»We perform an active land policy strategy. We discuss where the key parcels are to support urban development. 
[...] We purchase and sell land, but mainly we purchase. We do have a lot of public land reserves on which we can 
determine the use conditions« (Interviewee 42, City of Köniz, Local Planner, August 20th 2019). 
In summary, Köniz’ local planning authority combines public and private law instruments and is 
aware how to use available policy instruments effectively to promote affordable housing. 
The Case of Kloten
Same as Basel, so far, the city of Kloten has activated policy instruments which do not forcefully 
intervene into private investors investment interests (e.g. supply-side subsidies) in order to stay 
competitive and to attract business. 
»In case we have public land, we collaborate with non-profit cooperatives. However, this is not the normal case« 
(Interviewee 29, City of Kloten, Head of Local Planning Department, August 2019).
Moreover, available zoning instruments such as ‘special land use zones’ have been used without 
determining social restrictions for private investors to promote private investment. For example, 
in the ‘Waldeggweg’ project, the landowner was allowed to triple the number of apartments on the 
same parcel without any obligation to fulfil social tasks e.g. related to affordable housing, the pre-
vention of social exclusion or secure tenancy. 
»With the initiation of special land use plans, we buy the right to participate and to have a say. […] With this 
instrument, we can increase density and oblige the landowner to follow certain requirements related to architec-
ture, urban design or energy goals« (Interviewee 29, City of Kloten, Head of Local Planning Department, August 
2019).
The municipal planning authority legitimizes this strategy by the argument that the municipality 
seeks to attract business in order to compete with other suburban municipalities, and to become a 
regional center next to Zurich airport on its own. 
»We support densification and modernization through raising incentives for landowners. For instance, investors 
are allowed to double or even triple the number of apartments on the same parcel. Thereby, we promote demolish-
ment and rent increase of affordable apartments. [...] This procedure is politically and economically promoted by 
the local government« (Interviewee 29, City of Kloten, Head of Local Planning Department, August 2019).  
In summary, Kloten municipality follows a land policy strategy for affordable housing which is 
indeed one-sided: under scarce land conditions and the parallel prediction of population growth 
(+50% by 2030), the rights of tenants are neglected while the power and wealth of the local growth 




The main question introduced in this article addresses the link between planning and affordable 
housing provision as follows: How do municipal planning authorities promote affordable housing 
in densifying cities? In chapter 8.4, we show how institutions in general, and the strategic use of 
specific land policy instruments in particular, are at core for answering this research question. Not 
only does the article reveal how an instrument’s effect on affordable housing provision is indeed 
very different between the four municipalities (8.4.2). Moreover, our results show that the mere 
availability of land policy instruments is not sufficient for the effective provision of affordable 




Our analysis in four Swiss municipalities reveals that, so far, public policy instruments with no 
direct impact on the content of land use rights have proved to be the preferred support mechanism 
for the provision of affordable housing. This is because supply-side subsidies do not have a direct 
impact on the private property owner’s freedom or investment interests. As a consequence, public 
subsidies are easier to implement for municipal authorities than tools which intend to change pro-
perty rights. City governments do not need to gather the political majorities to oppose private de-
velopment rights which is why the whole political spectrum (from left-wing to conservative parties) 
is more willing to agree on. As our analysis reveals, however, these rather weak instruments are not 
sufficient to provide affordable housing under scarce land conditions. They need to be supplemen-




In the municipalities investigated (two core cities and two suburban municipalities), zoning me-
chanisms are acknowledged to be very effective in steering land use for affordable housing. This is 
because, when land gets scarce, planners are in need to actually intervene into private property ow-
ners rights to have a say how, for the benefit of whom, and for what existing housing stocks should 
be (re)developed. For example, a popular zoning mechanism which seems to succeed in promoting 
affordability objectives effectively is the use of quotas. Although quotas do not lead to a direct 
intervention into private ownership, they help local authorities to communicate long-term planning 
goals and to legitimize the reinforcement of new planning measures. However, at the municipal 
level, there occur differences how such additional zoning instruments are strategically implemen-
ted. In Zurich, for example, where the political majority for more proactive ways of land policy 
exists, zoning instruments which provoke ‘room for maneuvering’ on private property have more 
intensively been used in recent years. Specifically, the zoning instrument of special land use plans 
as it effectively intervenes into market forces. These zones grant municipal authorities the right to 
distribute, remove, and relocate private development rights according to social and affordable 
housing needs. In contrast, in the suburban municipality of Kloten, where political majorities 
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follow a more liberal tradition of state intervention and the share of public ownership is low, our 
analysis shows that special land use zones are used in a different way. Here, ‘special land use plans’ 
are used to promote modernization of existing housing stocks but at the expense of its social side 
(e.g. affordable housing) in order to attract business and to stay competitive. 
(3)	 Policy	instruments	leading	to	a	legal	redefinition	of	property	rights	(contracts)
In the four municipalities analyzed, the use of policy instruments which lead to a legal redefiniti-
on of property rights have gained in strategic relevance in recent years: when urban land becomes 
scarce, the inertia of private landownership might be too strong which is why increased flexibility 
but also planning security and predictability is needed. As a consequence, all forms of ‘planning by 
contract’ such as ground leases, urban development contracts and changes in tenancy matters help 
planners to effectively integrate their visions and housing policy objectives into private develop-
ment plans. Results show that especially in cities which do not have much public land reserves such 
as Kloten, this flexible type of planning has gained in importance. Through the possibility to stra-
tegically negotiate the terms and conditions, public-private-partnerships help planners to increase 
their power in front of landowners. 
(4)	 Policy	instruments	that	redistribute	property	rights	(public	ownership)
Landowning municipalities such as Zurich, Basel or Köniz succeed in effectively promoting affor- 
dable housing because they benefit from the power granted by property rights. As landowners 
they are able to steer land use according to their socio-economic interests and visions. However, 
such active land policy strategy comes with a number of problems too (Gerber et al. 2017): first, 
a municipality needs to be able to finance such acquisition strategy, which is difficult to manage 
especially for smaller suburban cities such as Köniz or Kloten. For them, the challenge with high 
land prices and austerity imposed on public actors is even harder to handle than for core cities such 
as Zurich and Basel. Land deals might also be financially risky for the public sector. Therefore, the 
question arises whether municipalities should take these risks or better transfer them to the priva-
te sector. Second, the city government needs to convince the parliament and the population of the 
benefits that emerge through a public authority managing assets. This mission is especially difficult 
for more liberal municipalities in which the political spectrum is more likely to agree on less state 
intervention (e.g. in Kloten). Our results show, however, that once the city government agrees on a 
more proactive intervention strategy for affordable housing provision such as in Köniz, the spatial 
development opportunities that arise through it are quickly recognized by politicians and residents. 
In the city of Zurich, for example, the purchase of public land has enabled municipal authorities to 
provide affordable housing through various ways such as the construction of public housing or the 
provision of long-term ground leases to non-profit coops. As a result, the share of social housing 
constantly increases and the financial expenses for the support of social-welfare recipients decrea-
ses simultaneously. 
In summary, results show that Swiss municipalities do not follow a ‘one-solution-fits-it-all’ land po-
licy strategy for affordable housing. Depending on the socio-political context (e.g. district charac-
teristics, financial capacity, political majorities, or the cultural conditions related to urban regenera-
tion goals), planners follow heterogenous policy goals and try to promote housing affordability by 
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implementing different policy instruments. However, we summarize that an active municipal land 
policy strategy for effective affordable housing provision requires both – the combination of public 
and private law instruments and the strategic activation of them: since private property rights are 
strongly protected by the Swiss Constitution and very inflexible, Swiss municipal land-use plan-
ning seem to experience difficulty in implementing democratically accepted spatial development 
plans on titleholders due to conflicting interests. As a consequence, the real housing challenge is 
not so much plan making, but rather plan implementation. Without heavy state intervention such as 
expropriation, new housing regulation in favor of housing affordability (e.g. new zoning) only gets 
implemented when titleholders agree to undertake new developments, sell their stock or the land or 
transfer their housing development rights. 
The shift towards densification in land-use planning makes this conflicting relationship between 
policy intervention and property rights even more difficult in the four cities investigated since den-
sification implies to deal with the already built environment. Planning therefore takes place within 
a tight web of existing rights and duties engraved in complex institutional norms and regulations. 
Potential for redevelopment is often given, but the land is frequently not accessible due to the land 
rights secured by strongly protected property titles. Under these circumstances, planners often 
fail to deal with complex private property right arrangements as most public intervention ways 
were crafted to handle simpler property rights situations on unbuilt agricultural or industrial land. 
Therefore, to cope with complex property rights situations on already built land such as intermi-
xed parcels of different sizes, co-ownership constellations, rights to object granted to neighbors, 
rights of way or mosaic of easements, more than ever, planners need a keen understanding of the 
close interactions between public policy and property rights to effectively steer affordable housing 
development. Our analysis reveals that it needs all the finesse and competencies (e.g. knowled-
ge, financial resources, networks, personnel) of municipal planning administrations to implement 
affordable housing objectives in dense cities, because land-owners have the power to defend the 
status quo through veto rights.  
In core cities like Zurich, for example, public officials succeed in increasing the share of afford- 
able housing units as they rely not only on zoning but also municipal ownership, long-term ground 
leases and tenancy law. In smaller municipalities such as Kloten, however, expert knowledge as 
well as personnel and financial resources for strategic activation of these policy instruments is not 
as pronounced. Also, the political acceptance and majorities for more proactive forms of planning 
is not always given – especially in more suburban areas. Local politicians often regard offending 
private investors’ plans as a too risky business for the municipality’s financial situation. This leads 
to the conclusion that even though no general local intervention strategy for affordable housing pro-
vision exists, this study has indicated how municipalities might coordinate and strategically activate 
different policy instruments to deal with scarcity of land and to satisfy affordable housing needs 
more effectively in the long run. Indeed, we showed that the introduction of new policy instruments 
is not always necessary but that the strategic activation and combination of available instruments is 
becoming more relevant.   
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8.6 Conclusion
While there is a growing body of literature focusing on the social impacts of densification on 
households (Burton 2000, 2003, Chiu 2003, Bramley et al. 2009), and another extensive body of 
research looking at land policy issues for the management of natural resources (Ostrom 2007; Hart-
mann & Spit 2015; Gerber et al. 2018;), research on how to combine the two concepts to housing 
inquiries is still thin (Balmer & Gerber 2017; Nicol & Knoepfel 2008). More qualitative and quan-
titative research is still needed on whether or not specific policy instruments such as changes in 
tenancy matters or the property rights logic can effectively steer affordable housing, and why some 
municipal authorities decide to activate specific instruments while others do not.
In this article, we introduced a neoinstitutional analysis framework which postulates a causal relati-
onship between (1) the affordable condition of the housing resource, (2) the institutions in force and 
corresponding policy instruments, and (3) the involved actors and their appropriation strategies. We 
analyzed the mechanisms at play between these three variables that explain why some groups or in-
terests experience disproportionate access to the decision-making process on housing use and tend 
to lose while others win. An active land policy strategy which aims to promote affordable housing 
through the activation of both new and available instruments proofed to be become particularly 
relevant in this matter. In particular, we showed how different land policy instruments function and 
are strategically activated by municipal planning authorities to provide affordable housing. Even 
though our results are limited to four Swiss cities, potential for generalization results from the follo-
wing identified causal mechanisms which are expected to have broader significance in other urban 
contexts too: affordable housing provision results from the intertwined relationship between land 
use planning (public policy) and property rights – the two main sources of formal constraints. Plan-
ners can influence the private property owners’ behavior in favor of increased housing affordability 
if they are able to find ways which reinforce their position in front of powerful landowners. To do 
so, they need to activate public and private law instruments which do not always need to limit pro-
perty owners’ rights but also work with property rights.  
This study addresses a gap in housing study literature (Burton 2000, 2003; Chiu 2004; Bramley et 
al. 2009; Kadi & Ronald 2014, Aalbers 2017) as it analyzes the cities lack of affordable housing as 
a land policy issue, and in relation to the formal institutions and the municipal authorities’ decisi-
on-making strategies involved. Taking into account future challenges of land scarcity that currently 
evolve in many cities (Gennaio et al. 2009; Touati-Morel 2015), the findings of this study may help 
municipalities to counteract trends of rising commodification and financialization of urban housing 
stocks. If city authorities do not succeed in providing affordable housing in densifying cities, the 
preservation of urban social qualities such as social mixing, tenure security or community cohesion 
is in acute danger since more and more tenants are forced to leave due to rising rents after densi-
fication. This scenario is highly unsustainable. This article helps municipal planners, practitioners 
and policy-makers to prepare for future housing challenges: a stable ‘right-to-housing’ for all does 
not necessarily require the mere introduction of new policy instruments but the strategic activation 
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Abstract: Since the 1970s, temporary uses of vacant spaces have become a preferred urban de-
velopment strategy to revitalise centrally-located neighbourhoods. In the housing sector, however, 
temporary uses are barely registered as they provide only short-term shelter in buildings shortly 
before demolition. Therefore, they do not secure a stable right to housing. In Switzerland, neverthe-
less, temporary uses are increasingly gaining momentum in the housing segment. Since the 2010s, 
besides institutionalised but non-profit temporary housing, a for-profit model has emerged. This 
commodified model is managed on the owners’ behalf and is based on loaning law contracts that 
require payment for operating costs, but not rent. Consequently, the legal protection of the tempo-
rary users’ rights, namely low-income families, single parents, people with social aid, and students 
remains weak. This article detects the mechanisms at play explaining the reasons for the shift 
towards profit-seeking in temporary housing by using an institutionalist and actor-centred analysis 
approach. Through a qualitative single case study analysis of Zurich, Switzerland, the phenomenon 
will be analysed in a city confronted with increasing affordable housing shortage and densification 
pressure.  




• … examines an extreme case of affordable housing scarcity in a context of densification – the 
emergence of a for-profit temporary housing model in the city of Zurich, Switzerland. 
• … explains in detail why and how the actors involved – in particular, landowners, public 
authorities, mediators, NGOs, and residents – benefit from the emergence of such new housing 
model. 
• … shows that not only young and flexible people live in temporary housing locations shortly 
before demolition, but also young families, single parents, and low-income migrants. 
• … questions the role of property owners, mediators, and the city government in promoting 
for-profit temporary housing and explains how they are able to defend their interests.  
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9.1 Introduction
Since the 1970s, temporary uses of vacant spaces have become a preferred urban development 
strategy to preserve and to revitalise centrally-located neighbourhoods, to express political claims, 
and to boost economic and social innovation in cities (Castells, 1983; Florida, 2002; Oswalt et al., 
2003; Galdini, 2019). Whether used for illegal or publicly subsidised temporary use, urban scholars 
have recognised the significant role of temporary urbanism for the dynamic (re)production, trans-
formation, and distribution of space in order to support self-determination, diversity, and flexibility 
of today’s urban society (Amin & Thrift, 2002; Bishop & Williams, 2012; Colomb, 2012; Smith, 
2017). 
Temporary use, however, is neither clearly defined in its form of activity nor in its duration or 
legal dimensions. The only common characteristic is temporariness, which means that temporary 
uses are “explicitly” and “intentionally” time-limited in nature (Németh & Langhorst, 2014:144; 
Lara-Hernandez et al., 2020:1). Unlike short-term rentals or Airbnb-arrangements (van Holm, 
2020), “temporary housing” as defined in this study takes place in vacant buildings shortly before 
demolition or reconstruction. It refers to an undefined temporary gap between the former residents’ 
moving out and the demolition and/or renovation of the building. Unexpected events such as the 
delayed approval of the building permit or changing investment conditions may lead to an expan- 
sion of the temporary housing period which are not previously foreseen (Angst et al., 2008). 
In the Swiss context, which will be presented in greater detail in the following sections, we observe 
the situation that temporary solutions have increasingly gained momentum in the housing sector. 
For low-income residents, temporary housing offers the possibility of living centrally and at low 
cost. Particularly in cities, we observe that the dynamics of temporary housing have changed since 
the revision of the Federal Spatial Planning Act (Art. 1, SPA)  in 2013. Following the revised Act, 
Swiss municipalities have become obliged to promote inward settlement development to curb 
urban sprawl. Through a process of densification (also termed “intensification” or “consolidation”) 
leading to an increase in the number of households within existing municipal boundaries, urban 
land gets increasingly scarce and the competition to use this land is rising. Confronted with such 
tight market conditions, we identify a housing situation in which a new, profit-oriented temporary 
housing model that is managed on the owners’ behalf has emerged. As our analysis reveals, this 
new model of temporary housing is based on loaning contracts that require payment for operating 
costs, but not rent. Despite this legal shift leading to the erosion of the protection of tenants’ rights 
in the name of increased flexibility for landowners and developers, this new business model proves 
to be favoured by a coalition of all major actors involved – temporary users, property owners, 
mediators, and municipal authorities. This article interrogates this puzzling situation and aims to 
explain the reasons behind. 
To capture this phenomenon, we ask: What are the institutional arrangements making for-pro-
fit temporary housing possible? Which rationales of the different actors involved in this system 
explain its expansion? And what are the consequences on the different categories of actors? We 
identify the mechanisms at play explaining how the shift towards profit-orientation in temporary 
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housing took place and discuss how the results are to be interpreted from a critical urban develop-
ment and social justice perspective. To answer the research questions, we apply an institutionalist 
and actor-centred analysis approach (section 9.2) and qualitative single case study methodology 
(section 9.3). 
9.2 Development stages of temporary housing
To explain the emergence of a for-profit temporary housing model, the article applies an institu- 
tionalist and actor-centred analytical approach (Healey, 2007; Nicol & Knoepfel, 2008): following 
this approach, housing is regarded as a resource, the affordable status of which is seen as the result 
of a complex interplay between the local regulatory framework and the decision-making behavior 
of the actors involved (municipal authorities, landowners, etc.). We distinguish two main sources 
of institutional rules: public policies and property rights. Institutions are defined as a set of norms 
and values—formalised in legal rules or not— that structure humans’ expectations about what 
others will do (Hall & Taylor, 1996:956). Within an institutional setting, actors develop strategies 
to defend their own interests in order to meet a particular goal (e.g. affordable housing provision) 
(Gerber et al., 2018).
More precisely, through public policies (stipulated in public law), public actors are granted de-
mocratic legitimacy and material power to solve a public problem in the name of a public interest, 
thereby confronting existing property rights (stipulated in private law), which follow an opposite 
logic – the protection of private interests against the state (Knoepfel et al., 2011). For example, mu-
nicipal authorities provide the local policy framework regulating temporary housing, e.g. through 
zoning or the authorisation to use the premises, as well as through specific measures designed to 
promote affordability. However, property owners are in a position to decide on temporary uses 
of their site. Their property titles, which grant them the power to define use or transfer rights, can 
oppose the interests defended by public actors. Hence, even though potential for affordable housing 
provisions is often given, apartments are often not accessible due to powerful landowners’ interests 
(Gerber et al., 2018).
While temporary housing organised through public support has been known of for several years 
(e.g., in the form of temporary student or refugee accommodations) (section 9.2.1), a new trend 
toward commodification of temporary housing is gaining momentum (section 9.2.2). We will ex-
plain this shift by analysing the underlying institutional rules as well as the rationales of the actors 
involved.
9.2.1 Legal security through institutionalisation
Historically, temporary housing has its roots in illegal and informal squatting. During the 1980s in 
many Western European cities such as Berlin, Amsterdam or Brussels, illegal squatting of vacant 
residential buildings became an eloquent symbol for social protests against the scarcity of afforda- 
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ble urban housing and rising unemployment (Holm & Kuhn, 2010; Pruijt, 2013). Because of the 
failure of city councils to respond to the lack of affordable housing, non-profit grassroots organi-
sations were founded out of the illegal squatting scene to provide an alternative to market-oriented 
housing (De Decker, 2009). 
In the following decade, however, many urban governments started to support these grassroots 
organisations and to publicly finance alternatives to squatting themselves. They aimed to calm 
down the protests and decided to integrate these self-help initiatives into their social housing policy 
strategies. In other words, out of the informal, urban squatting movement an increasing number of 
activists’ groups were clearly channelled into more stable and formalised patterns to keep a clean, 
safe, and respectable image of the city (Pruijt, 2003; Mayer, 2007; Priemus, 2011; Martínez, 2013; 
Özdemirli, 2014). 
The first legal temporary housing agencies working on a non-profit basis were founded in this con-
text. These mediator agencies are acknowledged as a primary institutionalised form of temporary 
housing in the sense that they started to connect vacancies and potential temporary users with each 
other on a professional basis. They also began to provide knowledge on the local legal framework 
for political, organisation, technical, administrative, and contractual constraints. Contrary to illegal 
squatting, they benefited from legal security, stability, and financial support as they operated under 
legal norms and political-administrative procedures. The city council used its authoritative power, 
including regulatory statues, penal law, or social housing policy regulations to promote non-profit 
temporary housing. This procedure served as a favourable public coping strategy to deal with the 
urban affordable housing shortages during the 1980s and 90s in many Western European states 
(Colomb, 2012). 
In Belgium, for instance, so called “social rental agencies” have started to integrate temporary 
housing as a widespread means to support vulnerable households covering a large part of the 
affordable housing demand in the country during the 1990s and 2000s (De Decker, 2009). In the 
Netherlands, “anti-squat” organisations have been created to temporarily manage buildings and 
to protect them from vandalism (Priemus, 2011; Pruijt, 2013). In Eastern Germany, the model of 
“safeguard houses” (in German: “Wächterhäuser”) was successfully implemented at the begin-
ning of the 2000s to offer affordable housing options to temporary users who, in return, protect the 
abandoned properties from decay (Dubeaux & Sabot, 2018). In summary, these temporary housing 
agencies all work on a non-profit basis to meet the needs of specific categories of tenants. As social 
organisations, they are integrated into the municipal housing policy system and not only provide 
accommodation to low-income groups (students, young adults, social welfare recipients, etc.), in 




As described in the previous section, the integration of non-profit temporary housing into urban 
housing policy systems has become a favored strategy to deal with affordable housing shortages 
and short-term vacancies for the past three decades (Vallance et al., 2017; Cardullo et al., 2018). 
Simultaneously, urban housing stocks have become the main target of capital investment and a safe 
source of revenue, especially for landowners. Such commodification strategies, however, poten-
tially hamper affordable housing provision (Marcuse, 1985; Harvey, 2012; Aalbers, 2017): the con-
cept of “commodification” is a very old one and acquired its meaning with the writing of Karl Marx 
(1859). It describes the process of how housing is influenced by market and profitability objectives 
which not only determine what type of housing is built but also how it is used, managed, and dis-
tributed (Harloe, 1982:40). Commodification of housing relies on the assumption that the market, 
including the profit-maximising rationality of investors, is the most efficient solution to guarantee 
the provision of housing for all income segments (Rolnik, 2013; Kadi & Ronald, 2014). Housing 
is no longer considered a basic human need and essential good, but rather more a commodity that 
must be traded or paid for in a globalised financial market (Harvey, 2005).
Critics point out that commodification objectives in the housing sector have profoundly affected 
the acknowledgement of the “right to housing” (Brenner et al., 2012; Harvey, 2012). While the 
process might be advantageous for those select few who reap the disproportionate benefits of the 
capital gain, the vast majority—and particularly those of lower income—would have little ability to 
capture value from this process (Harvey, 2005:166). Moreover, the investors’ profit-seeking behavi-
our and urban (re)development objectives foster gentrification processes as they lead to higher rents 
and to risks of social exclusion, tenure insecurity, and segregation in cities (Chiu, 2004; Lees, 2008; 
Korthals Altes, 2016). The role played by private landowners becomes particularly relevant in this 
matter. Due to the protection guaranteed by private property titles, landowners are free to define the 
profit-margin to be targeted on their parcels and to set the rents according to market prices (Marcu-
se, 1985). Real estate property is hence acknowledged as a foundational element to both power and 
wealth (Aalbers & Christophers, 2014) as it shapes the level of social inequality and exclusion in 
cities (Lai et al., 2018; Galdini, 2019). 
Commodification processes often lead to counter-strategies that aim toward decommodification. 
The concept of “decommodification” stands for the strength of social entitlements and for the citi-
zens’ degree of immunisation from market dependencies (Kadi & Ronald, 2014:270). It also aims 
to overcome the incapacity of generalised commodities to meet basic human needs for all as the 
process aims to reduce the control of the market laws on goods and thereby diminishes the pressure 
to generate financial profit (Lees, 2008). Consequently, decommodification of housing stands for a 
move away from the value of housing considered by its financial value to a focus on its use value 
in order “to provide every person with housing that is affordable, adequate in size and of decent 
quality, secure in tenure, and located in a supportive neighborhood of choice, with recognition of 
the special housing problems confronting oppressed groups” (Achtenberg & Marcuse, 1986:476). 
In temporary housing, the shift towards profit-orientation has not taken place. There are only a few 
for-profit temporary housing models and detailed analyses are missing, although this housing type 
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seems to be expanding. In the Netherlands, for example, for-profit private “anti-squat-agencies” 
manage buildings on the owners’ behalf and enter contracts with residents following an “anti-squat-
ter-attitude” (Priemus, 2011). The city of London is familiar with so called “safeguard houses”, 
meaning that a private agency organises temporary housing in vacant buildings before demolition 
(liveinguardians.com, 2020). It is unclear, however, why the involved actors participate in for-profit 
temporary housing, to what extent they only follow capitalist motives, and how these models have 
evolved. In addition, our study reveals that temporary users of for-profit temporary housing have a 
different profile and follow principles other than those of commercial or creative temporary users 
(e.g., such as artists, bohemians or start-up groups). They neither follow interests of creating an 
alternative lifestyle nor do they identify as members of the creative scene (Blumner, 2006). Becau-
se this turn towards profit-seeking in temporary housing is under researched, this article aims to 
analyse the institutional mechanisms and actors’ rationales driving this shift. 
To fill this gap, we focus the rest of the article on the Swiss housing situation. Switzerland makes 
an interesting study for the analysis of temporary uses in housing since the pressure on land and 
housing markets has increased in recent years, especially in cities. Swiss cities are characterised by 
extremely strained relations (vacancy rates below 1%) and rising rents (Balmer & Gerber, 2017:8). 
People with lower incomes as well as the middle class are negatively affected by inadequate affor- 
dable housing supply (FOSI & FOH, 2015). As a consequence, temporary housing solutions as a 
flexible model to handle population and economic growth have gained momentum in recent years 
(Bürgin, 2017). The state is organized on three executive levels – the confederation, the cantons, 
and the municipalities. The municipalities hold the greatest decision-making power regarding 
spatial development: they grant building permits according to the stipulations of zoning regulations, 
which is binding to private land-owners (Gerber et al., 2017:1690).
9.3 Study design
This study relies on a qualitative research approach. Through an embedded single case study analy-
sis, the mechanisms at play explaining the emergence of a for-profit temporary housing model will 
be assessed. This approach makes a detailed and differentiated understanding of the studied pheno-
menon possible (Yin, 2018:15). 
9.3.1 Case selection
The city of Zurich is a German-speaking city and the largest urban center in Switzerland (Statistics 
City of Zurich, 2020). The municipality of Zurich represents both the core center of Zurich agglo-
meration and the capital of the canton of Zurich. Zurich makes an interesting case study for the 
analysis of temporary housing as temporary uses of all kinds (e.g., commercial, office, or residen-
tial) have increased in recent years (Bürgin, 2017). In 2016/2017, Zurich was identified as a hub 
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of temporary uses within Switzerland. In total, 417 temporary use projects were set up in Zurich26  
whereas in the same period, only 61 temporary uses were registered in Basel, 37 in Berne, and 6 in 
Geneva (Wüest & Partner, 2017). 
This predominance of Zurich in the temporary use scene is connected to the city’s steady popula-
tion and economic growth, but also to its function as an international investment centre (Theurillat 
& Crevoisier, 2013). Since 1980, Zurich’s population has increased by +17% and investment into 
real-estate has constantly risen (Statistics City of Zurich, 2020). During the 1980s, Zurich has 
started to deindustrialize and some of the abandoned industrial land was redeveloped or taken over 
for cultural and temporary activities. Many investors and developers started to recognize the city’s 
economic potential and began to reclaim the buildings they owned (Rérat & Lees, 2011:131).
Since the year 2000, however, the (re)development of existing buildings or vacant plots has become 
increasingly challenging for investors since inner-city greenfield and brownfield sites are missing. 
Only 10% of all newly built apartments have been built on unbuilt parcels during the last two deca-
des. Most of the new built dwellings have been created through reconstruction and densification of 
existing housing stocks on already built land (Statistics City of Zurich, 2020a). As a consequence, 
the tensions between densification, modernization, and social exclusion mechanisms have increa-
sed significantly in recent years since redevelopment initiatives have led to higher rents and new 
(temporary) housing forms (Rérat, 2012). In fact, the absolute number of social evictions due to 
redevelopment in the city’s private rental sector doubled within the period of 2006 to 2017 (Stati-
stics City of Zurich, 2017). Between 2000 and 2013, rental prices in the housing stock increased by 
37%, while rental prices on the free market rose by 75% (Balmer & Gerber, 2017:8). Hence, mo-
ving to cheaper suburban areas or new forms of temporary housing have remained the only option 
for many vulnerable and lower income groups in Zurich. 
9.3.2	 Case	study:	Historical	background	of	temporary	housing	in	Zurich
Temporary housing has a long tradition in Zurich. This housing type first appeared during the 
“1980-opera-riots”, an urban social movement triggered by the tense situation on the housing mar-
ket and unfulfilled expectations about urban cultural life and open spaces (Kriesi et al., 1995). On 
30 May 1980, more than 200 young people (most of them under the age of 25 years), demonstrated 
against unequal policy investments in front of the Zurich opera house. The protest ended in a riot 
between the police and activists, and a two year political struggle about the support of alternative 
living forms and cultural activities. As a consequence, temporary squats of vacant houses became 
an eloquent symbol for the youths’ protest against Zurich’s Fordist model of economic growth, 
the lack of urban affordable housing, and rising unemployment. Aiming for progressive political 
change, Zurich’s youth squatted buildings in order to protest against the predominance of econo-
mic interests, the growing gentrification of inner-city neighborhoods, and the privatisation of urban 
housing stocks (Holm & Kuhn, 2010).
26	 The	study	mentioned	does	not	distinguish	between	housing	or	commercial	temporary	uses.
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Table 9: Steps, aims, and methods employed in this study. 
 Research questions Research Aims & Actions Methods employed 
Step 1 RQ1: What are the institutional 
arrangements making for-profit 
temporary housing possible?  
Analyse public regulatory response to 
Zurich’s socio-economic and housing 
situation, with a special focus on the 
interactions between regulation and 
property relationships 
Analysis of statistical data, policy 
documents (parliamentary 
debates, legislations, government 
reports), newspaper articles, and 
‘grey’ literature 
Step 2 RQ2: Which rationales of the 
different actors involved in this 
system explain its expansion?  
Analyse actors’ strategies related to 
temporary housing over time, with a 
specific focus on temporary users 
(residents) 
25 semi-structured interviews 
with experts as well as with 
temporary users 
Step 3 RQ3: What are the 
consequences on the different 
categories of actors?  
 
Analyse the socio-economic housing 
situation of temporary users and 
reflect on the repercussions of 
Zurich’s housing policy strategy for 
the stakeholders involved 
Unstructured field observation of 
temporary housing sites, 
questionnaire with temporary 
users including evaluation of 
income and paid rents 
 
The city government, however, publicly criticised the political attitude of the growing squatting 
scene. In most cases, it did not tolerate the status of illegality in housing and used police force and 
violence against illegal housing squats (Stahel, 2006). The civil society reacted strongly against 
this procedure and forced the political elites to undertake policy changes, particularly regarding the 
expansion of social housing as well as the introduction of new security policies. In section 9.4, we 
will explain how these policy changes during the 1980s and 1990s still affect Zurich’s temporary 
housing practice today. 
9.3.3 Methods
We conducted multiple methods to understand the mechanisms at play explaining the emergence of 
for-profit temporary housing in Zurich. The methods used enabled us to grasp a largely unknown 
and still barely quantifiable phenomenon (George & Bennett, 2005). The empirical data was collec-
ted in three steps (Table 9). 
As a first step, we analysed the public regulatory response to Zurich’s temporary housing situation. 
We strived to explain what public policy interventions (e.g., planning, housing, security, and social 
welfare policies) are involved in temporary housing as well as what private law institutions (e.g., 
property rights, tenancy matters) guide and shape the emergence of this housing type. We started 
with the analysis of socio-economic statistical data to explain the city’s housing situation over time 
(development of rents, vacancy rates, housing prices) (section 9.3.1). In addition, we analysed the 
local institutional rules involved in regulating temporary housing through an in-depth qualitative 
analysis of policy documents (parliamentary debates, legislations, government reports). These me-
thods were applied to capture the institutional origin and functioning of temporary housing within 
its real-life socio-economic and -political context (George & Bennett, 2005) (section 9.4.1). 
In our second step, we aimed to understand the objectives and strategies of the actors involved in 
temporary housing (public authorities, property owners, mediators, temporary users) to explain the 
emergence of for-profit temporary housing from an actor-centred perspective. Therefore, within the 
timeframe of January 2015 to June 2019, we conducted 25 semi-structured interviews with ex-
perts and residents to understand their interests and perspectives. We performed interviews to gain 
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information about “how” and “why” these actors defend their goals in temporary housing to get to 
know their motives (Yin, 2018:118). More precisely, we conducted interviews with seven tempo-
rary users, six property owners, six mediator agencies (non- and for-profit), and one representative 
of the city department for housing. In addition, we interviewed one expert from the local tenants’ 
association, one from the local homeowners’ association, one expert from a private local real-estate 
management agency as well as two politicians of the local legislative parliament. All interviewees 
were chosen due to their detailed understanding and knowledge of the topic as well as based on 
their practical expertise related to the position they occupied within certain professional structures 
(Yin, 2018:118). For instance, the actors representing the temporary users, the property owners, and 
the mediator agencies were chosen as they were part of seven on-going temporary housing projects 
in Zurich city region (Table 10). In doing so, we aimed to gain knowledge from participants direct-
ly involved in—or affected by—temporary housing. We stopped interviewing people when no new 























Shared flat with 
two temporary 
users 
Non-profit City Center 2 years 




Shared flat with 
three temporary 
users 
Non-profit City Center 4 years 
3 32 years, 
male 
Professional >3500 CHF Shared flat with 
three temporary 
users 
Non-profit City Center 6 years 







single mother with 
two children 
Non-profit City Center 1 year 





couple with one 
child 
For-profit Urdorf 10 months 




Shared flat with 
three temporary 
users 
For-profit Winterthur 4 months 




Single household For-profit Küsnacht 6 months 
 
In a third step, we focused on the temporary users’ socio-economic housing situation to draw 
conclusions on the beneficiaries of for-profit temporary housing strategies. To do so, we carried 
out “unstructured field observations” (Althaus et al., 2009:24) of the seven temporary housing 
sites to systematically document impressions related to the quality, size, and location of home and 
to provide material for the formulation of detailed questions during interviews. We noted all our 
observations in a field book to constantly improve our knowledge and to tailor questions prior to 
new interviews (Yin, 2018:132). Moreover, we conducted a questionnaire with the temporary users, 
including specific questions capturing their socio-economic profile (age, gender, education/employ- 
ment, income in relation to rent, household size, duration). The data collected makes it possible to 
compare the users’ situation with each other (Table 10) and to reflect on potential repercussions for 
municipal policy making. All temporary users interviewed signed a document for ethical approval 
to ensure that the data collected in their home can—in an anonymous way—be used for publication.
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9.4	 The	commodification	of	temporary	housing	in	Zurich
The emergence of a for-profit temporary housing model in Zurich took place in two stages (Figure 
10). First, through a process of institutionalisation, which demarcated it from squatting, temporary 
housing was no longer considered illegal. Temporary housing became regulated through formal 
rules and procedures, but with non-profit objectives. Actors involved in institutionalised temporary 
housing benefit not only from higher legal protection, but also from the ability to sanction abuses. 
At the beginning of the 2010s, out of institutionalised non-profit temporary housing, an additional 
step took place toward the emergence of a commodified model. This step was connected to the 
legal obligation to densify within municipal boundaries in Swiss cities which has led to increa-
singly tight urban housing markets. Under scarce land conditions legal security becomes relevant 
for landowners, as well as planning predictability, flexibility, and economic security. To cope with 
building delays, temporary housing offers them a leeway to bypass tenant protection in housing and 
to realise profitable housing projects at central locations without substantial investment risks. In this 
model, private mediator agencies provide their services and knowledge to their clients (property 
owners) with profit-oriented motives and get paid for their mediation work.
In the following section, we explain in detail these two mechanisms at play that lead to the shift 
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9.4.1 Local regulatory framework
In this section, we analyse the local regulatory framework (stressing both public policies and pro-
perty rights) regulating temporary housing in Zurich. Temporary housing is addressed in several 
public law areas. We start with the city’s police power. Then, we emphasise aspects of housing and 
planning policy because of their significant impact on housing (re)development. Finally, the role of 
private law will also be addressed as it has an impact on the property owner’s decisions regarding 
the use of urban vacancies (Table 11). 
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Public policies regulating temporary housing in Zurich
The “1980-opera-riots” have marked a significant change in Zurich’s police practise, particularly 
in regard to the clearance of housing squats. Following the claims of the activist groups, in the year 
1989, the municipal parliament agreed to introduce a legally-binding temporary housing clause in 
police law in order to calm down the youth protests of that time (Interview 20, member of muni-
cipal legislative parliament, 06.05.2015). Following the new legislation, the city police were only 
allowed to clear housing squats if the property owners could provide an approved building permit 
(Municipal Housing Squat Regulation27). Otherwise, the owners had to pay for the evacuation costs 
themselves (Interview 34, CEO of a for-profit mediator agency, 26.04.2019). In the following years, 
this legal change has led to increased public and political openness towards squatting and tempo-
rary use in Zurich (Stahel, 2006).
In housing policy, the opera riot led to several changes too. During the 1990s and 2000s, public 
subsidies for non-profit housing organisations increased with the primary aim to support vulnerable 
groups who struggle to find adequate housing (Municipal Housing Policy Act28, Art.1-6). Many of 
these social housing organisations are still tightly connected to the municipality and considered a 
political response to the demands formulated during the “1980-opera-riot” (section 9.4.2). Further-
more, on November 27, 2011, following a popular municipal initiative, 75.9% of Zurich’s voting 
majority agreed to raise the share of social housing property (public and non-profit cooperative) 
to at least a third (33.3%) of the total housing stock by 2050 (Municipal Constitution29, Art. 2). In 
2019, the property share of non-profit housing amounted to 24.6% (City of Zurich, 2019). To meet 
this policy objective, the city of Zurich builds on an active land acquisition strategy in favor of 





Table 11: Main dimensions of the regulatory framework influencing temporary housing practice in Zurich. 
 Regulatory measure Content 
Police and security 
policy  
1989: Municipal Housing Squat Regulation Police are not allowed to clear illegal housing 
squats without property owners’ approved 
building permit, with the aim to raise political 
tolerance and awareness of alternative 
movements 
Housing policy  1924: Municipal Housing Policy Act, Art. 1-6 
2011: Revision of Municipal Constitution, Art. 2 
New objective to increase the share of non-profit 
housing property to counteract rising rents and 
tenants’ social exclusion mechanisms 
Planning policy 2018: Revision of Municipal Planning Act Push for density increase within municipal 
boundaries to combat urban sprawl and resource 
depletion 
Tenancy law 1911: Federal Obligations Code, Art. 253-274 To protect tenants against unfair dismissal and 
rent increase  
Loaning law 1911: Federal Obligations Code, Art. 305-311;  
2013: in Zurich first applied for temporary 
housing 
To allow flexible use of vacant sites at low-cost 
without being obliged to follow the rules of 
tenancy (e.g., three month contract termination 
deadline, rent deposit payment, etc.) 
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Temporary housing, moreover, is influenced by planning law. As already mentioned in the introduc-
tory section, in March 2013, the Swiss voting majority approved the revision of the Federal Spa-
tial Planning Act (SPA) which, among other purposes, aims to increase density within municipal 
boundaries. Following the revised SPA, the city of Zurich has updated its planning legislation in 
2018. Particularly, the city council initiated planning measures such as the introduction of densifi-
cation zones30 to effectively promote population growth through internal settlement development 
and the efficient use of energy (Zurich City Council, 2013:5). As a consequence, urban densifica- 
tion projects leading to redevelopment of existing stocks have intensified in the last five years 
(Interview 35, City Department for Housing, 03.05.2019). Under these circumstances, temporary 
uses of vacant residential properties shortly before demolition or reconstruction have become a 
favoured coping strategy for landowners. Temporary uses help them to flexibly deal with short-term 
vacancies and potential planning delays in this context of densification (Bürgin, 2017). Simulta-
neously, however, residents’ social resistance strategies and NIMBY-syndromes against densificati-
on projects have increased too as modernisation often leads to higher rents and to social exclusion 
processes of lower income groups (COSD Zurich, 2014).
Private	law	configurations:	institutional	differences	between	letting	vs.	loaning
The temporary use of housing stocks is not only influenced by public regulations. Private law also 
impacts urban housing development. Swiss landowners are in a power position to decide on the 
use and disposal of their housing premises due to the constitutional guarantee of property  (Art. 26, 
SC). Property rights can only be restricted if strict conditions are met. In any case, full compensati-
on is to be paid (Art. 5, 26, 36 SC). 
In contrast, the rights of temporary users are protected by the articles for tenancy matters in the 
Swiss Constitution (Art. 109 SC) as well as in the Federal Obligations Code of 1911 (Art. 253-
274 OC). Under the rules of Swiss tenancy, private landlords, temporary users, and mediators 
agree to sign a terminable rent contract. What we observe in temporary housing practise is that the 
mediators are renting the whole building from the property owner with a regular rental contract 
that is time limited. The mediators sublet the individual apartments to the final temporary users 
(sub-tenants). Through this institutional set-up, the landlord has the guarantee to have his facilities 
empty at the date initially planned because the options granted by the law to object to any decision 
of the landlord are weakened due to the limitations of the subletting contract. Theoretically, the 
mediators as legal tenants are still able to have recourse against the owner in the cantonal tenancy 
court but in practice they do not because they need to maintain a good relationship with the owners 
for further housing options. 
Strategic weakening of the tenants’ position takes place above all through another institutional 
mechanism. In Zurich, besides tenancy law, loaning law regulation is also accepted to regulate tem-
porary uses in the housing sector (Federal Obligations Code, Art. 305-311). Historically, loaning 




all kinds in vacant places (e.g., in garages or tool rooms). In contrast to short-term rent or lease, 
loaning regulation allows flexible use of vacant sites at low cost without being obliged to follow the 
rules of tenancy (e.g., three month contract termination deadline, rent deposit payment, etc.). This 
also means that the user – legally the “borrower” – does not have to pay a fixed rent but rather a fee 
for monthly maintenance and operation costs such as water, heating, and electricity. The owner – 
legally the “lender” – has no restriction to keep the three-month contract termination deadline, as 
is mandatory in Swiss tenancy law. This legal framing gives property owners the ability to force 
users to leave the property at any moment and at short notice as they do not have a legal standing 
to claim their rights in court. Additionally, lenders have no duty to provide maintenance, such as in-
sulation, heating, or covering any damages in the apartment as would be mandatory under tenancy 
law. It is therefore possible that lenders use this legal discretion to evict borrowers on short notice. 
The temporary user, in addition, does not have the right to appeal against contract termination, 
unfair treatment, or other abuses in the cantonal arbitration board as legally, they are not identified 
as “tenants” (Büchi & Gehrig, 2014). In Zurich, loaning law was first used for the regulation of 
temporary housing projects in 2013. In contrast to other Swiss cities, there exists no legal restric- 
tion which forbids the use of loaning law for housing premises (see discussion for details). 
Ironically, in practise, our case study reveals that temporary users develop resistance strategies 
against loaning practise since they do not have to pay a rent but instead a monthly fixed fee for 
additional operation costs. For example, one temporary user installed a whirlpool in his backyard 
as he could not be charged for additional water consumption. Consequently, mediators developed 
legal strategies to counteract these abuses and raised the maintenance costs at the beginning (In-
terview 17, CEO of a for-profit mediator agency, 20.02.2015). Lastly, loaning contracts can easily 
and quickly be signed electronically, which reduces the administrative costs and optimises the work 
efficiency of the mediator agencies in that model (Büchi & Gehrig, 2014). 
9.4.2	 Stage	1:	The	emergence	of	institutionalised	but	non-commodified	temporary	housing	in		
  Zurich during the 1980s
In Zurich, temporary housing agencies working on a non-profit basis (stage 1) are organised under 
the tenancy law regime (Table 12). Typically, the mediators rent an apartment or a whole building 
from the property owner through a temporary rental contract and sublet the apartments to specific 
target-groups. These social organisations were founded more than 30 years ago and appeared as a 
political response to the demands of the “1980-opera-riot”. They are therefore still strongly connec-
ted to the municipal government.
The investigated non-profit housing organisations “Woko” (in German: “Studentische Wohnge-
nossenschaft”), “Juwo” (in German: “Jugendwohnnetz”), and “Domicil foundation” receive public 
financial support for their services and thus represent an integrated part of Zurich’s social housing 
policy system. In other words, these social institutions are part of an approach to ensure adequate 
and affordable housing provisions for vulnerable and low-income households (e.g., young adults, 
families, and social welfare recipients) in the city. By helping them to manage their daily life (bud-
get, housing rules, house-hold work), they act mostly as social workers and take responsibility for 
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the tenants’ social integration and security within urban neighbourhoods. The main motivation of 
these social organisations is to widen the housing possibilities for the specific needs of their social 
target groups. They select beneficiaries according to set criteria (age, income, degree of educa-
tion) and provide apartments exclusively for persons in difficult living situations. As a result, the 
agencies identify themselves as an integrated part of the tenants’ community and do not provide 
affordable housing to generate monetary returns (Interview 11, Director of Domicil foundation, 
21.01.2015). 
Woko, for example, was founded as a self-help association in 1956 and was later transformed into 
a housing cooperative in the 1970s. Its core business lies in renting affordable housing units to 
students. Additionally, Woko has always been a mediator between students looking for accommo-
dation and property owners. In 1987 (after the 1980s social protests in Zurich), a public foundation 
for student housing SSWZ (in German: “Stiftung für Studentisches Wohnen Zürich”) was created 
next to Woko. Thanks to SSWZ, it became possible to build new apartments for students for the 
first time in Zurich. While Woko focused on administration and facility management of student 
housing, the buildings were mainly owned by the foundation SSWZ, the municipalities of Zurich 
and Winterthur, the Canton of Zurich, and the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (Interview 7, 
Director of Woko, 12.01.2015). 
Juwo – the housing network for young people – is legally organised as an association and was 
founded as a direct response to the “1980s-social-movements” and the affordable housing crises in 
Zurich of that time. Juwo mainly arranges temporary housing options for a young and low-income 
segment of the population (Interview 4, Director of Juwo, 08.01.2015).
The private foundation Domicil was founded in 1994 and, as the others, follows a clear social 
objective. Its core interest is providing – wherever possible – long-term affordable housing. Parti-
cularly, Domicil works together with low-income people, families, single parents or people who ex-
perienced discrimination in the housing market. Many of them receive social welfare contributions. 
Temporary housing is only used as alternative strategy because it is very hard to find long-term 
affordable rental options that they can mediate to their clients in Zurich (Interview 11, Director of 
Domicil foundation, 21.01.2015).
»We show people how to clean a cooker, where ‘Migros’ [the local grocery store] is and what type of cleaning 
equipment they need to clean with. We also provide information about ventilation or mold prevention in the 
apartment or how to deal with the neighbour. We explain how to cooperate with the housekeeper and the property 
administration. All these different levels when it comes to housing (…)« (Interview 11, director of Domicil founda-
tion, 21.01.2015).
Since the 1980s, the affordable housing shortage has become a very strong driving force for the in-
stitutionalisation of temporary housing in Zurich. It serves as a flexible and individualised approach 
to address specific housing needs. Hence, the non-profit agencies started to expand their regular 
housing portfolio with temporary apartments. In a context of land scarcity and increasing rede-
velopment of existing buildings, this housing type has become practiced more intensively since the 
beginning of the 2010s (Interview 7, Director of Woko, 12.01.2015). 
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»We arrange temporary housing if people are totally in emergency. If we can simply not find any other solution. 
[...] In Zurich, there exists a clear housing shortage for this group of people we care about. [...] It is precarious. 
[...] Therefore, we started to add temporary housing to our portfolio« (Interview 11, director of Domicil foundati-
on, 21.01.2015).
Property owners who allow temporary housing mediated by the non-profit sector in their premi-
ses recognise this model either as a time and money saving opportunity in the phase that precedes 
redevelopment or as an effective protection against squatting and vandalism (or both). In their view, 
they benefit from higher predictability, secure economic profit, and lower maintenance costs than 
when leaving the property empty. Interestingly, they gain higher financial income due to the rent 
than property owners who rely on for-profit temporary housing (see next section). Some property 
owners also emphasise the moral satisfaction when enabling affordable housing options for users 
in need and when working together with non-profit mediators (Interview 8, private property owner, 
16.01.2015). 
»For the whole house, which is divided into two apartments, I get a rent of 3300 francs plus 700 francs main-
tenance costs for water and electricity supply per month. [...] I wanted to have about the same income as if the 
apartments were rented long-term. [...] Because of financial reasons. I needed the income. I do not have a house 
in Zurich only because it is nice« (Interview 8, 69-years old private owner, 16.01.2015). 
9.4.3	 Stage	2:	The	emergence	of	temporary	housing	as	a	business	model	in	the	2010s
Commodified temporary housing is regulated under the loaning law regime (section 9.4.1). The 
investigated mediator agencies (two private limited companies and one joint-stock company) or-
ganise temporary housing under loaning law to earn a living out of the vacancy business. Since the 
year 2010, three companies positioned themselves in the profit-oriented vacancy business in Zurich 
(Projekt Interim GmbH, Intermezzo AG, and novac solutions GmbH). Their core business activity 
is managing real-estate vacancies in a profit-oriented manner on the owners’ behalf and using them 
for temporary uses of all kind (e.g., creative economy, shared office spaces, or housing units). 
»We organise temporary uses. Normally before conversion or demolition of buildings. [...] We started in 2011 
and professionalised in 2013. [...] This was because we received requests« (Interview 17, CEO Projekt Interim, 
20.02.2015).
The most successful firm in the vacancy business we investigated is the private firm Projekt Interim 
GmbH (limited company). Originally, this firm was organised as a non-profit organisation until its 
shareholders changed the business structure to a private profit-oriented limited company in 2013. 
According to the founders, they changed their business structure to for-profit as they acknowled-
ged an increasing demand from the owners’ side. In recent years, complex densification projects 
within the urban built environment have required longer waiting times for building permits which 
is why the number of property vacancies has started to escalate. This means that many property 
owners terminate rent contracts even though they do not already have a building permit or know 




Stage 1 – Non-commodified model Stage 2 – Commodified model 
Legal framing Tenancy law regime – tenants are protected 
against unfair dismissal and rent increase 
Loaning law regime – residents only pay for 
maintenance costs, but can be evicted at short-notice 
Organisations 
studied 
Woko, Juwo, Domicil foundation Projekt Interim 
Mediators’ 
objectives 
Professional non-profit oriented mediators who 
- provide their services on the users’ behalf; 
- take social responsibility for people with 
housing needs;  
- are part of the local social housing policy 
strategy. 
Professional profit-oriented mediators who 
- provide their services on the owners’ behalf; 
- work for profit; 
- participate in housing provisions of the private 
profit-oriented sector.  
Property owners’ 
objectives 
Owners give their permission to use the 
premises. In return, they get rent as payment. 
Owners willingly paying for the mediators’ services 
to maximise their planning predictability in times of 
urban land scarcity and pressure on the housing 
market.  
Additional benefits in both models: protection against squatting and vandalism; moral satisfaction to 
contribution to affordable housing provision in times of affordable housing shortages. 
Temporary users’ 
objectives 
Temporary housing as affordable, flexible, and centrally-located opportunity. Most temporary users, 
however, would prefer long-term and stable housing solutions (see section 9.4.4). 
 
building permit can be demonstrated, a potential vacancy period between dismissal and demolition/
renovation emerges. As a consequence, temporary use suddenly becomes all the more profitable 
for the initiators of Projekt Interim GmbH since owners demand professional services to manage 
these vacancies. The firm brings together people with a wide range of expertise such as technical 
skills in real-estate management, a good network in Zurich’s creative scene, and legal knowledge 
about local and national regulations regarding temporary use (Interview 17, CEO Projekt Interim, 
20.02.2015). 
Property owners who choose working together with profit-oriented companies follow the clear ob-
jective to minimise risks of development delays in a city under densification pressure and a tight ur-
ban housing market. They are under high economic investment pressure and fear losing money due 
to building delays, which is why they need to be sure to start with the new construction on time. 
Their main objective is to increase predictability and flexibility in a period of economic uncertainty 
(Interview 34, CEO Intermezzo AG, 26.04.2019). Therefore, they willingly pay for the mediator’s 
services to benefit from the legal possibility of evicting the temporary users at short notice. From 
a financial point of view, temporary housing under loaning law mainly affects the property owners 
because they agree to pay for the mediators’ management skills and the legal security to expel oc-
cupants (Interview 33, CEO Novac Solutions AG, 24.04.2019).
»After legal advice, we [institutional property owners] recognised that if someone with a loaning contract applies 
for a contract extension, the person does not have any legal possibility to extend. [...] This way, potential objec-
tions are directly off the table. At the same time, we can get temporary users out of the house within a short time. 




According to a study on residents’ income in the city of Zurich (Martinovits, 2014), the majority 
of the occupants living in the investigated temporary apartments can be identified as low-income, 
with a monthly net-income per person of 1000 to 3500 Swiss francs (Table 10). As a rule of thumb, 
in Switzerland, it is generally assumed that a quarter of the household net-income can be spent on 
housing costs without negatively impacting other dimensions of life (FOSI & FOH, 2015). 
Under loaning law, the temporary housing prices are much cheaper than under tenancy. For in- 
stance, when renting a 4.5 room temporary apartment in Zurich (see investigated project Nr. 3: 
2260 CHF for 4.5 rooms), the price is more than three times as expensive as when loaning tempo-
rary housing (see project 5: 740 CHF for 4.5 rooms) (Table 13). Due to these massively cheaper 
offers under loaning law, the socio-economic profile of temporary users changed significantly in 
the 2010s. Nowadays, besides the temporary users of the creative scene (e.g., students, young 
urban creatives) more and more working-poor families, young families, people with social aid, and 
low-income immigrants decide to benefit from low-cost and centrally-located dwellings. In com-
parison to options on the regular housing market, temporary housing is offered below market rates 
(in letting and loaning), although in substandard conditions (e.g., with bad sanitary, insulation, and 
heating facilities).
»It is a very special house. The ceilings are very low. Everything is crooked. You cannot find any right angle here. 
If you look at this wall, you surely have 5 to 10% inclination. It has no heating. [...] It is very rudimentary. It has 
a shower cabin downstairs but up here it has no shower. [...] Nobody would invest money to renovate something 
because it is a temporary use« (Interview 2, 26-year-old male, temporary user and student at Zurich University, 
06.01.2015). 
In addition to affordability, some temporary users – namely students and young professionals – 
appreciate the flexibility provided by temporary housing. As they have not settled down yet, they 
acknowledge temporary living as a unique opportunity to explore the city (Interview 9, 27-ye-
ars-old architect, 17.01.2015).
However, out of the seven temporary user parties investigated (three students, two young urban 
professionals, one working-poor family, and one low-income immigrant family) all of them stated 
that they would not decide to live in a temporary apartment if they could have a long-term, stable, 
and similarly cheap alternative on the regular housing market. It is especially difficult with children 
to live in temporary housing because of the frequent changes of backgrounds and friends. Tempo-
rary users living with their family also stated that they had to live in temporary apartments due to 
their work during night shifts. They were dependent on living at a low cost but also close to their 
work-place in the city centre so temporary housing remained the only option (Interview 10, single 
mother with two children, working as cleaning assistant, 17.01.2015). 
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Table 13: Comparable example of a 4.5 room temporary housing apartment under letting and loaning 
(Wüest & Partner, 2017, and questionnare with temporary users).
Model Project Nr. Rent/loan per month for 
temporary apartment 




3 2260 CHF / 4.5 rooms 2530 CHF / 4 to 4.5 rooms 
 





740 CHF / 4.5 rooms 
 
1850 CHF / 4 to 4.5 rooms 
 
»At this moment, it is financially ideal. Also in Zurich, where it is almost impossible to find something for a good 
price at a good location. [...] But for a family, it is hard. A little tough. We are now looking for a long-term apart-
ment because of our child. It would be nice if we could have a little rest« (Interview 13, 32-year-old male tempo-
rary user, working as cook and freelancer, living together with his wife and his one-year old boy, 28.01.2015). 
Astonishingly, temporary users are financially more affected in the non-profit model than they are 
in the commodified model. From a purely economic perspective, this is legitimised by the fact that 
paying for the rent ensures that their housing rights remain protected in court.
9.5	 Discussion:	all	in	favor	of	commodified	temporary	housing?
The main research questions of this article address the tension between housing provision, tempo-
rary use, and tight urban housing markets as follows: What are the institutional arrangements that 
make for-profit temporary housing possible? Which rationales of the different actors involved in 
this system explain its expansion? And what are the consequences on the different categories of ac-
tors? In section 9.4, we show how institutional arrangements and the strategic behavior of different 
actors involved in temporary housing are at core for answering these research questions. Not only 
do our results reveal how the municipal regulatory framework affects the temporary use of urban 
housing stocks (9.4.1). They also show how different actors involved in temporary use respond to 
and are impacted by new legal practices such as the shift towards loaning law in temporary housing 
(9.4.2-9.4.4).
We show that a commodified temporary housing model that is managed on the owners’ behalf has 
emerged in Zurich. In this new business model, temporary housing is favoured by a coalition of 
all major actors involved – property owners, mediators, temporary users, and municipal authori-
ties. Despite apparent agreement, however, this does not remain without consequences for those in 
need of affordable housing. We reveal that the short-term interests of the property owners and the 
for-profit mediators get the upper hand over the long-term and stable housing needs of low-income 
households. 
For-profit mediator agencies take advantage of the gaps in Swiss tenancy law to offer short-term 
housing solutions based on loan use regulation. Individual knowledge from the non-profit tempo-
rary use sector and a strong business intuition were the drivers to institutionalise temporary housing 
through these new rules of the game (loaning law) and with for-profit objectives. Although for-pro-
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fit mediators insist that they are aware of their social responsibility to organise temporary housing, 
they contribute to the weakening of tenants’ security through the promotion of a housing model 
outside of tenancy law. 
Property owners in the commodified model do require payment for operation costs but not rent. 
Due to increasingly complex inner-city redevelopment procedures and corresponding planning 
delays (e.g., due to objections by neighbours), the financial investment risks for owners increa-
sed in recent years. In this situation, temporary housing under loaning law fulfils a specific niche 
function on real estate markets in the sense that it increases planning predictability, legal security, 
flexibility, and economic security for the owners. More specifically, in an environment where land 
is scarce and competition to use this land is increasing, property owners can no longer afford to 
leave their properties empty for an unpredictable duration. Inevitably, they are interested in a time 
and money-saving solution to remain flexible and economically competitive. In the end, because of 
the almost repealed protection of tenants’ rights and the absence of any legal tenancy obligation to 
provide maintenance services, owners enjoy maximal economic security and full decision-making 
power. 
The need for better predictability might even be reinforced by the municipal police regulation on 
housing squats which accepts squatting as long as landowners cannot demonstrate a formal building 
permit. Paradoxically, this attitude might create additional pressure on the owners as their property 
is no longer protected by the state in the period of vacancy and planning uncertainty. Hence, the 
owners are in need of finding a short-term solution which helps them to manage their vacant pro-
perties. Although the municipality of Zurich does not directly financially support the for-profit mo-
del, they contribute to its economic success by tolerating the loaning law regime in housing. Even 
though this model frames housing in a completely different way, it seems that the city government 
has not yet realised potential detrimental consequences. To counterpoise this decision, politicians 
and NGOs in other Swiss cities have started to call for legal prohibition of loaning law practise in 
housing, for instance in the city of Basel. Here, a temporary user is legally allowed to claim that the 
costs paid by the users for maintenance are too high for its acceptance as a loan. Instead, it can be 
classified as rent which makes eviction at short notice illegal (City of Basel, 2018). 
Finally, the temporary users – namely low-income families, single parents, people receiving 
social aid, young urban professionals, and students – appreciate the ability to live centrally and at 
a low cost in Zurich. However, these vulnerable groups are caught in a vicious circle leading to 
dependence on precarious housing solutions and the erosion of their social rights and protection 
in housing. By signing loaning law contracts, temporary users abandon their legal protection as 
they do not have the ability to extend contracts or to claim their rights in court. Under this legal 
framing, they remain totally dependent on the conditions offered by the owners and mediators. In 
the investigated non-profit model, in contrast, temporary housing can still be interpreted as a part of 
the existing social housing policy system as the provision of housing is organised for the users’—
not the owners’—benefit. Nevertheless, even if non-profit temporary housing follows clear social 
objectives, it still needs to be critically questioned whether the requested rent prices are justified for 
temporary apartments that are mostly sub-standard and designated to be demolished.
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9.6 Conclusion
While there is a growing body of literature critically discussing how temporary urbanism affects 
urban social life (Vallance et al., 2017; Lai et al., 2018; Galdini, 2019), and another line of research 
focusing on the potentials of temporary use for the flexible development of urban spaces in gene-
ral (Özdemirli, 2014; Németh & Langhorst, 2014; Dubeaux & Sabot, 2018; Cardullo et al., 2018), 
research on how different forms of temporary use affect the housing situation in cities is still thin 
(Lara-Hernandez et al., 2020; van Holm, 2020). More qualitative and quantitative research is there- 
fore needed to understand how temporary housing changes everyday life in cities and potentially 
leads to precarious living situations for lower income groups. Future research should focus more 
intensively on the social dimension of sustainability in cities (affordability, tenure security, stability, 
etc.) to understand how to cope with tight urban housing markets and intensifying scarcity of land. 
In this article, we explained the emergence of a commodified temporary model in the Swiss urban 
context. Even though our results are limited to the city of Zurich, potential for generalization results 
from the following identified causal mechanisms which are expected to have broader significance 
in other urban contexts too: our analysis reveals that even though the city council publicly commits 
to affordable and socially equitable housing development (Municipal Constitution, Art. 2, Para. 5), 
in temporary housing, it assists in bypassing tenancy law by accepting the loaning law regime in 
housing. This, in turn, assures increased flexibility and predictability for the owners (no contract 
termination deadline and no corresponding judicial uncertainty). The municipal government might 
be reluctant to prohibit the loaning law regime for temporary housing as it might hinder property 
owners from densifying their parcels as investment risks increase. Simultaneously, property owners 
benefit from an economic incentive to raise the profit margin when obtaining densification mea-
sures due to smaller transaction costs. For temporary users, however, we see that loaning regula-
tion leads to the erosion of their social rights, stability, and protection in housing as it promotes 
a precarious standard and short-term perspective of living. This model stands for a more general 
shift towards the acknowledgement of housing as a commodity and investment asset rather than as 
a basic human need and unique kind of good (Marcuse, 1985; Harvey, 2005, 2012; Rolnik, 2013). 
We finally identify a risk that low-income residents become increasingly excluded from inner-city 
housing as the supply of new housing – in particular through support measures for housing coope-
ratives – targets the middle class instead of the lower socio-economic segments of the population 
- a highly unsustainable urban development scenario! If the for-profit temporary housing model 
becomes more mainstream and competes even more directly with non-profit firms, it may reinforce 
the residents’ dependence on the owners’ short-term decisions and increasingly become a social 
challenge for the city government. In the long run, public expenses for social aid might rise as the 
number of residents suffering from unstable housing conditions increases and more people poten- 
tially become dependent on social welfare contributions. 
Let’s not open Pandora’s box – housing is a matter for tenancy law, not loaning law, to protect the 
users’ stability, security, and long-term right to housing. We are convinced that Zurich’s municipal 
government is in the power position to change the legal setting to prohibit temporary housing under 
loaning law and to minimise further flexibilisation of the housing sector. As demonstrated in other 
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Swiss cities (e.g. Basel), legal changes in tenancy law neither lead to an increase of urban vacancies 
nor to a prohibition of non-residential temporary uses. Instead, temporary housing vacancies are 
managed under non-profit objectives and with predictable tenure conditions for the users. Simulta-
neously, Zurich’s city government should point particular attention to housing provisions for those 
with the lowest incomes. To look more closely at those who pay the social price of densification 
and corresponding urban upgrading measures is essential if urban quality and viability is to be 







The title of this dissertation – The Business of Densification – makes 
a clear statement about how densification in urban areas takes place – 
along profit-oriented intentions, despite insistent discourses on sustain-
ability. However, the central goal of this dissertation is not just to make 
this claim but rather to explain what local governance mechanisms at 
play are responsible for this development and to identify the reasons 
behind this complex situation. To accomplish this aim, three theoreti-
cal blocks were identified that help to understand densification from a 
neoinstitutional and actor-centered perspective: social sustainability 
in housing (dependent variable), institutions (independent variable), 
and actors’ strategies (intermediary variable). By combining concepts 
deriving from public policy analysis (planning as a public policy), new 
institutional economics (property rights), and political ecology (power), 
the results of this thesis extend the knowledge about why some groups 
or interests experience disproportional access to housing stocks in 
densifying urban areas, and tend to lose while others tend to win. In the 
concluding part, the key results answering the three sub-questions (SQ1 
to SQ3) are presented. Results are discussed that contribute to neoinsti-
tutionalist political ecology research. Chapter 11 closes with the findings 
that answer the main research question (RQ). Finally, the limitations of 
the theoretical and methodological model applied are discussed (section 
13), and an outlook for future research is presented (section 14). 
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10. Theoretical contribution to neoinstitutionalist political  
 ecology research and discussion of key results
The overarching aim of this thesis was to investigate the mechanisms that govern the implementa-
tion of densification objectives and the impact of this process on housing uses, actor’s strategies, 
as well as the impact densification has on social sustainability in housing. In each paper, I analyzed 
the conditions of decision-making and focused on interviews with public and private stakeholders 
involved, in-depth document analyses, household surveys, and participant observations in order to 
understand this complexity. Although results are limited to Switzerland, potential for generaliza- 
tion to other urban contexts results from the identified key results and causal mechanisms (section 
10.2). Figure 1 – that I already introduced at the beginning of my thesis – will help the readers to 
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10.1 Theoretical contribution to neoinstitutionalist political ecology research
 Densification represents a real shift of paradigm in planning that is often not recognized as such.  
 For many decades, planning has been oriented toward sprawl (greenfield development). The shift  
 towards densification in land use planning and policy making requires that public and private  
 stakeholders involved in the process deal with the already built environment. Where investors and  
 developers used to be able to build in the simple institutional settings offered by greenfield or  
 abandoned brownfield, today they need to deal with complex webs of existing rights and duties  
 characteristic of the built environment: property titles, contracts or public policy outputs, such as  
 land-use plans, environment standards or housing regulations (Gerber & Debrunner, 2021, in  
 prep.).
 Reversing the trend toward redevelopment and densification calls for deeper changes, in particular  
 new strategies that take into account social and political challenges. Only with a clear picture of  
 power relations can a structured discussion and possibly renegotiation be carried out on unsustain- 
 able consequences of power distribution in dense urban environments. However, this requires  
 analytical concepts that are able to grasp power structures from the start, before they materialize in  
 bricks and mortar (Flyvbjerg, 1998).
 By combining approaches from public policy analysis (planning as a public policy), new institutio- 
 nal economics (property rights), and political ecology (power), this thesis facilities explicit re- 
 flection on the institutional configurations and conflicting actors’ interests that might induce social  
 exclusion processes in housing under scarce urban land conditions. To explicitly capture power  
 issues at stake in humans‘ relationship with their environment and to insufflate greater power-
 awareness into IRR literature (rather than conceptualizing power as integral part of public policy  
 analysis) (e.g. Knoefel et al., 2007; Gerber et al., 2009), this thesis has added conceptual appro-
 aches that emerged in political ecology (Lasswell, 1936; Robbins, 2004; Swyngedouw, 2009).  
 A discipline that politicizes environmental change (Krueger & Gibbs 2007; Evans & Jones 2008),  
 and questions the role and status of powerful actors as well of what is taken for granted in leading  
 discourses on environment and development (Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2019). Vice versa, IRR  
 research brings new insights to political ecology studies by unrevealing and explaining the emer- 
 gence of power structures and relations in a systematic way. Rather than addressing power on a  
 broad scale, the IRR helps to identify concrete mechanisms of play in which power is enacted, deci 
 sions are taken, and housing uses are governed. 
 Overall, the following contributions to neoinstitutionalist political ecology were exercised in this  
 research project: 
• This thesis contributes to neoinstitutionalist political ecology research by focusing on the un-
derlying (and often hidden) power structures that explain why the social dimension of sustain-
ability has become neglected in densification processes, although it appears so crucial for the 
success of a sustainable settlement development (Portney 1994; Breheny, 1997). It discusses in 
a systematic way why and how actors whose interests are legally protected enjoy not only stron-
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ger positions in development projects, but also reinforced political power. It explicitly adds to 
political ecology discourse by politicizing resources degradation and environmental change in 
a context of urban land scarcity, and demonstrates that sometimes only few people suffer the 
quality of life burdens of measures taken on behalf of environmental sustainability. 
• Moreover, results show how laws and regulations are revised, remain unimplemented, are 
diverted, or hijacked by different categories of stakeholders (owners and non-owners). They 
explain how institutional regimes in force are mediated by powerful actors who convey their 
experiences through different channels (e.g. resistance strategies, urban social movements, pro-
perty rights) to political-administrative actors. Hence, this new institutionalist political ecology 
perspective enables researchers to analyze, to reconstruct, and to explain why many different 
stakeholders can come into conflict with each other in the first place. It enables to trace the 
concrete mechanisms of (unfair) power distribution in urban densification processes. 
 
 More precisely: 
	 10.1.1	 Theoretical	contribution	to	block	1	(section	3.2):	Social	sustainability	in	housing		
	 	 	 (dependent	variable)
Historically, the IRR evolved out of environmental debates of the 1980s. For considerable time, 
therefore, the framework has associated a ‘sustainable city’ primarily with efficient waste manage-
ment, recycling opportunities, reduced car dependency, and greater use of alternative modes of 
transport in order to limit cities’ ecological footprint (for discussion see chapter 3.2) (e.g. Knoepfel 
et al., 2003; Nicol & Knoepfel, 2008; Gerber et al., 2009; Gerber et al., 2020). This thesis expands 
this environmental perspective by adding a social sustainability view to IRR research. 
• It adds to IRR literature by identifying how social sustainability parameters (housing affordabi- 
 lity, accessibility etc.) are shaped and influenced by actors‘ decision-making behavior and the  
 social agency within which actors develop and defend their housing use interests. For instan- 
 ce, it analyzes the institutional conditions under which residents’ inclusion and access to, as  
 well as equitable distribution of housing stocks as a resource take place. The impacts of imple- 
 menting densification objectives on social sustainability in housing are analyzed through the  
 structured analysis of the actors’ constellations (agency), their housing use strategies (of ow- 
 ners and non-owners), and their decision-making behavior. Conceptualization and integration  
 of social sustainability is a new element that this research project has brought to IRR research.
•  This thesis moreover contributes to neoinstitutionalist political ecology research by using a 
sustainability perspective to fathom and to explain the social problem in its complex context. It 
shows how in a dense urban environment the social concerns are watered down by other acclai-
med economic or environmental sustainability benefits, and how government interventions (due 
to power imbalances) fail to save those who are adversely affected. It also demonstrates how 
people are sensitized and manipulated to biases in the way environmental risks are borne (e.g. 
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Portney, 1994; Burton, 2000; Bramley et al., 2009; Vallance et al., 2011), and makes explicit 
the potential impact of private sector abuses (Jonkman, 2019). This thesis blatantly demonstra-
tes how in market-based economies, economic, and environmental sustainability are achieved 
at the expense of the social wellbeing of the disadvantaged groups, even in more welfare-orien-
ted societies such as Switzerland.
	 10.1.2	 Theoretical	contribution	to	block	2	(section	3.3):	Institutions	(independent	variable)
The IRR analytical framework considers that capturing the interactions among different public 
policies and property rights, but also between public policies and property rights is fundamental 
to understanding social sustainability in housing. Institutions encompass the range of authorized 
actions that the holder of rights can undertake in terms of the use of goods and services provided by 
the housing stock. Institutions can also represent opportunities for particular groups, for instance, 
in assessing knowledge, financial capacity, or personnel resources to effectively defend interests 
(Nicol & Knoepfel, 2008; Balmer & Gerber, 2017; Hengstermann, 2019; Gerber et al., 2020). 
For instance, an access right granted to housing has a fundamentally different scope and robustness 
if it is backed up by a property title inscribed in a land register (e.g. share in a housing cooperative), 
if it is based on tenancy law (rental contract), social policies (subsidy to pay rent), or a temporary 
housing arrangement (e.g. based on loaning law). In states based on the rule of law such as Switzer-
land, this means that a close analysis of the legal foundations of the property rights system (Civil 
Code) and the public policies in force is necessary as they regulate different economic, ecological, 
and social aspects of housing. They define the scope of action of each individual user. To capture 
patterns of housing uses, exclusive, or collective appropriation, or social displacement, the institu- 
tional configurations are essential to examine.  
• This thesis adds to the existing body of neoinstitutional literature by analyzing in depth the 
intertwined relationship between public policy (in particular of land-use planning and energy 
policy) and property rights that guide social sustainability in housing in a context of densifica-
tion. It discusses the role of private property rights and public policy in the Swiss legislative 
context where both are involved in regulating socially sustainable housing development. This 
thesis expands existing neoinstitutional literature with regard to housing in dense urban areas 
(Nicol & Knoepfel, 2008; Hassler et al., 2009; Nicol, 2013; Balmer & Gerber, 2017), which 
has not been specifically mentioned this aspect thus far. 
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	 10.1.3	 Theoretical	contribution	to	block	3	(section	3.4):	Actors‘	use	strategies	
	 	 	 (intermediary	variable)
Motivating actors to use housing stocks in dense city areas in a socially sustainable way is a 
complex challenge with no single solution. Following the IRR approach (see Gerber et al., 2009), 
human actions take place within a tight web of institutional rules that structure humans’ expecta-
tions about what others will do. Within this institutional setting, actors involved develop strategies 
to defend their interests in order to meet a particular goal. In housing, Kohler and Hassler (2002) 
argue that it is thus necessary to improve knowledge about the specific views of the different stake-
holders, who try to steer housing. Such analysis reveals whether, how, and why some actors are able 
to defend their interests effectively and tend to win, while others tend to lose. 
Different user actors can make use of specific forms of social, economic, or political power to use 
the leeway given by the legal norms in force. This includes not only the ability to determine and 
take advantage of unregulated spaces or loopholes, but also the power to resist public implementa- 
tion efforts through selective and strategic rule activation (Davy, 2012; Hartmann & Needham, 
2012; Gerber et al., 2017; Kolocek, 2017). Target groups of public policies (owner and non-owner 
actors) can develop resistance strategies (e.g. collective organization, political support, informa- 
tion campaigns) to accelerate or slow down public policy implementation (Lefebvre, 1970; Harvey, 
1973; Castells, 1983).
• This thesis contributes to neoinstitutional political ecology literature by closely analyzing pu-
blic (executive and legislative committees, administrative actors) and private (owners, tenants, 
NGOs) actors’ housing strategies in the Swiss urban rental segment. By shedding light on stra-
tegic actors’ behavior in cities confronted with scarce land use conditions, this thesis moreover 
extends IRR research (Nicol, 2013; Balmer & Gerber, 2017) that has not specifically mentioned 
aspects of actors‘ applied housing use strategies and power relations in residential densification 
so far.
In the following chapters, a final conclusion is drawn whether and how the implementation of den-
sification objectives leads to social sustainability in housing. This is done by analyzing the institu-
tional regime (key finding 1), and the different actors’ strategies using housing stocks under scarce 
urban land use conditions (key findings 2 to 4). Making explicit the local governance mechanisms 
of possible trade-offs and power games among actors (key finding 5) in densification procedures is 
a new contribution of this research project to neoinstitutionalist political ecology research.
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10.2 Discussion of key results
SQ1:	 How do institutional rules affect the outcomes of densification in terms of social sustain-
  ability in housing?
Key	empirical	finding	1:	Institutional	incoherence	between	landowners’	and	tenants’	rights,	
and	the	extent	of	rules	influencing	the	implementation	of	densification	objectives,	lead	to	soci-
ally unsustainable housing development
Results of Articles 1 to 4 confirm hypothesis 1 (see chapter 3.5): in a context of densification, the 
Swiss institutional regime in force is indeed key for disentangling how and why social sustainability 
in housing is produced. Article 1 demonstrates how the unequal distribution of legal power between 
public policy and property rights in the Swiss federal regulatory framework, but also the extent of 
formal rules impacting the densification implementation process, affect the way actors use housing 
goods and services (e.g. affordable living space, energy source). Whereas property titles are strongly 
secured by the Swiss Constitution and the Civil Code, and are very enduring and long-lasting, Swiss 
public policies regulating housing stocks are quickly revised depending on current political majori-
ties. More precisely:
Article 1 shows that while in Swiss federal planning, tax and energy policy the parliament has only 
recently agreed to introduce new legislation that stronger enshrines energy efficiency objectives, 
legal amendments to support social interests of densification (e.g. in housing, planning, or social 
welfare policy) have not been made. Federal policy instruments in favor of socially-sensitive rede-
velopment such as the introduction of a fixed minimum share of 10% non-profit housing in the Swiss 
Constitution31 or the obligation for private homeowners to pass tax benefit for energetic renovation to 
tenants, have been politically debated but never fully enacted. In addition, on November 20th 2020, 
the Swiss Federal Court only recently decided that landlords can increase the rent by several hundred 
Swiss francs in case new renters move into an apartment (in stock as well as in new built housing). 
This decision was made based on the grounds that institutional owners (e.g. pension funds) would 
make too little profit due to the low interest rates on the property markets. It is therefore expected 
that the number of mass dismissals in the rental segment will increase in Switzerland since owners 
can benefit of fast and increasing rent revenue (Perricone, 2020).
Consequently, even though the land use context in Swiss cities has changed, Swiss property owners 
still benefit from public subsidies for energetic renovation or modernization wherever housing stock 
is being densified (see Table 5, chapter 6.5.1). Owners must neither pass the received subsidies to the 
tenants nor are they obliged to stick to certain rent levels where real estate is demolished and refur-
bished resulting in higher costs for residents. In sum, owners are encouraged to densify through pub-







rent increase, dismissal of elderly, or disruption of long-enduring communities. While this power 
guaranteed to landowners has not triggered any conflicts on unbuilt green- or brownfields, the legal 
tensions between owners’ and residents’ interests have increased in a context of densification.  
Indeed, even though the socio-spatial conditions under the compact city model have changed signifi-
cantly, results show that property owners are still allowed to densify existing housing stocks without 
further tenancy restriction (see chapters 6.6, 7.6, 9.4). They can terminate an open-ended rent con-
tract within three months without any specific reasons and without any legal obligation to compen-
sate the tenants, for example, for moving costs. Moreover, in newly-built housing, it is possible for 
landowners to start the rent at a new level. They do not have to follow rent levels as would be man-
datory for renovated real estate. Therefore, property owners are highly motivated to densify through 
complete demolition as they can make a lot of profit through increased rent revenue after rebuilding. 
Moreover, their position is secured by strongly protected property titles. This means that the owner is 
free to define the profit-margin to be targeted on the parcel and can set the rents according to market 
prices. Hence, urban densification is essentially profit-driven in Switzerland since property owners 
do not face any institutional boundaries that would prevent them from acting socially unsustainable. 
Housing providers are not forced by law to follow a more socially inclusive solution (e.g. in terms of 
housing affordability, prevention of discrimination). 
Tenants, in turn, are not in the legal position to be heard or to counteract (see chapters 6.5, 7.4, 
9.4). Regardless of their strength of social integration, age, or years of residency in a neighborhood, 
tenants can legally be evicted within three months. Under the Swiss rules of tenancy, residents do 
also not need to be informed about up-coming redevelopment tasks before receiving the contract ter-
mination. In daily practice, this often leads to social eviction at short-notice. Tenants may counteract 
in court; however, in most cases they do not use this option as they neither have the financial means 
nor the expert knowledge to do so. 
Under this given legal setting, results of Article 1 show that the Swiss federal government withdraws 
from its responsibility of covering the housing needs for all income segments. In the name of fe-
deralism, it passes the duty on to the cantons, municipalities, and ultimately the individual subjects. 
The federal government does not enforce more rigorous institutional rules and policy instruments to 
protect tenants. Because legal regulations and policy instruments, which would directly alleviate the 
land rent (e.g. rent level or social eviction controls, quotas for affordable housing, zoning measures 
etc.), would lead to strong owners‘ resistance (see key finding 2). Simultaneously, owners make full 
use of their rights to private ownership including their rights to control housing access, rights of 
management, rights of exclusion, or rights of alienation. 
Ultimately, results of Articles 2 and 4 reveal that this institutional incoherence between property ow-
ners’ and tenants’ rights in the Swiss federal regulatory framework trickles down to cantonal and mu-
nicipal levels. While private property owners’ profit-making interests are very strongly protected by 
law in Switzerland, tenants do not experience the same legal protection of their affordable housing 
needs. This legal dependence from the owners’ position encourages the performance of densification 
as an “Eco-Business” at the expense of its social function (key finding 5). 
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SQ2:  What strategies do actors (owners and non-owners) follow to contribute to socially sustain- 
  able housing in a dense city?
Key	empirical	finding	2:	Resistance	power	of	landowners	prevents	socially	sustainable	
housing development in a dense city
Results of the four articles of this thesis confirm hypothesis 2 (chapter 3.5): private property owners 
together with the private building and real estate industries working on their behalf are identified 
to be the main driving force behind tenants’ social exclusion in Swiss cities. For them, densificati-
on represents a lucrative business and financial asset since they benefit from enhanced revenue on 
centrally-located parcels (more apartments). In comparison to development on greenfield outside 
of the built-up urban areas, they regard residential urban densification as an attractive business for 
stable rates of return and as a solid risk diversification strategy (see chapters 6.5.2, 7.4.2, 9.4.3). 
As a consequence, consolidation in Swiss cities increasingly becomes a process led by capital in 
the sense that it is primarily shaped and guided by private actors. They intend to boost the city’s 
economic activity through intensive investment into housing (re)development. Owners (including 
speculators), investors, and the private construction industry congruently benefit from this emerging 
“Business of Densification“ as it leads to a substantial increase in land rent and income revenue. 
Moreover, the private companies (investors, banks, insurances) studied in Articles 2 and 4 are of 
a certain size, and are thus able to possess large-scale housing projects. They can manage them 
through considerable means (purchase of land, demolition of old infrastructure, construction costs, 
etc.). In addition, investors (such as Credit Suisse pension fund) acknowledge the compact city as 
an opportunity to legitimize the transfer of property rights power over public planning principles 
(densification) from one scale to another and to justify the precedence of densification accorded to 
financial values over use values. They promote densification in a way that neglects distributional 
consequences or social equity issues and ignores the residents’ needs for increased affordability, 
integration into decision-making, or community cohesion. Results show that these firms neither en-
gage with the concerned communities nor are they aware of intersectional power structures. Becau-
se their rights to private property prevent them from choosing more socially stable solutions.
Goals of social inclusion, community cohesion, or housing accessibility are not considered in de-
cision-making since investors by law do not feel compelled to act socially responsibly (key finding 
1). As long as they are not legally required to do so, and their position is secured by strong property 
titles, owners acknowledge no need to support tenants’ interests. Furthermore, results of Article 1 
show that the interests of these private development firms are well represented in the federal par-
liament (chapter 6.5.2). Profit-oriented goals of densification become increasingly integrated into 
political games taking place at higher decision-making levels. Through the coalition of political 
forces (in legislative and executive committees), the introduction of formal rules that aim to promo-
te more socially inclusive objectives in housing is constantly prevented, for example, in regard to 
the provision of affordable housing, mass dismissals, or improved tenure security. 
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Key	empirical	finding	3:	Effective	tenants’	resistance	against	rent	increase	and	displacement	
is limited due to their weak legal standing in front of powerful landowners
The assumption made in hypothesis 3 cannot be confirmed: results of the four articles of this thesis 
reveal that tenants confronted with contract termination in most cases neither have the financial me-
ans nor the legal standing to counteract the landlords’ decision effectively. Under the given Swiss 
federal institutional setting (key finding 1), and the decision-making strategies applied by property 
owners (key finding 2), tenants’ capacity for resistance against rent increase and displacement is 
limited. Swiss property owners are well equipped to resist tenants’ claims thanks to their strong 
position as titleholders. Even though residents try to resist through street rallies, formal petitions, 
or the collaboration with local tenants’ associations, they do not succeed in defending their social 
interests effectively (e.g. for affordable housing provision). They face discrimination due to their 
low-income status and weak legal position. Hence, even in the Swiss direct democratic system, 
tenants’ grassroots resistance does not lead to enhanced socio-political pressure on governments 
and owner-actors to obtain measures against dismissal and displacement (see e.g. chapter 7.5). 
In the studied municipalities, NIMBY-efforts prevent planned projects only to the extent that new 
developments might be delayed, but never fully rejected. Moreover, property owners (but also 
public authorities) develop strategies to counteract such NIMBY-opposition in advance in order to 
prevent building delays, which cost them a lot of money. For instance, Article 4 shows that proper-
ty owners have started to promote a temporary housing model that works outside of tenancy law 
(loaning law), which obliges low-income households to live in precarious housing situations in 
buildings shortly before demolition. The city government of Zurich has not prohibited this practice 
even though it leads to the constant erosion of tenants’ social rights and legal security. In doing so, 
owners prevent former residents from squatting their buildings, which would delay their consolida-
tion and upgrading plans. By supporting this housing format, public authorities manage to imple-
ment densification goals effectively.  
In addition, results of Articles 2 and 4 reveal that property owners have developed professional 
communication strategies with tenants and planning authorities to hinder social resistance. For 
example, to convince residents to participate, investors develop strategies to make densification 
palatable to them even though it leads to the loss of their social habitats. They offer, for instance, 
economic compensation measures to tenants such as alternative dwellings in parts outside the city 
to diminish NIMBYism that may delay their projects. Simultaneously, public planning administra-
tions too develop a financial language and management skills that smooth the dialogue with private 
investors and tenants. Participatory forms of planning such as cooperative planning, test planning, 
or urban design competitions play a central role in this context as they make the densification pro-
cess more efficient and profitable for both sides – investors and local authorities (chapter 7.4.2). 
In essence, the constant erosion of their social rights, relations, and contacts to family members, 
neighbors, and friends worsens the housing situation of tenants living in private rental housing 
stocks in Swiss cities. Even though they do their utmost to rebel and to make their protest against 
densification and up-grading visible, their weak legal standing hampers effective resistance. Even 
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though they might be included in participative forms of planning, in case they do not agree with the 
plans, they do not have the legal standing to actually incorporate their visions into formal rules and 
regulation. As a consequence, they remain heavily dependent on the decisions made by the landow-
ners. 
Those being displaced have become the victims of powerful forces of capitalist urbanization and 
differential spending power in the Swiss legal system. To cope with this legal situation, informal 
mechanisms of accountability occur within self-organized arrangements that enable communi-
ty-based collective action, for example, in the form of non-profit housing associations or non-profit 
temporary housing organizations (see Article 4). However, I argue in this thesis that current housing 
challenges need to be solved in a way that includes profit-oriented housing providers as well, 
because the non-profit sector only holds a small share of the total housing stock in Switzerland. 
Finally, results of Article 1 show that enhanced tenants’ lobbying power is needed to change the 
regulatory framework in force in favor of more social goals. While the Swiss homeowners’ asso- 
ciation manages to constantly influence the implementation of energy policy instruments or tenancy 
regulations to make densification less socially diverse, for many years, tenants’ activist groups have 
not succeeded in activating new rules that promote tenants protection. This lack of access to formal 
decision making at the federal level (due to lack of lobbying power) constantly reinforces social 
inequalities in the Swiss legal and housing policy system. This subsequently also affects regulatory 
regimes at the cantonal and municipal levels. 
Key	empirical	finding	4:	Municipal	authorities’	strategic	activation	of	public	and	private	law	
instruments leads to socially sustainable housing development in a dense city
Results of Article 3 confirm the assumption made in hypothesis 4: a shift towards active municipal 
land policy is necessary to promote socially sustainable housing in a context of urban densification. 
Municipal planning administrations are in the key position to intervene into private development 
interests. They can prevent tenants’ social exclusion, but they therefore must know how to densify. 
Article 3 provides a central theoretical contribution to this field of research in the sense that – by 
conducting comparative case study research – the article makes a clear suggestion what an effective 
municipal land policy strategy for socially sustainable housing transformation might look like. In a 
context of urban land scarcity, public authorities do not only need to understand the technical cha-
llenges such as contamination. They must also (re)consider neighborhood conflicts or the under-
lying property rights’ structure if they aim to fight urban sprawl without discrimination, displace-
ment, and social exclusion. Article 3, moreover, indicates that planners should be aware that, at 
the center of the action system are the owners, who initiate the densification process as well as the 
private homebuilding industry working on their behalf. Together they form a private alliance that 
favors densification in order to promote business (key finding 2). 
To counteract such profitability objectives – resulting in rising rents and displacement – results in 
Article 3 show that municipal planning authorities must find ways to deal with the power of title-
holders. More specifically, they need to understand how to activate specific public and private law 
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instruments that do not always need to limit property owners’ rights, but also work with property 
rights. Such an active approach requires public intervention outside of a purely market-based in-
vestment logic. Besides the mere introduction of new policy instruments (e.g. quota for affordable 
housing), it involves the strategic activation of existing formal rules (see chapters 8.5 and 8.6). 
Moreover, Article 2 demonstrates that to legitimize such land acquisition strategy, broad political 
support, knowledge, as well as financial and personnel resources are needed. These are not always 
given, even in big and wealthy cities such as Zurich or Basel. Consequently, making densification 
more socially sensitive is a matter of the ability of municipal planning administrations to familiari-
ze themselves with the entire range of existing intervention possibilities. The strengthening of more 
social measures must be given more weight in the planning process, and should be considered and 
included more actively into formal decision-making processes (for details see section 12).





The final assumption made in hypothesis 5 can be confirmed: results of all four articles show that 
even though densification has been introduced as a legally binding policy objective in order to pro-
mote sustainable settlement development effectively, its implementation process is far from socially 
sustainable in the sampled Swiss cases. In the Swiss context, densification objectives are imple-
mented in a way that neglects the social pillar of sustainability in favor of economic (profit) and 
environmental (energy efficiency) dimensions. Consolidation is promoted as an “Eco-Business” 
by coupling urban competitiveness with ecologic viability goals, while neglecting social aspects 
such as housing affordability, -availability, or tenants’ inclusion into formal decision-making. More 
precisely:
Results of Articles 1 to 4 reveal that densification – as a key objective of Swiss planning policy – 
only gets implemented if private titleholders agree to obtain new development. To convince owners 
to participate in densification policy efforts, public authorities agree to the development terms and 
conditions dictated by the landowners (chapter 8.4.3). Because public planning administrations can-
not trigger densification objectives alone. They are reluctant to intervene against property owners 
using measures that directly influence the land rent (e.g. stricter zoning) because they fear strong 
resistance. Therefore, planning authorities implement densification according to the landowners’ 
profitability terms rather than not being able to promote consolidation goals at all. Otherwise, they 
would risk that densification as key element of environmentally sustainable settlement transformati-
on might slow down – or even come to a standstill – if property owners refuse its implementation.
Under the flag of “sustainable urban development“, this results in consolidation implemented in 
the form of “green gentrification” (Budd et al., 2008:266), which couples ecologic modernization 
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(energy efficiency) with densification goals, but at the expense of a city’s social qualities. The po-
licy shift towards densification enables owners to (re)develop existing real estate through the con-
struction of more and newly renovated apartments at the same location (key finding 2). They can 
increase rent revenue steadily and substantially. Moreover, even though public authorities would be 
the ones responsible for counteracting trends of gentrification through targeted government inter-
vention, results of Articles 2 to 4 show that the political instrumentalization of the compact city is a 
very real possibility for municipalities. 
Indeed, public authorities use the compact city as a cover to push forward policies and interventions 
that have goals other than social stability (see e.g. chapter 7.4.2). For example, energy efficiency or 
climate adaption objectives. Since the compact city model fits into very different political agendas, 
this increases the possibility that it is used instrumentally. Densification enables governments to 
grow, attract, and accommodate new (potentially higher-income) residents. Hence, authorities try to 
justify the (re)development of old housing stocks with the need to produce increased net financial 
capacity for managing urban growth. In the city of Zurich, for example, municipal planning autho-
rities define planning documents that facilitate the (re)construction of housing stocks as they are 
interested in attracting wealthy taxpayers in order to increase tax revenue (Articles 2 to 4). Public 
authorities (on behalf of local executive and legislative committees) entail an economistic per-
spective – yet one often integrated with ecological discourse – by highlighting the financial cost of 
sprawl and by mobilizing arguments in favor of dense and compact cities. Such arguments include, 
for instance, a reduction of transaction costs through spatial proximity, which subsequently may 
lead to increased urban livability. 
Consequently, more than ever before, public actors incorporate gentrification into densification 
policy objectives – used either as a justification to obey market forces and private sector entrepre-
neurialism, or as a tool to direct market processes in the hopes of reorganizing urban landscapes in 
a more benevolent fashion. Swiss public authorities (particularly planning administrations) seem 
to regard gentrification as one of the social costs of economic success or ecologic renovation that 
is worth tolerating (7.4.2, 8.4.3). To do so – in the sampled Swiss cases – they argue that failure to 
allow new private buildings will create definite and severe impediment to economic growth or cli-
mate protection. In Articles 2 and 3, for instance, municipal authorities legitimize their actions with 
the argument that the impact of doing nothing for economic or environmental sustainability would 
be devastating. Primarily, because “doing nothing” could potentially create additional pressure for 
production, jobs, and residents to move out of the city, which could foster urban decline. Terms 
like “partnerships”, “participation”, “collaboration”, or “sustainability” are used instrumentally to 
reinforce the power of the central state or to presage the hegemony of property owners’ lobbies.
While the displacement of lower-income encouraged in the course of implementing densification 
programs is generally made a taboo, the furthering of participation and articulation options for desi-
red groups and newcomers is widely discussed and politically promoted. However, such an urban 
development strategy is far from the original aims of the compact city and considered highly unsus-
tainable as it supports social displacement and eviction of residents. In the Swiss context, results 
of the four articles show that implementing densification goals not only leaves the very housing 
situation of the lowest-income groups at risk but also that of the middle class. 
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Through consolidation and upgrading, affordable housing units are demolished and rebuilt with 
higher densities but also with the consequence of higher rents. Findings in chapters 7.4.1 and 
9.4.4 reveal that social ties in neighborhoods are being disrupted at short notice because evicted 
tenants cannot afford rental prices on the free market after contract termination anymore. Social 
aspects such as housing affordability, housing availability, or tenants’ access to decision-making are 
bypassed during the process of upgrading. Social qualities that are a city’s basis of community-ba-
sed initiatives and solidarity-creating capacities are jeopardized, which leads to social exclusion, 
gentrification, and -polarization of lower-income (particularly old-aged), but also middle class. In 
Swiss cities, this results in a way of implementing densification goals that is highly unattainable, 
especially regarding its socioeconomic consequences for the residents.
10.3 Intermediate summary
In summary, results so far show that the conditions for socially sustainable housing development in 
Swiss cities have changed in recent years due to a situation of urban land scarcity. The shift towards 
densification has strongly influenced actors’ use interests in housing and the way they activate the 
regulatory institutional regime in force. At the local level, coordination among competing housing 
uses may be improved through mutual adjustment of institutions (stronger protection of tenants’ 
rights, see key finding 1) or strategic capacity building of municipal planners (through active land 
policy, see key finding 4). However, results show that coordination in favor of socially sustainable 
densification is often impeded by the following: 
1. Key empirical finding 1: the enacted federal regulations and policy instruments hinder the re-
duction of rent levels throughout all institutional levels (also cantonal and municipal). Findings 
show that the Swiss institutional regime is characterized by strong institutional fragmentation 
– characterized by contradictions not only between public policies (e.g. energy, planning, social 
welfare), but also between public policies and property rights (that are strongly protected in 
Switzerland). This failure in introducing more socially-inclusive policy measures (e.g. quota for 
affordable housing, stricter tenure protection in case of modernization) is triggered by a general 
policy shift towards the promotion of renewable energy production regardless of its social costs 
(“Eco-Business”);
2. Key empirical finding 2: the owner-actors’ ability to strategically resist against public densifi-
cation or against tenants’ NIMBY-efforts through strategic rule activation (of property rights) 
or rule formulation (less tenure security). Moreover, owner-actors unite their forces and policy 
resources (e.g. through networks, capital, knowledge, or law) in order to prevent a backdrop 
of an overarching rule that could potentially lead to more social requirements in densification 
projects; and 
3. Key empirical finding 3: the residents and tenants‘ activst groups weak legal standing in front 
of powerful landowners. They often fail to anchor their concerns in political documents and 
legislation in a targeted manner. Legislative changes in favor of stronger tenants’ protection can 
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only be amendend in unique “windows of opportunity“ (e.g. in times of severe housing crises) 
in which tenants experience broad public and political support.
4. Key empirical finding 4: a lack of knowledge, financial capacity, and personnel of public 
planning administrations (at the federal and municipal level) to resist against owners’ interests 
and to strategically activate existing or introduce new formal rules to prevent social exclusion. 
Enforcing a change in the institutional setting may help tenants and public actors to reduce the 
rival housing uses and to boost more accurately social sustainability objectives in housing.
Chapter 11 closes with the findings answering the main research question.
159
11. Local governance for socially sustainable urban  
	 densification:	final	conclusion
Since many decades, planning and policy efforts have increased dramatically that embrace densi-
fication as key element of sustainable settlement transformation. The compact city model has been 
introduced as a global attempt to incorporate green growth objectives (e.g. energy efficiency) to 
the level of cities (e.g. Elkin et al., 1991; Frey, 1999; Newman & Kenworthy, 1999). However, this 
thesis has demonstrated that when the concept is applied to practice, the compact city solution starts 
to lose some of its gloss. 
Land-use claims in dense city areas appear diverse and contradictory. Decision-making procedures, 
for example, those meant to reduce affordable housing shortages, are complex due to intricate and 
changing small-scale ownership structures, veto rights controlled by power actors, and intertwined 
interests. To capture these use conflicts and power games among actors, this thesis has applied a 
neoinstitutionalist political ecology analysis approach – the one of the Institutional Resource Regi-
mes (IRR) – that combines theories of policy analysis (planning as a public policy), new institutio-
nal economics (property rights), and political ecology (power). It appraises densification as a politi-
cal field by analyzing the socio-political determinants of socially sustainable housing provision and 
discusses arising challenges in a more solution- and practical planning-oriented manner.
More precisely, by mobilizing the IRR conceptual framework (Knoepfel et al., 2007; Gerber et al., 
2009; Gerber et al., 2020), causal relationships between housing as a resource, institutions (both on 
the public policy and property-titles level), and involved actors’ strategies are explained. In contrast 
to other neoinstitutional analysis attempts (e.g. Ostrom, 1992; Healey, 2007; Needham et al., 2018), 
such an approach enables the researcher to recognize that many different resource users can come 
into conflict with each other and puts particular emphasis on the distinction between the charac-
teristics of public policy and property rights. It allows for a systematic analysis to examine how 
various actors behave in response to a specific socio-political setting. The IRR moreover manages 
to address issues of power, scale, politics, embeddedness, and social justice in interactions between 
humans and their environment. 
The leading question of this thesis, which is – What governance mechanisms lead to socially 
sustainable	housing	development	in	a	dense	city?	– can be answered as follows: In cities cha-
racterized by scarce land use conditions, social sustainability in housing can be achieved if local 
governance mechanisms are to be improved by the following: 
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1. by counterbalancing the weakness of federal and cantonal policies (particularly of planning, 
energy, and tenancy laws) that neglect the social pillar of sustainability in housing. This is to be 
done;
2. by introducing and/or activating more socially effective municipal policy instruments such as:
•  public control mechanisms of housing finance capital (e.g. municipal housing foundations, 
public subsidies for non-profit housing associations);
•  public control mechanisms of private land (e.g. restrictive zoning in favor of social criteria, 
provision of building leases to housing cooperatives, or public land acquisition);
•  social protection mechanisms for tenants (e.g. eviction controls, rent controls, legal protec-
tion from redevelopment or modernization).
Such policy measures (for details see Article 3) would foster stronger protection of rents and 
residents from market-dependencies and thus lead to more decommodified forms of housing.
3. by counteracting the decision-making capacity and resistance power of private property owners 
and other owner-actors (e.g. private real estate industry), who are in the legal position to resist. 
To do so, municipal authorities must approach an active land policy strategy that promotes 
decommodification of housing stocks. Besides the activation of existing or the introduction of 
new policy instruments (see previous argument), such a strategy includes city authorities’ ca-
pability and sensitivity to promote affirmative action as well as equitable resource allocation in 
order to raise political pressure and to limit profiteering. Public planning administrations must 
take the socio-economic consequences of densification seriously and start to plan for those with 
less financial means. 
Closer analysis of the shift towards active municipal land policy is presented in section 12. 
This thesis concludes that the emerging ‘Business of Densification’ in Swiss urban areas has city- 
specific implications for the integration of the urban poor and middle-classes. Insecurity of land 
tenure compounded by high prices and scarcity of land results in precarious housing forms such as 
profit-oriented temporary housing based on loaning law. Social criteria (e.g. social mixing, tenure 
security, housing affordability) are put in the background, while economic and ecological criteria 
become more prioritized. However, an urban structure in which only high-income people can con-
tinue to afford to live ultimately reduces fair distribution of, and access to life-sustaining resources 
(such as housing as a basic human need). If densification is approached only through a process of 
green gentrification (energetic modernization leading to social eviction), city sustainability will be 
put at risk. It cannot be achieved by supporting particular economic and environmental aspects at 
the cost of the social. The diminishing of one dimension affects the others. 
In other words, sustainable settlement transformation calls for “the continuous creation and re-cre-
ation of adequate patterns of social organization, within which technological progress can unfold 
properly, the use of natural resources can be managed soundly, and the social actors of development 
can participate, both individually and collectively, and can share the goals and benefits of develop-
ment” (Cernea, 1993:19). To contribute to such change, this thesis has addressed a gap in IRR re- 
161
search (e.g. Nicol & Knoepfel, 2008; Nicol, 2013; Balmer & Gerber, 2017) by more closely 
connecting housing challenges to land scarcity, and land policy debates (e.g. Davy, 2012; Kolocek, 
2017), as well as social sustainability concerns (e.g. Burton, 2000; Chiu, 2004; Bramley et al., 
2009).
The foregoing argument has shown that, unless strategic municipal governmental action is taken, 
residents and non-profit tenants’ associations will continue to remain excluded from the emerging 
“Business of Densification”. Taking into account future challenges of land scarcity that currently 
evolve in many cities, the findings of this research may help municipal planners, practitioners, and 
policy-makers to counteract trends of rising commodification in housing, and to develop new forms 
and modes of housing resource management in order to (re)organize paths of capital accumulation. 
Only by doing so, city governments will be able to adequately address social equity issues and the 
needs of the disadvantaged in a context of intergenerational resource stability both in the short and 




This thesis explores how in daily planning practice every society sets the boundaries where com-
modification begins and where it ends. It reveals that where the boundaries lie is a matter of conten-
tion. In housing, the role of institutions becomes crucial for explaining exclusion and unjust societal 
structures. Moreover, it demonstrates that the redefinition and redistribution of the rights of private 
property and the profit rate derivative entails a revolution in political-economic practices. Political 
struggles towards decommodification, and even of freedom itself, move center-stage in the search 
for alternatives. 
The four articles that constitute this thesis confirm that strategies of decommodification exist even 
in Switzerland, a state representing the very core of advanced capitalist economies. Even though 
results confirm that marketization and commodification of housing are not going to go away – what 
urban practitioners, local politicians, civic organizations, and other public and private stakeholders 
must find are more collective forms of governance and housing production so that densification 
processes respond to the needs of the public at large rather than simply catering to private individu-
als and firms. 
To accomplish this aim, municipal planning authorities, first, can promote the introduction of new 
policy instruments to make densification more socially sensitive. Such instruments include, for 
instance, a quota for affordable housing, public subsidies for non-profit housing cooperatives, or 
social eviction controls (Article 3). However, the introduction of new rules presents by no means 
a panacea. Instead, making densification more socially sustainable is strongly influenced by the 
strategic ability of public administrators to familiarize themselves with all existing intervention 
possibilities. 
Second, effort should therefore be made to properly activate existing instruments in force, for 
instance, zoning regulations. In the case of Switzerland, some municipalities (e.g. Zurich, Köniz) 
have indeed allocated plots of their land to non-profit foundations or cooperatives on favorable 
terms. By following the cost rent principle, these social organizations offer dwellings at lower 
prices than those determined by the free market. In Basel, moreover, municipal authorities have 
started to negotiate the terms and conditions of (re)development via public-private-partnerships 
(contracts). Such action could become more generalized to integrate social equity goals more effec-
tively into concrete densification projects. Planning authorities need to initiate a more project-ori-
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ented approach (rather than plans only) and collaborative approaches (rather than hierarchical 
organizations) to cope with social challenges. However, it must also be noted that there are risks as-
sociated with project planning as well. The most important one is the issue of equality of treatment 
of different stakeholders involved in the planning process – which local planning administrations 
need to be aware of when entering a new project. 
Third, making densification more socially sensitive presents a matter of political will for social 
sustainability. To promote institutional change or to legitimize a proactive land acquisition strategy 
in favor of tenants’ social inclusion, broad political support is needed. However, local politicians 
often regard offending private investors’ plans as too risky for the municipality’s financial situation. 
In such situations, it takes all	the	finesse	and	professional	competencies	of municipal planning 
administrations and politicians (e.g. expert knowledge, financial resources, networks, personnel) 
to promote social aspects, because landowners have the power to defend the status quo with strong 
veto rights. So, even though community cohesion and residential stability are widely acknowled-
ged as important components for urban livability, there is still a risk of downplaying this aspect in 
daily densification practice. Here, municipal authorities are in a key position to take responsibility 
in order to include local ideas about community stability and cohesion and to encode them into land 
use regulations. 
Forth, municipal planning needs to be sensitive to the potentially disruptive impacts of densifica-
tion on local identity and diverse ways of living. This thesis advocates for planners and policy-ma-
kers to consider social sustainability criteria (e.g. affordability, cohesion) in order to address more 
accurately potential trade-offs between economic, environmental, and social concerns of densifica-
tion. Planning processes should not be limited to actors with the right of appeal but should include 
all affected actors such as residents of different age, income, or nationality. To ensure the inclusion 
of local knowledge and inhabitants’ social mix, municipal planners should encourage owners to 
share and to discuss ideas about up-coming projects or dismissal trials before owners submit the 
building application so that formal facts and procedures are not created beforehand. 
Finally, it must be noted that, even though local planners are theoretically able to intervene into 
strong market forces, the decision is not only up to them. Their action depends on whether there is 
political will for such an intervention strategy, which is – particularly in the Swiss liberal context 
– often not the case. This said, chapter twelve has outlined for municipal authorities four possible 
intervention ways how to intervene strategically and actively into housing densification procedures. 
It therefore demonstrates how it might be worth at least a try to follow these paths for creating a 
more socially sensitive and inclusive city. 
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13. Theoretical and methodological limitations
This thesis has some theoretical and methodological limitations that need to be addressed in order 
to critically reflect upon the results. From a theoretical perspective, a challenge in using the IRR 
was to uncover the strategies behind specific actions taken and to make them visible. Depending on 
the institutional background, stakeholders are considered to have different means to either change 
these dimensions or to influence others to do so. An interdependent relationship between the actors 
and the institutional structure is assumed although this interaction is sometimes limited (particular 
in regard to informal networks). To counteract these ambiguities, my work mostly followed a po-
licy instrument-focused approach to make the applied strategies graspable in the format of the tools 
activated. The way actors aimed to achieve particular goals became visible by analyzing how and 
why they activated specific formal rules (e.g. zoning or property rights).
Moreover, the social sustainability indicators introduced in this thesis (e.g. in Article 2) are conside-
red a useful approach to evaluate housing use conflicts in dense cities. By developing a deeper un-
derstanding for the multi-faced processes that housing under scarce land use conditions is confron-
ted with, my attempt was to connect consolidation with on-going debates of social exclusion and 
gentrification. In addition, my goal was to connect the concept of social sustainability with the IRR 
framework that allows for a systematic analysis of social challenges in dense urban environments. 
However, it must be noted that the indicators introduced do not fully present the complete picture. 
Each process is only a part of the complex whole constituting the city. Great attention is needed for 
the transferability of such norms and perspectives of social sustainability and its physical adequacy. 
The evaluative model provides potential for the application to, for example, other households living 
in existing housing stocks. Nevertheless, the extent to which the criteria can be compared to other 
cases with different policy and housing market contexts needs to be assessed. Within the wider 
Swiss situation, for instance, authentic commitment to social sustainability in housing would need 
to be reflected in national and local approaches and directives that move beyond rhetoric. While 
this research project attempts to provide a theoretical basis for a more comprehensive land-use-
planning policy, more work will need to be performed to empirically apply the proposed evaluative 
criteria so as to evaluate different policy instruments from various stakeholders‘ perspectives. 
Conclusory, by applying the IRR analytical framework, this thesis has evaluated social challenges 
in dense urban environments by combining concepts from public policy analysis (planning as a pu-
blic policy), new institutional economics (property rights), and political ecology (power). Making 
explicit the local governance mechanisms of possible sustainability trade-offs and power games 
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among actors in densification procedures is a new contribution of this research project to neoinsti-
tutionalist political ecology research. Indeed, the differentiated discussion of the results shows that 
combining these concepts has led to new insights in critical environmental studies as: a)	power 
structures were systematically detected by adding a neoinstitutionalist perspective to political eco-
logy research, and	b)	power structures were explicitly discussed rather than as an integral part of 
public policy analysis. 
This combination has led to results showing that depending on the institutional background, stake-
holders have different means to either change the formal rules in force or try to influence others to 
do so. These governance mechanisms are at the same time the channels through which stakeholders 
exercise power. However, further research is needed to refine these concepts (e.g. by integrating a 
Foucauldian or feminist political ecology perspective) to enable analyzing how exactly stakeholders 
make use of these ‘power channels’, and what factors increase their effectiveness in relation to their 
institutional background means. 
From a methodological perspective, the case studies employed in Articles 1-4 provide in-depth 
insights into actors’ behavior and regulatory regimes shaping residential densification. Even though 
results are limited to Switzerland (and findings should only be generalized to other cases with cau-
tion), potential for generalization to other states and cities results from the identified causal mecha-
nisms (key findings 1 to 5), the relevance of which is expected to be broader than in the analyzed 
cases only. Through the clear description of the research setting, the reasons for case selection, the 
deductively developed research approach, as well as the critical discussion of the methods conduc-
ted (section 4), the validity of the results of this thesis is clearly outlined. 
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14.	Densification,	IRR,	and	beyond:	
 implications for future research
This dissertation raises further interesting questions. Even though densification has become a core 
objective of policy agendas across the globe, critical analysis of its socio-political limitations, 
challenges, and contradictions, particularly concerning its impacts on tenants from a social sustain-
ability perspective, was largely missing when this research project started. It would therefore be 
interesting to initiate an international comparative study in order to compare the Swiss case with 
other examples in different state cotexts. For example, to investigate if and how housing stocks are 
affected by densification measures in other urban contexts in order to understand how the process is 
negotiated and governed in different state settings. 
In particular, further research is needed to analyze the	burgeoning	field	of	research	on	land	po-
licy in planning. In particular, how different stakeholders make use of certain institutional rules or 
policy instruments, and what factors increase their effectiveness in defending their interests. While 
much literature so far has focused on individual policy instruments (e.g. urban growth boundaries), 
the strategic combination of different instruments to reach particular densification goals still needs 
to be empirically further analyzed and theoretically conceptualized. 
For example, it would be interesting to focus more on the role of the investors and how they recog- 
nize existing power relations and institutional mechanisms that regulate their access to housing in 
densifying cities. Decisions on the acquisition and sale of parcels, housing and building stocks, or 
building rights are primarily made by the head management of large investment firms. Mainly in 
the person of the portfolio manager, but under the supervision of the board members. To promote 
meaningful engagement with diverse local stakeholders and interests, it is necessary for owners to 
become more socially responsible. However, the question still remains how exactly and in what 
kind of setting. The operations, motivations, and funding structures of housing investment compa-
nies should therefore be analyzed in greater detail. Actions should also be designed to encourage 
each type of landownership (public, cooperative, private) to use their room for maneuvering to 
promote social sustainability in housing. 
By applying the IRR analytical framework, this thesis has tried to evaluate these questions by using 
concepts from public policy analysis (planning as a public policy), new institutional economics 
(property rights), and political ecology (power), as well as by applying a qualitative case study 
methodology. Further cross-fertilization between different academic stands and methodological 
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approaches can offer new insights into on-going debates such as multi-level governance or rural 
densification. For instance, a more quantitative approach to evaluating socio-spatial differences, 
room stress of households, or socio-economic effets of densification could provide inspiration for 
further study of such issues as what are the housing needs for different groups or individuals. 
Moreover, it is imperative that qualitative empirical research be brought to bear on issues, such as 
the extent to which there are disproportionate housing risks borne by specific groups of people.  
Actions taken on behalf of environmental sustainability – such as the policy shifts towards the 
compact city model – have a consequence on the environment and the people. Especially but not 
exclusively the disadvantaged. More must be learned about those effects so that residents who are 
likely to be overlooked become more included into decision-making procedures. Because one thing 
we have learned in this thesis: only a socially inclusive city is also a sustainable city. 
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Nr. Date Role Profile	of	the	interviewee
1 06.01.2015 Temporary user Female, 25 years, student
2 06.01.2015 Temporary user Male, 26 years, student
3 07.01.2015 Cooperative property owner “Baugenossenschaft Eidgenössisches Perso-
nal”, cooperative property owner
4 08.01.2015 Director of a non-profit mediator 
agency
In German: “Jugendwohnnetz” - the housing 
network for young people
5 10.01.2015 Temporary user Male, 32 years, employee in tourism indu- 
stry
6 12.01.2015 Temporary user Male, 27 years, architect
7 12.01.2015 Director of a non-profit mediator 
agency
In German: “Studentische Wohngenossen-
schaft” - non-profit housing cooperative
8 16.01.2015 Private property owner Male, 69 years, individual property owner
9 17.01.2015 Temporary user Male, 25 years, student
10 17.01.2015 Temporary user Single mother with two children, 42 years, 
employee in cleaning industry
11 21.01.2015 Director of a non-profit mediator 
agency
Domicil foundation
12 28.01.2015 Cooperative property owner “Baugenossenschaft Limmattal”, coopera- 
tive property owner
13 28.01.2015 Temporary user Male, 32-years, working as cook and free-
lancer, living together with his wife and his 
one-year old boy
14 30.01.2015 Institutional property owner “Sansara”, institutional property owner
15 30.01.2015 Real-estate management firm Employee and team leader in the private 
firm “Livit“ (joint stock company)
16 20.02.2015 Local homeowners’ association 
(NGO)
Employee and expert in housing issues
17 20.02.2015 CEO of a for-profit mediator agency Projekt Interim (limited company)
18 20.02.2015 Institutional property owner, Helvetia 
insurance
Institutional property owner
19 12.03.2015 Private property owner Female, 39 years, private property owner
20 06.05.2015 Politician of the local legislative 
parliament
Member of the green party, expert in tempo-
rary use and housing
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21 27.08.2018 Federal Office for Spatial Planning, 
Department for Sustainable Settle-
ment Development
Head of Department
22 29.08.2018 Federal Office for Housing Director
23 13.08.2018 Federal Office for Energy, Department 
for Sustainable Housing
Employee at the Department for Sustainable 
Energy in Housing
24 28.08.2018 Swiss homeowners’ association Director
25 14.08.2018 Swiss tenants’ association Director
26 27.08.2018 Swiss association of the building 
industry
Director
27 05.09.2018 Swiss association of institutional 
investors
Director
28 14.08.2018 Member of national council Member of the Green Party
29 15.08.2019 City of Kloten, Head of Planning 
Department
City planner
30 17.09.2018 Member of national council, President 
of the Swiss Cities’ Association
Member of the Liberal Party (FDP)
31 18.04.2019 Zurich local tenants’ association 
(NGO)
Head of the association and politician in the 
local legislative parliament
32 18.04.2019 Politician of the local legislative 
parliament
Member of the alternative party, expert in 
housing issues
33 24.04.2019 CEO of a for-profit mediator agency Novac Solutions (joint stock company)
34 26.04.2019 CEO of a For-profit mediator agency Intermezzo (joint stock comapny)
35 03.05.2019 City of Zurich, Housing Department Employee and expert in housing issues, 
Head of the residential housing section and 
expert in non-profit housing provision
36 28.05.2019 City of Kloten, Head of Social Welfa-
re Department
Expert in housing issues and social welfare
37 13.06.2019 Brunaupark’s local tenants’ associati-
on (NGO)
President of the association and resident in 
Brunaupark
38 26.06.2019 Basel local tenants’ association Head of the association, Expert in housing 
issues and tenancy law
39 08.07.2019 Credit Suisse pension fund Zurich Portfolio manager 
40 31.07.2019 City of Zurich, Department for Urban 
Development
Employee and expert in housing issues
41 20.08.2019 Basel-City, Urban Development and 
Housing Department
Head of the urban development department
42 20.08.2019 City of Köniz, Head of Planning 
Department
City planner
43 12.09.2019 Credit Suisse asset management Basel Portfolio manager
44 20.09.2019 Basel-City, Planning Department City planner
45 24.10.2019 City of Zurich, Head of Planning 
Department
Head of Planning Department
46 18.04.2019 Resident, Köniz Nessleren Male, 45 years old, lawyer
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47 24.04.2019 Resident, Kloten Southern district Female, 72 years old, retired
48 13.06.2019 Resident, Köniz Nessleren Female, 32 years old, housewife
49 26.06.2019 City of Basel, Hirzbrunnen district 
office
Head of district office
50 30.07.2019 Resident, Kloten southern district Female, 66 years old, retired
51 20.08.2019 Institutional investor, Previs private 
foundation
Portfolio manager
52 05.09.2019 Institutional investor, Helvetia in-
surance
Portfolio manager
53 05.09.2019 Care worker for elderly residents in 
Basel Schorenweg
Social worker and nurse
54 09.09.2019 Institutional investor, Kloten CEO of private firm
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Die Wohnungsfrage ist eine Bodenfrage
Bodenpolitische Instrumente zur Sicherstellung
des preisgünstigen Wohnraums im Bestand
in Schweizer Städten
Gabriela Debrunner, Andreas Hengstermann und Jean-David Gerber
Die im Frühjahr 2019 geführte Enteignungsdebatte1 in Deutschland zeigt, dass ei-
ne passive Planung, die rein auf die Wohnungsversorgung durch den Markt ver-
traut, in der Wahrnehmung eines zunehmend großen Bevölkerungsanteils nicht
ausreicht. Die politische Forderung nach einer aktiven kommunalen Bodenpoli-
tik wird in vielen westeuropäischen Städten immer lauter (vgl. Vollmer/Kadi 2018;
Deleja-Hotko et al. 2019). Zu stark sind die städtischen Mieten in den letzten bei-
den Jahrzehnten gestiegen und zu prekär ist die Wohnsituation insbesondere im
preisgünstigen Segment (UN Habitat 2016; Schönig et al. 2017).
In Schweizer Städten ist preisgünstiger Wohnraum für untere und mittlere
Einkommen nicht nur aufgrund der steigenden Nachfrage zu einer knappen Res-
source geworden (BWO 2016b). Zudem ist auf Bundesebene am 01. Mai 2014 die
Revision des Raumplanungsgesetzes (RPG) zugunsten der »Innenentwicklung« in
Kraft getreten. Diese verpflichtet die 26 Kantone und über 2000 Gemeinden nun
deutlich strenger dazu, die Entwicklung ihrer Siedlungen »unter der Berücksich-
tigung einer angemessenen Wohnqualität nach innen zu lenken« (Art. 1 § 2 lit. abis
RPG). Dabei ist Verdichtung als Prozess zu verstehen, welcher innerhalb bestehen-
der Gemeindegrenzen zu einer Erhöhung der Anzahl von Personen auf gleicher
Fläche führen soll (Saglie 1998), und zwar mit dem politischen Ziel, Zersiedlung zu
stoppen und Landwirtschaftsland zu schützen (Gennaio et al. 2009). Das Bauen
auf der »grünen Wiese« außerhalb der bestehenden Siedlungsgrenzen gehört da-
mit der Vergangenheit an und auch freistehende innerstädtische Industriebrachen
sind in Schweizer Städten bereits weitestgehend überbaut (Nebel et al. 2017). Das
zukünftige Bevölkerungswachstum und die damit verbundene steigende Nachfra-
ge nach Wohnraum werden aufgrund des Gesetzes zur Innenentwicklung deshalb
1 Siehe dazu eingereichteVolksinitiative »DeutscheWohnen&Co. enteignen« imSenat Berlin.
Annex	2:	Article	5	(not	peer-reviewed)
Debrunner, G., Hengstermann, A. and Gerber, J.D. (2020): Die Wohnungsfrage ist eine Bodenfra-
ge. Bodenpolitische Instrumente zur Sicherstellung des preisgünstigen Wohnraums im Bestand in 
Schweizer Städten. In: Schönig, B.; Vollmer, Lisa (Hrsg.), Wohnungsfragen ohne Ende?! Ressour-
cen für eine soziale Wohnraumversorgung, Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, pp. 49-68.
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zunehmend durch eine Verdichtung imBestand aufgefangenwerdenmüssen, kon-
kret also über die Umnutzung, Aufstockung, Erneuerung oder den Abriss undNeu-
bau von bestehenden Gebäuden (Schweizer Bundesrat 2017).
Diese Form der Umsetzung von Verdichtungsbestrebungen birgt hingegen
soziale Risiken, insbesondere für Mieter/-innen des profitorientierten Miet-
wohnungssektors. In der Schweiz, einem liberalen Staat par excellence (Lawson
2009: 26), beträgt dieser Anteil in den Städten rund 63 Prozent des Gesamtwoh-
nungsbestandes (BWO 2017): Werden bestehende Wohnungen nun aufgrund von
Verdichtungsmaßnahmen saniert, umgebaut, abgerissen und neu aufgebaut,
ist dieser bauliche Eingriff häufig mit einer Mietpreissteigerung in Folge der
Modernisierung und Aufwertung verknüpft (BWO 2016a). Ansässige Bewoh-
ner/-innen können sich vielfach die steigenden Mieten nach Verdichtung und
Erneuerung nicht mehr leisten und müssen in Gebiete außerhalb der Städte
ziehen. Betroffen von sozialer Verdrängung sind insbesondere solche Haushalte,
welche in Wohnungen des profitorientierten Mietwohnungsmarktes leben, da
dort die Mietpreissteigerung – im Gegensatz zu nicht-gewinnorientierten Wohn-
bauträgern wie Genossenschaften – nach Verdichtung am höchsten ist und keine
Alternativwohnungen zur Verfügung gestellt werden müssen (BWO 2016b). Als
Folge dieser sozialen Exklusionsprozesse haben Widerstandsbewegungen gegen
Verdichtungsprojekte in Schweizer Städten in den letzten Jahren zugenommen
(Maissen 2018).
Viele Schweizer Kommunen haben inzwischen den Weg zugunsten der För-
derung des preisgünstigen Wohnraums über bodenpolitische Instrumente einge-
schlagen, z. B. über den Kauf von Bauland oder die Abgabe von Land im Erbbau-
recht2, insbesondere an Genossenschaften. Tatsächlichmachen öffentliche und ge-
nossenschaftliche Wohnungsbestände in Schweizer Städten – abgesehen von den
weit bekannten Leuchtturmprojekten wie z. B. Zürich und Basel – durchschnittlich
nur fünf Prozent des städtischen Wohnungsbestandes aus (BWO 2017). Genossen-
schaften verfügen zudem über lange Wartelisten und die zu bezahlenden Anteils-
scheine können sich viele der Wohnungssuchenden nicht leisten (Balmer/Gerber
2017). Sie sind deshalb angewiesen auf eine Wohnung im profitorientierten Miet-
wohnungsmarkt, wo sie wiederum von Verdichtung und Gentrifizierung akut be-
droht sind.Hinzu kommt, dass diesesWohnsegment gleichzeitig Zielobjekt für das
2 Im schweizerischen Kontext wird das »Erbbaurecht« mit dem Instrument des »Baurechts«
übersetzt. Dabei bleibt die Gemeinde Grundbesitzerin, während das Eigentum am Gebäude
für bis zu 99 Jahre auf einen Dritten übertragen wird (z. B. Wohnbaugenossenschaft). Eine
solcheöffentlich-privatePartnerschaft zwischender Stadt undeinemBauherrn führt nicht zu
einer direkten Subventionierung von Wohnungen, sondern setzt auf günstige Konditionen,
die von öffentlichen Akteuren angeboten werden (z. B. Darlehen) (Gerber et al. 2017).
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Renditeinteresse institutioneller Investoren – z. B. Banken, Versicherungen, Anla-
gefonds, Pensionskassen – darstellt. Anders als die Bewohner/-innen selbst, sehen
diese in Wohnraum kein Grundbedürfnis oder eine essentielle Ressource, sondern
eine potentielle Investitionsmöglichkeit, insbesondere in städtischen Zentren, wo
die Nachfrage konstant hoch ist und deshalb keine zusätzlichen Anlagerisiken ein-
gegangen werden müssen (Aalbers 2017).
Umso wichtiger erscheint es uns in diesem Artikel, die Rolle der öffentlichen
Hand im Konkurrenzkampf um die Nutzung der »Ressource Wohnraum« bei Ver-
dichtung zu analysieren. Konkret verfolgen wir das Ziel, die Rolle kommunaler
bodenpolitischer Instrumente zugunsten des preisgünstigen Wohnraums im Be-
stand aufzuzeigen und zu diskutieren.Heterogene Eigentumsstrukturen und stark
divergierende Partikularinteressen machen die Bestandsverdichtung – insbeson-
dere im Hinblick auf den Erhalt von preisgünstigem Wohnraum – zu einer der
schwierigsten Aufgabe der Schweizer Raumplanung in den nächsten Jahrzehnten.
Wir wollen deshalb bereits heute auf mögliche Handlungsmechanismen für Kom-
munen aufmerksam machen. Wir fragen:
1. Mit welchen bodenpolitischen Instrumenten stellen Schweizer Gemeinden
preisgünstigen Wohnraum im Bestand sicher?
2. Wo liegen die sozio-politischen Herausforderungen bei der Anwendung dieser
bodenpolitischen Instrumente bei Verdichtung im Bestand?
Umdiese Fragen zu beantworten, gehen wir in diesem Artikel wie folgt vor: Erstens
definieren wir ein für das Verständnis von preisgünstigem Wohnraum im Kon-
text der Innentwicklung grundlegendes theoretisches Konzept – die »Bodenpoli-
tik«. Wir differenzieren zwischen aktiver und passiver Bodenpolitik. Zudem füh-
ren wir vier Kriterien ein, welche zur Bewertung bodenpolitischer Instrumente in
der Praxis herangezogen werden können. Zweitens präsentieren wir die Resulta-
te einer umfassenden Dokumentenanalyse zum Thema »Verdichtung und Wohn-
raumentwicklung« in der Schweiz. Das Ergebnis ist eine Zusammenstellung der
in Schweizer Gemeinden vorhandenen bodenpolitischen Instrumente zugunsten
des preisgünstigen Wohnraums bei Bestandsverdichtung. Abschließend diskutie-
ren wir diese Instrumente im Hinblick auf deren sozio-politische Herausforde-
rungen bei der Umsetzung in der Praxis. Der Artikel liefert somit einen wertvollen
und zukunftsorientierten Beitrag zur Wohnungs- und Bodenfrage im Kontext der
Verdichtung im Bestand in Städten.
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Die Wohnungsfrage ist eine Bodenfrage.
Das Konzept der Bodenpolitik im Kontext der Verdichtung
Die Sicherstellung von Wohnraum für alle Einkommenssegmente ist laut Artikel
25 der UN-Menschenrechtskonvention3 ein Grundbedürfnis. Die Wohnraumnut-
zung ist aber – insbesondere im Kontext der Verdichtung – abhängig von der
knapper werdenden »Ressource Boden«. Dies, weil einerseits die Mieten steigen,
wenn die Bodennachfrage pro gleicher Fläche und der damit korrespondierende
Bodenwert zunehmen. Andererseits kann insbesondere die Bestandsverdichtung
zu einer Mietpreissteigerung führen, weil sie mit einer Aufwertung der bestehen-
den Gebäude verknüpft ist, woraufhin die Bodenrente und die Mietpreise ebenfalls
steigen (Stone 2006).
Bodenpolitik ist in diesem Zusammenhang definiert als »die Gesamtheit aller
staatlichen Entscheidungen und Handlungen, welche darauf abzielen, den Wert,
die Nutzung und die Verteilung des Bodens zur Erreichung eines bestimmten
räumlichen Zwecks zu verändern« (Hengstermann/Gerber 2015). Diese aktive
Definition von Bodenpolitik unterscheidet sich von einer passiven Bodenpolitik
(siehe z. B. Davy 2005) insofern, als dass es nicht nur darum geht, ob die Boden-
nutzung verändert wird (passiv), sondern insbesondere auch darum, warum bzw.
mit welchem räumlichen Entwicklungsziel (aktiv).
Die staatlichen Eingriffe können dabei über öffentlich-rechtliche oder privat-
rechtliche Instrumente erfolgen (Hood 1983; Hood/Margetts 2007). Instrumente
sind definiert als »die Art der Intervention oder die Maßnahmen, die vorgesehen
sind, um die Ziele einer öffentlichen Politik zu verwirklichen« (Knoepfel et al. 2011:
181).
Die Unterscheidung zwischen öffentlich- und privatrechtlich ist deshalb wich-
tig, weil diese zwei Arten bodenpolitischer Instrumente sich in ihrer Anwendung
und Umsetzung mit unterschiedlichen sozio-politischen Herausforderungen in
der planerischen Praxis konfrontiert sehen:
• Öffentlich-rechtliche Instrumente sind die Maßnahmen einer öffentlichen Politik,
die darauf abzielt ein öffentliches Problem, welches von den staatlichen Behör-
den als solches definiert wurde, zu lösen, z. B. die Zersiedlung durch Verdich-
tung zu stoppen. Durch die Anwendung öffentlich-rechtlicher Instrumente er-
hält der Staat die hoheitlichen Befugnisse, die Handlungen derjenigen Akteure,
von denen angenommen wird, dass sie die Ursache des Problems darstellen,
im Namen des öffentlichen Interesses zu beeinflussen. Zudem werden öffent-
liche Politiken und Instrumente laufend überarbeitet und verändert. Nicht nur,
3 Die »Universal Declaration of Human Rights« wurde am 10. Dezember 1948 durch die Gene-
ralversammlung der Vereinten Nationen verabschiedet.
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weil sich das Problem, auf das sie abzielen, laufend ändert, sondern auch, weil
wechselnde politische Mehrheiten alternative Lösungen für das Problem vor-
schlagen (Knoepfel et al. 2011). Angewendet auf das in diesem Artikel disku-
tierte öffentliche Problem des Erhalts preisgünstiger Mieten im Kontext der
Bestandsverdichtung sind unterschiedliche öffentliche Politiken mit verschie-
denen Bereichen des öffentlichen Rechts an der Lösung des Problems beteiligt.
Nebst dem Planungsrecht, welches die Bodennutzung direkt reguliert, wirken
unter anderem auch das Energierecht (z. B. bei Vorgaben zu energetischen Sa-
nierungen im Mietwohnsegment), das Steuerrecht (z. B. bei Steuerabzügen)
oder der Denkmalschutz (z. B. bei Schutz vor Abriss) regulierend auf die Bo-
dennutzung ein.
• Privatrechtliche Instrumente regeln die Beziehung zwischen zwei rechtlich gleich-
gestellten Subjekten. Staatliche Organe können dabei in hoheitlicher Funkti-
on auftreten und in dieser Rolle die Eigentumsrechte beschützen. Anderer-
seits kann der Staat auch als einfaches Rechtssubjekt auftreten und selbst pri-
vatrechtliche Instrumente anwenden (Hengstermann 2018). Im Kontext der
Verdichtung werden privatrechtliche Instrumente (u.a. Eigentumsrechte, pri-
vatrechtliche Verträge, Erbbaurechte, Mietrecht) besonders relevant. So kön-
nen Behörden die Entscheidung von Grundeigentümer/-innen, ob die Mieten
nach Verdichtung erhöht werden oder nicht, zwar beeinflussen, z. B. mit ge-
zielten Eingriffen über die Raumplanung. Letztendlich liegt es jedoch in der
Entscheidungs- und Verfügungsgewalt der Eigentümer/-innen selbst, über die
Höhe der Renditen auf ihren Grundstücken zu entscheiden (Marcuse 1998; Bui-
telaar/Needham 2007). Auch werden neue planerische Rahmenbedingungen
– wie z. B. die Neuaufstellung des Flächennutzungsplans – nur dann um-
gesetzt, wenn Eigentümer/-innen den Entwicklungsvorhaben zustimmen. So-
lange Eigentümer/-innen ihre Parzelle nicht entwickeln wollen, wird der Plan
nicht umgesetzt (Gerber et al. 2017). In der Schweiz schützt die Verfassung das
»Recht auf Eigentum« als ein Grundrecht (Art. 22 BV), das nur eingeschränkt
werden kann, wenn erstens eine Rechtsgrundlage und ein überwiegendes öf-
fentliches Interesse bestehen, zweitens dieMaßnahme verhältnismäßig ist und
drittens eine volle Entschädigung gezahlt wird (Art. 5; Art. 36 Abs. 1-3; Art. 26
Abs. X BV). Im Rahmen dieser Rechtsordnung können Eigentümer/-innen ei-
ner Parzelle beliebig über diese verfügen.
Aktive kommunale bodenpolitische Strategien zeichnen sich dadurch aus, dass so-
wohl öffentlich-rechtliche als auch privatrechtliche Instrumente verwendet wer-
den. Anders als bei der passiven Bodennutzungsplanung umfasst dies auch eigen-
tumsrechtliche Instrumente wie z. B. Bodenbevorratung und die Vergabe in Erb-
pacht (Hengstermann 2018).
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Bewertungskriterien bodenpolitischer Instrumente
Selbst wenn Kommunen in der Lage sind, bodenpolitische Instrumente zur Errei-
chung eines bestimmten räumlichen Entwicklungsziels anzuwenden, bleiben of-
fene Fragen: Wie wirksam ist beispielsweise ein bodenpolitisches Instrument im
Hinblick auf die Erreichung eines bestimmten räumlichen Entwicklungsziels?Wel-
che Auswirkungen haben solche Ansätze auf andere Fachpolitiken, z. B. auf das Ge-
meindebudget? Und wie kann durch die Anwendung dieser Instrumente insbeson-
dere die bezahlbare Wohnraumversorgung für die ärmsten Bevölkerungsgruppen
sichergestellt werden?
Die Beantwortung dieser Fragen gibt schlussendlich Auskunft darüber, wie es
um das preisgünstigeWohnraumangebot im Kontext der Bestandsverdichtung ak-
tuell steht. Die folgenden Bewertungskriterien bodenpolitischer Instrumente kön-
nen voneinander unterschieden werden (Hartmann/Spit 2015):
• Wirksamkeit beschreibt, ob durch den Einsatz eines Instruments das ge-
wünschte Nutzungsziel im gewünschten Zeitraum, im richtigen Moment
und ohne Auslösung zusätzlicher Nutzungskonflikte erreicht werden kann
(Needham 2007).
• Kosten (kurzfristig) beschreiben den Umfang der finanziellen Belastung, die bei
der Gemeinde kurzfristig durch das Ergreifen einer Maßnahme entstehen
(ebd. 2014).
• Kosteneinsparnisse (langfristig) beschreiben die Höhe der finanziellen Kostenein-
sparnisse, welche bei der Gemeinde langfristig durch das Ergreifen einer Maß-
nahme entstehen (Knoepfel et al. 2011; Needham 2014).
• Soziale Gerechtigkeit beschreibt, wie die Rechte, Positionen und Handlungsmög-
lichkeiten – insbesondere im Hinblick auf die Inklusion der ärmsten Bevölke-
rungsgruppen – durch den Einsatz dieses Instruments gestärkt werden (Rawls
2005).
Alle diese Kriterien dienen der Modellierung. In der planungspraktischen Realität
ist eine Vielzahl von weiteren Abstufungen und Varianten zu beobachten.
Kommunale bodenpolitische Instrumente zur Sicherstellung
des preisgünstigen Wohnraums bei Verdichtung im Bestand
in Schweizer Städten
In Abbildung 1 sind kommunale bodenpolitische Instrumente zugunsten des preis-
günstigen Wohnraums im Bestand – analysiert anhand von Schweizer Gemeinden
– dargestellt. Die aufgelisteten Instrumente in Abbildung und Tabelle 1 stammen
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aus der Analyse von fünf nationalen Forschungsberichten sowie den Aussagen aus
neun Expert/-innen-Interviews.4
 
Abbildung 1: Kommunale bodenpolitische Instrumente zur Sicherstellung des preisgünstigen
Wohnraums bei Verdichtung im Bestand – dargestellt anhand von Schweizer Gemeinden.
Quelle: Eigene Darstellung.
Anmerkung: Das Instrument des »Vorkaufsrechts« kann sowohl öffentlich- als auch privat-
rechtlich sein: öffentlich-rechtlich, wenn in der kommunalen Bau- und Zonenordnung ein
Vorkaufsrecht, z. B. zugunsten gemeinnütziger Wohnbauträger festgehalten wird, privat-
rechtlich, wenn ein Vorkaufsrecht in der Praxis über die Unterzeichnung von Verträgen zwi-
schen zwei Privatpersonen erfolgt, d.h. über eine vertragliche Einigung zwischen zwei Privat-
personen.
Die Auflistung und Einschätzung der Instrumente ist nicht als abschließend zu
bewerten, sondern entspricht dem aktuellen Forschungsstand über die Schweiz.
4 Insgesamt wurden fünf nationale Forschungsberichte (Schweizerischer Städteverband 2013;
BWO 2014, 2016a; Schweizer Bundesrat 2017, 2018), sowie nationale Gesetzestexte, politi-
sche Strategie- und Positionspapiere, Protokolle politischer Debatten sowie neun Interviews
mit Expert/-innen auf Bundesebene zum Thema der Wohnraumentwicklung im Kontext
der Bestandsverdichtung in der Schweiz ausgewertet. Die Expert/-innen hatten die folgen-
den Funktionen: Präsident des Schweizerischen Mieterverbands, Präsidentin des Schweize-
rischen Verbands der Bauwirtschaft, Präsident des Schweizerischen Verbands der institutio-
nellen Investoren, Leiter der Abteilung »Nachhaltiges Sanieren« beim Bundesamt für Ener-
gie, Direktor des Bundesamtes für Wohnungswesen sowie der Leiter der Abteilung »Sied-
lung und Landschaft« beim Bundesamt für Raumentwicklung. Zusätzlich wurden zwei Bun-
desparlamentarier (Grüne, FDP), welche über hohe Fachkenntnisse zum Thema verfügen,
befragt.
• Zonen- und Nutzungsplan
• Zonen für preisgünstigen Wohnraum; 














• Mietverträge mit Vergabekriterien
Öffentlich-rechtliche Instrumente Privatrechtliche Instrumente
Bodenpolitische Instrumente
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Abhängig von den lokalen Bedingungen kann es ortsspezifische Abweichungen
und/oder Ergänzungen zu den einzelnen Instrumenten geben.
Tabelle 1 (s. Anhang dieses Beitrags) ist eine Einschätzung der vorhandenen
kommunalen bodenpolitischen Instrumente zur Sicherstellung des preisgünstigen
Wohnraums im Bestand in Schweizer Gemeinden entlang der vier in der Litera-
tur beschriebenen Bewertungskriterien (siehe oben). Es geht in der Analyse nicht
darum abschließend zu bewerten, ob und wie genau ein Plan bzw. ein Instrument
umgesetzt werden kann, sondern darum, die Folgen der Umsetzung eines Instru-
ments zu beurteilen. Ziel ist es, die einzelnen in Abbildung 1 dargestellten Instru-
mente in Tabelle 1 näher vorzustellen und die Bewertung derselben exemplarisch
durchzuspielen.
Diskussion und Schlussfolgerung: Wie weiter mit dem preisgünstigen
Wohnraumangebot in dichter werdenden Schweizer Städten?
Die obige Analyse zeigt, welche der vorhandenen bodenpolitischen Instrumente in
der Schweiz die gewünschte Wirkung – nämlich den Erhalt preisgünstigen Wohn-
raums im Bestand – unter Berücksichtigung des Gemeindehaushalts und der so-
zialen Gerechtigkeit erzielen und welche nicht. Obwohl die vier Indikatoren bei
vielen der dargelegten Instrumente erfüllt sind (konkret bei Mechanismen wie z.
B. Zonierung, Mehrwertausgleich oder Quoten), scheint die Umsetzung dieser In-
strumente in der schweizerischen Planungspraxis dennoch zu scheitern. Wir wol-
len die Gründe dafür diskutieren.
Die Sicherstellung preisgünstiger Mieten im Bestand bedarf strategischen
Verhandlungsgeschicks kommunaler Planungsbehörden
Aus der Sicht öffentlicher Akteure bedarf die Entwicklung einer aktiven bodenpoli-
tischen Strategie zugunsten des preisgünstigen Wohnraums im Bestand viel Zeit,
da hierfür politischer Konsens (primäre Legitimation) notwendig ist. Nur wenn
das Ziel – d.h. die Bekämpfung der Wohnungsknappheit im preisgünstigen Seg-
ment – über mehrere Legislaturperioden verfolgt wird, kann sich eine breite poli-
tische Akzeptanz und Unterstützung für bodenpolitische Maßnahmen entwickeln
(sekundäre Legitimation).
Für eine solche bodenpolitische Strategie spricht, dass vielfältige politische Zie-
le verfolgt werden können. Von sozialpolitischen Zielen der politischen Linken (u.a.
Inklusion der Armen) über umweltschützerische Belange der Grünen (u.a. Energie-
sparmaßnahmen effektiv umsetzen) bis zu protektionistischen und konservativen
Motiven der politischen Rechten (u.a. langfristige Kosteneinsparnisse). Hauptar-
gument gegen eine solche Strategie ist aber die Haltung, dass Wohnbedürfnisse
203
Die Wohnungsfrage ist eine Bodenfrage 57
auch ausschließlich über den Markt geregelt werden können. Problematisch ist
auch, dass vor allem eigentumsbasierte Lösungen wie der Kauf von Bauland ent-
sprechende Finanzmittel benötigen, deren politische Zweckmäßigkeit und ökono-
mischer Ertrag sich erst deutlich später einstellen. Die politische Herausforderung
besteht also darin, diesen Teufelskreis zwischen primärer und sekundärer Legiti-
mation zu durchbrechen: Sekundäre Legitimation für eine aktive kommunale bo-
denpolitische Strategie kann sich nur einstellen, wenn primäre Legitimation dafür
vorhanden ist. Diese kann aber nur in spezifischen windows of opportunity erhöht
werden, beispielsweise bei grundsätzlich geführten Debatten zum Thema Eigen-
tum oder Enteignung, wie z. B. in Berlin im Frühjahr 2019.
In der Schweiz ergreifen aktuell viele Gemeinden aufgrund dieser fehlenden
primären Legitimation für starke bodenpolitische Instrumente zugunsten des
preisgünstigen Wohnraums im Bestand (z. B. Mehrwertausgleich, Enteignung)
insbesondere diejenigen Maßnahmen, welche private Investoren nicht direkt in
ihrer Handlungs- und Investitionsfreiheit einschränken. In der Planungspraxis
sind dies einerseits Instrumente, welche der Erhöhung des Anteils öffentlichen
Eigentums dienen (z. B. über Landkauf). Diese sind wiederum stark abhängig von
den zur Verfügung stehenden finanziellen Mitteln einer Gemeinde. Andererseits
kommen insbesondere vertragliche Verhandlungen mit Privaten zum Zug. Im
letzteren Fall kann eine Gemeinde beispielsweise im Rahmen einer Sondernut-
zungsplanung dem Investor eine höhere Ausnutzung vertraglich zusichern5, aber
nur, wenn dieser als Gegenleistung der Sicherstellung preisgünstiger Wohnungen
einwilligt. Diese Vorgehensweise erfordert aber strategisches Verhandlungsge-
schick der kommunalen Planungsbehörden, welches wiederum abhängig ist von
den einer Gemeinde zur Verfügung stehenden politischen Ressourcen (Wissen,
Personal, Zeit, Geld etc.) sowie den vorhandenen Entscheidungskompetenzen
(Vollmer/Kadi 2018). Kleinen und mittleren Kommunen stehen diese politischen
Ressourcen kaum bzw. gar nicht zur Verfügung, weswegen preisgünstige Mieten
im Bestand stetig zu schwinden drohen.
Abschließend betrachtet sind einkommensschwache Haushalte bei Verdich-
tung hauptsächlich betroffen von passiv gewählten bodenpolitischen Strategien
der Gemeinden. Aufgrund der Mietpreissteigerung nach Verdichtungsmaßnah-
men haben sie Mühe, eine preisgünstigeWohnung im städtischen Mietwohnungs-
markt zu finden. Sie müssen deshalb an periphere Lagen außerhalb der Stadt aus-
weichen. Der Verlust sozialer (Lebens-)Qualität, tragbarer Mieten und das Risiko
5 Ob eine Sondernutzungsplanung, welche eine Abweichung von der baurechtlichen Grund-
ordnung bewirkt, die Bewilligung des Gemeinderats oder sogar eine kommunale Volksab-
stimmung benötigt, ist kantonal geregelt. Es bestehen in der Praxis diesbezüglich Unter-
schiede zwischen den Kantonen in der Schweiz.
204
58 Gabriela Debrunner, Andreas Hengstermann und Jean-David Gerber
der sozialen Segregation spitzen sich in Schweizer Städten somit zu. Selbst dieje-
nigen Mieter/-innen, welche sich über öffentliche Kundgebungen, Demonstratio-
nen oder Kündigungsanfechtungen gegen Verdichtungs- und Aufwertungsmaß-
nahmen im Mietwohnungssektor wehren, müssen aufgrund stark geschützter Ei-
gentumsrechte und schwacher Mietrechte in der Schweiz ihre Wohnungen – über
kurz oder lang – verlassen.
Dieser Artikel leistet einen Beitrag zur Frage, wie eine soziale Wohnraumver-
sorgung zugunsten der Inklusion einkommensschwacher Mieter/-innen durch ei-
ne dauerhafte Eindämmung von Boden- und Mietpreissteigerung im profitorien-
tierten Wohnungsmarkt gelingen kann. Das Spektrum der in der Schweiz vorhan-
denen bodenpolitischen Instrumente wurde aufgezeigt und deren sozio-politische
Herausforderungen bei der Umsetzung diskutiert.
Literatur
Aalbers, Manuel (2017): »The variegated financialization of housing«, in: Interna-
tional Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Symposium, S. 542-554.
Balmer, Ivo/Gerber, Jean-David (2017): »Why are housing cooperatives successful?
Insights from Swiss affordable housing policy«, in: Housing Studies Heft 33, S.
361-85.
Bundesämter für Sozialversicherungen & Wohnungswesen (BSV & BWO) (2015):
Wohnungsversorgung in der Schweiz –Bestandsaufnahme über Haushalte von
Menschen in Armut und prekären Lebenslagen, Bern.
Buitelaar, Edwin/Needham, Barrie (2007): »Property Rights and Private Initiatives:
An introduction Exploring alternatives to customary land use planning«, in:
The Town Planning Review Heft 78, S. 1-8.
Bundesamt fürWohnungswesen (BWO) (2014): Wohnungspolitischer Dialog Bund,
Kantone und Städte Zwischenbericht der Arbeitsgruppe, Bern.
Bundesamt für Wohnungswesen (BWO) (2016a): Bericht Energetische Gebäudesa-
nierungen im Mietwohnungsbereich, Bern.
Bundesamt für Wohnungswesen (BWO) (2016b): Wohnungspolitischer Dialog
Bund, Kantone und Städte Zwischenbericht der Arbeitsgruppe, Bern.
Bundesamt fürWohnungswesen (BWO) (2017): GemeinnützigesWohnen im Fokus.
Ein Vergleich zu Miete und Eigentum. Grenchen, Schweiz.
Davy, Benjamin (2005): »Grundstückswerte, Stadtumbau und Bodenpolitik«, in:
vhw Forum Wohneigentum Nr. 2, S. 67-72.
Deleja-Hotko, Vera/Fichtner, Ullrich/Friedmann, Jan et al. (2019): »Enteignungsde-
batte: So leiden die Deutschen unter den hohen Wohnkosten«, in: Spiegel on-
line vom 12.04.2019. https://www.spiegel.de/plus/wie-deutschland-unter-den-
205
Die Wohnungsfrage ist eine Bodenfrage 59
hohen-wohnkosten-leidet-a-00000000-0002-0001-0000-000163403845 (letz-
ter Zugriff am 01.09.2019).
Gennaio, Maria-Pia/Hersperger, Anna M./Bürgi, Matthias (2009): »Containing ur-
ban sprawl-evaluating effectiveness of urban growth boundaries set by the
Swiss Land Use Plan«, in: Land Use Policy Heft 26, S. 224-232.
Gerber, Jean-David (2019): »Aktive Bodenpolitik zur preisgünstigenWohnraumver-
sorgung«, in: Publikation IBA_Wien 2022, unveröffentlicht.
Gerber, Jean-David/Nahrath, Stéphane/Hartmann, Thomas (2017): »The strate-
gic use of time-limited property rights in land-use planning: Evidence from
Switzerland«, in: Environment and Planning A Heft 49, S. 1684-703.
Hartmann, Thomas/Spit, Tejo (2015): »Dilemmas of involvement in land manage-
ment – Comparing an active (Dutch) and a passive (German) approach«, in:
Land Use Policy Heft 42, S. 729-737.
Hengstermann, Andreas (2018): Von passiver Bodennutzungsplanung zu aktiver
Bodenpolitik – Eine Fallstudie zur Wirksamkeit von bodenpolitischen Instru-
menten anhand von Lebensmittel-Discountern, Bern: Springer.
Hengstermann, Andreas/Gerber, Jean-David (2015): »Aktive Bodenpolitik – Eine
Auseinandersetzung vor dem Hintergrund der Revision des eidgenössischen
Raumplanungsgesetzes«, in: Flächenmanagement und Bodenordnung, S. 241-
250.
Hood, Christopher C. (1983): The tools of government, London: Macmillan educa-
tion.
Hood, Christopher C./Margetts, Helen Z. (2007): The tools of government in the
digital age, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Knoepfel, Peter/Larrue, Corinne/Hill,Michael/Varone, Frédéric (2011): Public policy
analysis, Bristol: Policy Press.
Lawson, Julie (2009): »The Transformation of Social Housing Provision in Switzer-
land mediated by Federalism, Direct Democracy and the Urban/Rural Divide«,
in: European Journal of Housing Policy Heft 9(1), S. 45-67.
Maissen, Flurin (2018): »Massenkündigungen von Mietwohnungen nehmen
zu«, in: Swiss Radio and Television am 20.11.2018. https://www.srf.-
ch/news/schweiz/rendite-um-jeden-preis-massenkuendigungen-von-miet-
wohnungen-nehmen-zu (letzter Zugriff am 22.07.2019).
Marcuse, Peter (1998): »Sustainability is not enough«, in: Environment and Urban-
ization Heft 10(2), S. 103-112.
Nebel, Reto/Hollenstein, Karin/Di Carlo, Giovanni/Niedermaier, Mathias/Scholl,
Bernd (2017): Schweizweite Abschätzung der Nutzungsreserven 2017, Zürich:
ETH University.
Needham, Barrie (2007): Dutch Land Use Planning: Planning and Managing Land
Use in the Netherlands, the Principles and the Practice, Den Haag: Sdu.
206
60 Gabriela Debrunner, Andreas Hengstermann und Jean-David Gerber
Needham, Barrie (2014): Dutch land-use planning: The Principles and the Practice,
Garnham/Surrey, UK: Ashgate.
Rawls, John (2005): A theory of justice, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Rérat, Patrick (2012): »The new demographic growth of cities: the case of reurban-
isation in Switzerland«, in: Urban Studies Heft 49, S. 1107-25.
Saglie, Inger-Lise (1998): Density and Town Planning: Implementing a Densifica-
tion Policy. Oslo: The Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research.
Schönig, Barbara/Rink, Dieter/Gardemin, Detlef/Holm, Andrej (2017): »Paradig-
menwechsel in der kommunalen Wohnungspolitik? Variationen kommunali-
sierter Wohnungspolitik im transformiertenWohlfahrtsstaat«, in: Marlon Bar-
behön/Sybille Münch (Hg.), Variationen des Städtischen –Variationen lokaler
Politik. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, S. 25-62.
Schweizer Bundesrat (2017): Verdichtetes Bauen in Ortszentren fördern, aber wie?
Bericht des Bundesrates in Erfüllung des Postulats von Graffenried 14.3806 vom
24. September 2014, Bern.
Schweizer Bundesrat (2018): SchweizerOrtsbilder erhalten Bericht des Bundesrates
in Erfüllung des Postulates, Bern.
Stone, Michael E. (2006): »What is housing affordability? The case of the residual
income approach«, in: Housing Policy Debate Heft 17(1), S. 151-184.
United Nations (2016): Habitat III – United Nations Conference on Housing and
Sustainable Urban Development, Quito.
Vollmer, Lisa/Kadi, Justin (2018): »Wohnungspolitik in der Krise des Neoliberalis-
mus in Berlin und Wien. Postneoliberaler Paradigmenwechsel oder punktuelle
staatliche Beruhigungspolitik?«, in: PROKLA. Zeitschrift für Kritische Sozial-
wissenschaft Heft 191, S. 247-264.
207
Die Wohnungsfrage ist eine Bodenfrage 61
Anhang: Tabelle 1 – Bewertung kommunaler bodenpolitischer Instrumente
zur Sicherstellung des preisgünstigen Wohnraums im Bestand in Schweizer
Städten entlang der vier ausgewählten Kriterien – Wirksamkeit, Kosten
(kurzfristig), Kostenersparnisse (langfristig) und soziale Gerechtigkeit.
Anmerkung: Die Tabelle gibt Auskunft darüber, welche der vorhandenen Instrumente, die
gewünschte Wirkung – nämlich den Erhalt preisgünstigen Wohnraums im Bestand – unter
Berücksichtigung des Gemeindehaushalts und der sozialenGerechtigkeit erzielen können und
welche nicht (Die Beurteilungen basieren auf der Auswertung folgender Quellen und Inter-
views: Schweizerischer Städteverband 2013; BWO 2014, 2016a; Schweizer Bundesrat 2017,
2018 und Expert/-innen-Gespräche).
 
* ISOS steht für »Inventar schützenswerter Ortsbilder« in der Schweiz von nationaler Be-
deutung. Das ISOS ist im Schweizerischen Natur- und Heimatschutzgesetz (NHG, SR 451)
verankert und verfolgt u.a. das Ziel, schützenswerte Ortsbilder vor Abriss und Neubau zu
schützen.
 
** Bei der »Objekthilfe« werden nicht einzelne Grundeigentümer/-innen, sondern einzelne
Gebäude unterstützt. In der Regel erfolgt diese Unterstützung durch öffentlich subventionier-
te Darlehen und rückzahlbare Zuschüsse von Baukosten mit Zinssubventionen. Die Eigentü-
merschaft ist damit verpflichtet, die Mietpreise den entsprechenden Einsparungen anzupas-
sen. Um diese Förderkonditionen nutzen zu können, müssen gemeinnützige Wohnbauträger
in der Schweiz Mitglied in einer der zwei Dachorganisationen – »Wohnbaugenossenschaften
Schweiz« und »Wohnen Schweiz« – sein und sich zu den Prinzipien der Kostenmiete bekennen
(Bekenntnis zur Charta der gemeinnützigen Wohnbauträger in der Schweiz). Diese beiden
Dachorganisationen verwalten gemeinsam den vom Bund finanzierten »fonds de roulement«
(gemäß nationalemWohnraumförderungsgesetz WFG). Nur so können die gemeinnützigen
Wohnbauträger von der Trägerförderung des Bundes profitieren und objektbezogene Subven-
tionsleistungen beantragen (Balmer/Gerber 2017; Gerber 2019)
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